# DA – Turkey / NATO Unity – MNDI AHP

### Notes

#### Thanks to other labs for link evidence that we included in this file – including Khirn and Tim Alderete.

#### Thanks to Bennett, Nina, Alex, Dora, Aiman, TJ, Lilian, Hannah, Evelina and Yechen who worked hard to complete this file.

#### You should not read both of these arguments separately in the 1nc because there is a lot of overlap in terms of links and internal links. If you have a specific link that Turkey would oppose the plan, I would recommend reading that version. In either case, the links and internal links from the other could be used to strengthen the overriding thesis that a strong, unified, and expanding NATO is necessary to effectively deter Russia.

#### Time did not permit us to develop this file as fully as we wanted. Here are some suggestions for supplementing it in the future:

* Expand the link section – this is very important because many affirmatives will utilize their solvency or “say yes” evidence to demonstrate that the plan is popular and possibly improves unity with NATO. Even if all NATO states eventually support the plan, you could develop a link around the diplomatic capital, concessions or horse-trading that the U.S. or other member states would have to do in order to reach consensus
* Find more reasons why it is good to include Finland and Sweden in NATO outside of deterring Russia. This would give the disad an impact external to many affirmatives.
* Both arguments could become net benefits to consultation counterplans.

### 1nc DA NATO Unity

#### Ensuring Russian strategic failure in Ukraine is the U.S. goal BUT it’s not a guarantee and requires full cooperation and unity of allies to make adjustments to strategy and posture

McPartland, 22 --- assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (May 11, 2022, Connor, “How can the US and NATO help bring about Russia’s ‘strategic failure’ in Ukraine?” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-can-the-us-and-nato-help-bring-about-russias-strategic-failure-in-ukraine/>, JMP)

With Ukraine having repelled Russian forces near Kyiv, the Kremlin’s war of aggression has entered a new phase: a more limited offensive in eastern Ukraine. As the United States and its transatlantic allies and partners formulate fresh strategies for what will likely be a protracted conflict, there are several factors they must consider, senior officials and experts said at a recent Atlantic Council event.

The US objective is Russian “strategic failure”—militarily, politically and economically— US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said at the May 2 conference, titled “Priorities for the NATO Summit and Security in Europe.” That would involve in the long term “holding the Russian leadership to account in front of its own population and in front of the global stage,” she said. Wallander’s comments expanded on US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s recent statement that the United States “want[s] to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.”

What Russian accountability will look like is unclear at this point. However, US Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), speaking at the conference, argued that the United States has to “look ahead to a regime change before we could ever have anything in the way of a productive working relationship with Russia,” and describing Russian President Vladimir Putin as “not fit to serve.”

At the same time, Michael Kofman, research program director at the Russia Studies Program of CNA, cautioned against treating Russia’s comprehensive strategic failure in the war as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the “trend lines favor Ukraine,” he said. However, changes in Russia’s tactics such as full mobilization could lead to a longer, more drawn-out conflict, Kofman added, addressing the event ahead of the NATO summit scheduled for late June.

The United States and NATO must not learn the wrong lessons from the war, he said. The Russian military, despite taking a beating so far, still presents a real threat. “I’m worried that I’m going to have to spend a lot of years now arguing that [the Russian military] isn’t four feet tall,” said Kofman. When it comes to new defense investments, Alliance members should also avoid relying on broad conclusions about the effectiveness of capabilities in Ukraine, warned former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen (Ret.) James Cartwright.

The United States and NATO allies need to continue and expand their supply of ammunition and heavier artillery weapons that have been a key part of Ukrainian battlefield success against Russia, according to Kofman. Yet, nations supplying Ukraine must also take care that they do not deplete their own stocks of critical weapons systems too much, with the pipeline to produce and replace advanced weapons sent to Ukraine being “quite narrow” in many cases, as described by Kofman. The United States can play a critical role here as the “arsenal of democracy,” harking back to the role it played in World War II, some speakers suggested. US Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) said that the United States was “going to have to look at ramping up production… to make sure that all of our allies have what they need” to supply Ukraine while maintaining their own supplies.

The Alliance will also need to make major adjustments to its strategy and posture in Eastern Europe, speakers said. Already, allies have shifted significant forces further east, making NATO’s conventional deterrence “the strongest that it has been… in our lifetimes” according to US Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin. Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Gen (Ret.) Philip M. Breedlove added that NATO has to be ready to “seize the moment” and “move readiness and capability forward” in Europe. More ready and capable forces, including persistent, rotational US deployments to Eastern Europe will help move NATO from a deterrence by punishment posture to deterrence by denial, making it harder for any future Russian attack to take and hold NATO territory.

NATO will also move to finalize its new Strategic Concept this summer, the first new guiding strategy for the Alliance since 2010. “The 2022 edition will definitely be the most challenging,” said Alexander Vershbow, Atlantic Council distinguished fellow, former NATO deputy secretary general, and former US ambassador to Russia. Vershbow agreed with Breedlove, saying that the Strategic Concept should revamp NATO’s defense and deterrence posture by shifting more forces forward. Many of these forces, if and when they are deployed, will go to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—frontline nations that are some of the Alliance’s most vulnerable members. These countries have long been advocates for increased allied presence in the region. Speaking at the conference, Lithuanian Minister of National Defense Arvydas Anušauskas highlighted increased spending by the country on facilities to enable it to host larger numbers of allied forces in the future.

Throughout the discussion, panelists emphasized that the conflict and the new strategic circumstances that Russia has created in Europe will shape the security dynamic there for the foreseeable future, and the Untied States and its allies in NATO will need to remain focused and united to adapt to this challenge and ensure Russia meets strategic failure. In the words of Michael Kofman, “Security in Europe is an unfinished business, and to me this conflict reflects that.”

#### This unity is not guaranteed and takes a lot of work and active diplomacy to sustain

Wormuth, 22 --- Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense (June 2, 2022, Christine Wormuth, moderated by Vivian Salama who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal “NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/>, JMP)

VIVIAN SALAMA: President Biden has repeatedly made it clear that there are not going to be boots on the ground in this conflict so long as it’s isolated within Ukraine’s borders. Something I heard repeatedly while I was there is that military leaders and the president’s office even are concerned that as this conflict increasingly becomes prolonged, momentum to assist, to keep on fueling them with weapons, with assistance, with other kinds of training, could start to wane and especially when we have our own domestic priorities to worry about.

And so how do you see the US sustaining this level of support for Ukraine in a way that could actually make a difference in embattled regions like the Donbas, which is suffering significantly right now?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think—you know, I think the administration has done, frankly, an admirable job, you know, helping the alliance come together and have the very, very strong unified position that we’ve had against the Russian invasion, and I think we’ll continue to see that unity, frankly. It will take work. I know from my own experience, you know, back in 2014 and 2015 it takes a lot of active diplomacy to be able to sustain that alliance unity. But I think, you know, all of the NATO countries see what is at stake, frankly, in what’s happening, and that alone, I think, is an incentive for us to maintain unity. I think, you know, in a practical way, we are looking—you know, certainly in the Department of Defense and in the Army—at how—you know, what do we need to be doing to allow us to continue to sustain the kind of lethal assistance that we’re providing to the Ukrainians? And that’s why we’ve signed contracts to replenish our Stingers and replenish our Javelins. You know, we have really leaned into trying to provide, you know, everything that the policymakers deem essential to get to the Ukrainians, and, you know, we have taken some risk to our own readiness, not an unacceptable level of risk at all. But I think we will continue to do that, and I think, you know, again, we can’t take that unity for granted, but I think the NATO countries know what’s at stake.

VIVIAN SALAMA: Where does the US draw the line? I mean, we’re hearing a lot these days, and I was hearing it in Ukraine, about multiple-launch rocket systems and other long-range rocket systems that they so desperately need; the US has sort of wavered on this a little bit in recent weeks, and so, you know, a lot of reporting that it’s going to be announced this week. Can you tell us, you know, where the US stands as far as those types of systems getting into the hands of Ukrainian fighters?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think where the US stands is, you know, wanting to provide all of the assistance that we can to the Ukrainians without escalating the situation to a point where, you know, the war spills over or, frankly, you know, goes in a terrible direction. I mean, there’s been, you know, discussion about if Putin starts to feel cornered, you know, would he lash out? Would he contemplate using chemical weapons, for example, or even, you know, more horrifically, potentially some sort of a tactical nuclear demonstration? So I think, you know, we in the administration have to very prudently measure those risks, you know, and to think very carefully about, you know, how can we best, again, give the Ukrainian military what they need? We are in, obviously, a grinding artillery battle right now that I think—you know, it’s going to be more challenging, frankly, to sustain the morale of the Ukrainian forces, you know, given the bombardment that they’re being subject to. But again, you know, we cannot allow this war to escalate. Then I think you will see—if you want to talk about concerns to NATO unity, concerns for the American support for this conflict, if it escalates, I think that unity will be much more challenging to sustain.

#### \*\*\*Insert Specific Link\*\*\*

#### Disagreements spillover and tube cooperation on an entire NATO program

Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis

NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38

While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40

The question for allies is what must the role of the Alliance be in reinforcing its core values when they are under assault from within. NATO is both a political and a military alliance. It is not enough to be bound together by a commitment only to Article 5 collective defense. The values in the Treaty and the adherence of NATO allies to those values is fundamental for Alliance cohesion. That shared commitment to values in turn makes credible the Article 5 commitment. The Washington Treaty is binding for both its political and military commitments.41 Allies cannot ignore the failure to abide by political commitments including values and expect military commitments to be unaffected. In short, NATO allies should not expect that they could violate democratic values without consequences, while resting assured that NATO cohesion is intact and other commitments in the Treaty will be upheld. The Treaty is not a menu of options from which allies can select some obligations while ignoring others.

The NATO Treaty has no provision for policing members that drift from common political values, unlike the European Union Treaty’s Chapter 7 that has been invoked recently toward several EU member states with some success.42 While it would be impossible to achieve consensus to impose penalties on wayward allies, given that the ally in question could veto any penalties, a range of escalating political initiatives on the part of the Secretary General and a coalition of the other allies could assert pressure. As a start, the Secretary General should express concern in his bilateral meetings with the anti-democratic governments, with the support of key allies and in partnership with the European Union. To increase awareness within the Alliance and among the public, foreign ministers could review annually indicators of democracy for all twenty-nine allies, perhaps prepared by an informal high-level group of experts drawing on Freedom House data. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and coalitions of allies can amplify the message.43 To increase pressure, NATO could suspend hosting of visits, official meetings and even military exercises with these nations. In severe cases, NATO infrastructure spending and even access to military schools and information sharing could be affected. An indirect way to express concern among allies is to increase the prominence of core democratic values when considering NATO enlargement decisions in the future.44 None of these steps is without political cost and risk, even if calibrated carefully. But the costs and risks of the gradual erosion of Alliance cohesion as member states drift from the founding values are even greater. NATO cannot expect to remain coherent and relevant and able to address the full range of challenges it faces, if it ignores the internal drift from democracy within some member states. This drift is a fundamental issue for the Alliance.45

Streamlining NATO Decision-Making

Finally, the challenges facing NATO today demand more flexibility in executive decision-making. As a core principle in preserving NATO cohesion, consensus decision-making must remain the basis for major NATO actions.46 The Treaty requirements for consensus on collective defense decisions (Article 5) and enlargement decisions (Article 10) remain sensible. Major policy decisions like the Defense Investment Pledge or the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force rapid reaction capabilities require consensus. But today with NATO enlarged to twenty-nine members and facing increasingly diverse and complex challenges, it is time to consider how other, more routine, administrative decisions can be taken more efficiently. But this should be a management function, not derogation from the consensus principle.

We recommend strengthening the Secretary General’s role as the chief executive of the Alliance with broader authority to carry out routine business without seeking consensus among the twenty-nine members. For example, the Secretary General should consult allies on matters such as agendas and timings of Ministerial Council meetings, but not be required to seek consensus agreement. Today the agenda and even the dates of a Foreign Minister meeting or a NATO-Russia Council meeting can consume hours of formal Council time seeking consensus at the ambassadorial level, consuming headquarters’ bandwidth and crowding out more substantive and urgent topics, including many outlined in this paper. Further, the Secretary General’s flexibility on international staff personnel changes and NATO budget matters should be increased. Today, for example, the Secretary General is severely constrained from adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges by making meaningful shifts in personnel and budgetary resources.47 While nations will continue to want a critical role in all these decisions, criteria should be developed that will provide for more flexibility while ensuring that all allies gain a fair share of opportunities and allocation of resources.

A related problem is the tendency of some allies to bring into the Alliance bilateral issues that impede progress on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might hold up agreement on the entire NATO military exercise program because of an unrelated bilateral dispute with a NATO partner who wishes to participate in an exercise.48 This practice erodes Alliance cohesion and should not be permitted. After appropriate consultation, we recommend the Secretary General should have the authority to exclude such external issues from consideration in the Alliance, even if it means moving forward without full consensus.

#### Maintaining unity through enhanced consultation with allies prevents a wider European conflict that will wreck the international order --- perceived differences will be exploited by Putin

* U.S.-Russian proxy conflict will undermine Mutually Assured Destruction
* Spurs a new wave of nuclear proliferation

Graham, 22 – cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University [Thomas, March 08, 2022, “Preventing a Wider European Conflict”, <https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-wider-european-conflict>, acc 6/18/22, NB]

Introduction

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now underway could quite plausibly precipitate a wider conflict in Europe. The United States is focused primarily on raising the costs to Russia with punishing sanctions and reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies neighboring Russia of its commitment to collective defense. Less attention has been given to containing the war to Ukraine and preventing its escalation into a broader European conflict.

The stakes are enormous. The ripple effects of a wider conflict in Europe would spread across the globe, stressing the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations of the international order the United States has fashioned and underwritten since the end of the Second World War. It would test the resilience of the U.S. global system of alliances, the international financial system, global energy markets, arms control regimes, and global institutions in the face of ever more violent great power competition. No region of the world would be spared, although developments on the Eurasian supercontinent, the other locus of world power and economic might outside North America, would bear the gravest consequences for U.S. interests.

The Contingency

The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity.

The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals.

As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense.

To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack.

A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support.

A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response.

The U.S. and NATO response to Russian actions will impact Moscow’s decisions on the conduct of the conflict. Both a weak response and an excessively harsh one could lead to escalation. In the first case, Moscow could be tempted to press militarily even further into Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin has demanded that NATO withdraw its forces back to the lines they held in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and the first wave of post−Cold War expansion remained in the future. His remarks announcing the start of hostilities against Ukraine hinted at a broader effort to restore Russia’s control over all of the former Soviet Union. That could include military action against the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, through which Moscow could try to carve out a land corridor to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. NATO would have little choice but to provide military aid to those states if it did not want to forfeit its role as the central pillar of European security.

Crippling sanctions, meanwhile, could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence. If Putin felt cornered, he could escalate the conflict either horizontally to other countries or vertically to the nuclear level in a desperate effort to save himself, his regime, and, in his mind, Russia itself. And he could find considerable public support for such a reaction. Already, some Russians believe that U.S. and EU sanctions are aimed not simply at the leaders behind the war but, by cratering the economy, at all Russians.

Warning Indicators

As is the case with the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s intentions will remain ambiguous. The indicators of an approaching escalation in the conflict beyond Ukraine are likely to fall into three categories.

The first indicators that political and military conditions are increasing the risk of broader conflict include a breakdown in channels of communication with Moscow. The absence of active diplomatic ties would preclude a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. An end to U.S.-Russian military-to-military channels would undermine any effort to avoid direct military conflict between the two countries. Another indicator would be major insurgent successes that dramatically increase Russian casualties. Moscow would be tempted to move more aggressively against insurgent safe havens rather than capitulate on what it considers to be its vital interest in Ukraine.

Second are the indicators that Moscow is preparing for a broader conflict, which it would undoubtedly argue had been forced by Western actions. Such signs include Kremlin efforts to prepare the Russian public for a wider conflict, which could entail official statements, greater media focus on escalating Western “aggression,” an increased pace of civil defense drills, and mobilization of reserves. Another indicator includes the massing of Russian forces in the Baltic region. It could include such moves as aggressive hybrid actions to destabilize Poland and the Baltic states, coupled with efforts to rally indigenous ethnic Russian communities against their governments.

Third are the indicators that Moscow is intentionally seeking to widen the conflict. This could include greater support for Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, such as diplomatic and financial backing, and provision of weapons. They could also encourage Serb leaders to more assertively pursue their grievances against Kosovo.

Implications for the United States

A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. It would test the durability of its global system of alliances and the efficacy of international regimes and institutions that have guarded world peace, security, and prosperity. The challenge would come at a time when the United States itself is in immense disarray, as a deeply polarized polity confronts massive domestic problems—the pandemic, inflation, racial justice, and cultural wars—that leave less time and fewer resources for foreign matters. The United States will be tested to see whether it can muster the will, energy, and creativity to execute an effective policy toward the unfolding crisis in Europe.

At home, public attention has been focused on developments in and around Ukraine, but the Joe Biden administration cannot ignore the home front. In response to U.S.-levied sanctions, Russia can be expected to step up its cyber operations against the United States. It will more actively sow disinformation, seek to exacerbate domestic tensions, and paralyze critical infrastructure. The severity of the attacks will likely rise in proportion to the harshness of the sanctions Washington levies on Moscow.

Abroad, the fate of the transatlantic community, a central pillar of U.S. security and prosperity, would be a stake. One of the Biden administration’s priorities, as laid out in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021, is repairing U.S. alliances—especially with Europe—after four disruptive years under President Donald Trump. Although relations are more cordial, significant substantive differences remain and the willingness of allies to align behind a common purpose for the long haul remains questionable.

The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO, as will most likely be the case. Putin will seek to exploit divisions through differentiated levels of pressure on NATO members, targeted energy cutoffs, offers of negotiation, and the like to advance two long-standing Russian goals: the end of NATO as a collective defense organization and the erosion of the foundations of the EU. Should he succeed, the new order that would emerge in Europe is far from certain. But Russia would undoubtedly play a central role in its formulation, and almost any conceivable new order would diminish the power and role of the United States on the continent.

A similar situation obtains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration spent 2021 bolstering relations with its allies and partners—energizing the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), and cutting a submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia—to meet the growing strategic challenge posed by China. A major, prolonged European distraction could undo further efforts to pivot to Asia, raise doubts among allies and partners about the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and free China to pursue its objectives with greater vigor. The United States could avoid this outcome by pursuing lesser goals in Europe—leading to the quicker development of a new order less favorable to American interests—or by a massive buildup of its military capabilities that would enable it to play a major, perhaps decisive, role in both regions. The latter would have to come at the cost of the Biden administration’s domestic priorities. Whether the Biden administration could muster sufficient domestic political support, if it decided to move in this direction, is far from certain.

In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war.

Likewise, a broader conflict in Europe would stress, perhaps to the breaking point, the United Nations and many of its auxiliary organizations. Already stymied by a growing rift between the Western permanent members and Russia and China, the Security Council would have failed in its primary reason for being—to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe. It could continue to exist as a forum for the airing of grievances and acrimonious debate, but it would serve little purpose as a platform for addressing major global issues.

Finally, the humanitarian costs of a wider conflict in Europe would be staggering, particularly given the destructiveness of modern weapons. Beyond the physical destruction and loss of life, untold numbers of refugees would flow across borders not only into Central East Europe but perhaps further West depending on the scale of the fighting. The strain on the socioeconomic systems—coming on top of the stress of the two-year-old pandemic, economic dislocation, and mounting inflation—could bring some close to collapse.

Preventive Options

U.S. policy toward Russia has traditionally been a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration deployed both as it tried to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine. Both have a role to play in reducing the risk of a wider European conflict, now that Russia has invaded.

Many of the steps that the Biden administration is now taking to counter Russia could be accelerated and expanded to deter it from expanding its military operations beyond that country. They would likely prove more effective due to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee, which does not apply to Ukraine. The Biden administration could:

* With its NATO allies, accelerate and expand its current augmentation of forces in vulnerable allies along the frontier with Russia to reassure them—and convince Moscow—of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense.
* Step up its already intensive schedule of consultations with allies to maintain alliance unity in the face of a burgeoning Russian threat.
* Develop a long-term plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported Russian gas, building on the stopgap measures it is already putting in place to deal with a near-term decision by Moscow to stop flows of gas westward.
* *Consider cutting off energy imports from Russia, and asking the Europeans to do the same, but only after it has prepared the American public for the economic hardship (rising energy costs, inflation) such a step would entail.*
* *Accelerate efforts to harden American and allied critical infrastructure against cyber intrusions*.

### 1nc DA NATO Expansion

#### Turkey can still be convinced to support NATO expansion but it will need to cajoled and persuaded --- Erdogan needs to demonstrate a strong standing with voters in the lead up to the election

Aydıntaşbaş, 22 --- Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (16 May 2022, Asli Aydıntaşbaş, “Turkey, NATO, and the Ukraine war: Why Erdogan’s grievances are about more than Sweden and Finland; The Turkish president is unlikely to veto Nordic membership of NATO – but Turkey’s bigger strategic worry is of a NATO-Russia conflict arising out of the war in Ukraine,” <https://ecfr.eu/article/turkey-nato-and-the-ukraine-war-why-erdogans-grievances-are-about-more-than-sweden-and-finland/>, JMP)

Just when NATO members were about to pop the champagne in celebration of Finland’s and Sweden’s applications to join the alliance, the buzz-kill dropped: Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared on Friday that he looks unfavourably on the duo becoming members.

“We are following developments. We currently do not have a positive [favourable] position on the issue of Sweden and Finland [joining NATO],” Erdogan told reporters after Friday prayers in Istanbul. “Scandinavian countries are like terrorist groups’ guesthouses,” he continued, referring to the presence in Sweden of exiled Gulenists and sympathisers of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – which Ankara views as a terrorist organisation that has tentacles in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.

This was an obstacle in an otherwise well-choreographed Nordic march into NATO. Was Erdogan trying to put pressure on the US Congress for those F-16s that Ankara wants to purchase? Was this really about more money for Syrian refugees in Turkey? Or did he really want Gulenists or PKK sympathisers extradited to Turkey?

By Monday, Turkish officials had started floating the idea that they wanted Sweden and Finland to show that they had stopped “supporting terrorists” and lift export bans on Turkey.

It is unlikely that Erdogan had one specific policy goal in mind, but he will no doubt be expecting to be cajoled, persuaded, and eventually rewarded for his cooperation, as in the past. Over the weekend, his spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, walked back the idea of a Turkish veto by saying that Ankara was not “closing the door” on Nordic entry, but that it wanted a crackdown on terrorists’ activities in Sweden.

Indeed, Erdogan’s statement was expressed more as a complaint than as a firm veto threat. And it may not be all about Sweden and Finland. The president almost certainly sees this as an opportune moment to air his grievances about existing NATO members, especially with the Biden administration, which has kept the Turkish leader at arm’s length. In the long list of problems between Ankara and Washington, a key item might be Erdogan’s disappointment at being unable to establish the type of presidential telephone line with Joe Biden as he had with Donald Trump. “We had good relations with Obama and Trump and had no problem talking. Have we achieved the same with Mr. Biden? No, we haven’t. That wasn’t what we wanted,” he recently lamented. With dwindling domestic support at a time when Turkey is entering a critical electoral cycle, Erdogan is looking for a higher international profile to demonstrate his global importance to Turkish voters.

Turkey’s leader is a man who wears his emotions on his sleeve – and he almost certainly would have been upset at the recent news that Washington has lifted sanctions on Syria’s Kurdish-controlled (as well as Turkish-controlled) regions, allowing the autonomous Kurdish administration to trade with the outside world. Turkey views the US-allied Kurdish administration in northern Syria, dominated by the Syrian Democratic Forces, as an offshoot of the PKK and a threat on its southern border. It is angry at Western support for Syrian Kurds.

For the past few years, Ankara has criticised NATO for failing to be a reciprocal love-match, a relationship that overlooks Turkey’s security concerns despites the country’s decades of loyalty to the alliance. And there are occasional bouts of friction with NATO partners, most notably with Greece and France over issues such as eastern Mediterranean maritime borders and overflights in the Aegean. The Turkish air force has recently pulled out of a military exercise in Greece and tensions between the two countries are quietly brewing regarding the Aegean.

In addition, Turkey’s position on Nordic entry to NATO is in line with its balancing act between NATO and Russia. While selling armed drones to Kyiv and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, Ankara has been reluctant to sever relations with Moscow and it has stayed away from Western economic sanctions. It may be using this to signal its decoupling from Western actions on Ukraine.

Senior Turkish officials are quietly concerned that the conflict is now turning into a NATO-Russia war and that the risk of escalation is growing, fuelled by greater arms support for Ukraine and the absence of a negotiations framework. They are also disappointed with the West’s reluctance to rally behind Turkish-brokered ceasefire talks. High-level Turkish officials have accused “some NATO countries” of not wanting the war to end in order to harm Russia.

Meanwhile, Sweden is an easy pick for any Turkish leader, but especially one in an alliance with nationalists at home. Swedish foreign policy’s focus on human rights, gender equality, and diversity is almost anathema to the male-dominated, conservative political culture in Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party. Within the European Union, Swedes have championed a human rights-based approach in relations with Turkey – which has annoyed Ankara for years. As the divide between Stockholm and Ankara widened, Turkey’s foreign minister, Mevlüt Cavusoglu, got into a public spat with the Swedish foreign minister Ann Linde in 2020, accusing her of double standards and of lecturing Turkey on human rights. A senior Western diplomat told me that the mood at this weekend’s NATO meeting was similar.

The irony is that Turkey is one of NATO’s oldest members, but, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it has been an enthusiastic champion of enlargement. Turkey has traditionally supported countries that now comprise NATO’s eastern flank – from Poland and Hungary to Albania and North Macedonia – to enter the alliance. It has also developed strong military partnerships with states on the periphery, such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

But that was then, and this is now.

Europe’s strategic landscape is changing fast, and Turkey, increasingly seeing itself as a friendless loner, does not want to be caught in crossfire.

In all likelihood, Erdogan will soften his stance in the coming weeks following pleas from NATO partners. A call from Joe Biden would help, but so too would addressing other issues, such the EU agreeing to expedite the new tranche of its migration deal with Turkey, or lift some of its export restrictions on Turkey’s defence industry.

What would not change is the overall view in Ankara – that this conflict is heading in the wrong direction and that, despite the self-congratulatory mood among NATO partners, the risk of a wider escalation emerging from this grinding war is greater than ever.

#### U.S.-Turkey relations are transactional --- only prioritizing, and compromising through prior consultation can ensure cooperation

Singh & Ulgen, 20 --- \*Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and managing director at The Washington Institute, AND \*\*chairman of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe (Nov 17, 2020, Michael Singh and Sinan Ulgen, “Biden Can’t Avoid Erdogan, But He Can Keep the U.S.-Turkish Relationship on Track,” <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/biden-cant-avoid-erdogan-he-can-keep-us-turkish-relationship-track>, JMP

For all the problems bedeviling their ties, the United States’ and Turkey’s interests will still be better served by cooperation than antagonism. While nostalgia for the U.S.-Turkey alliance of the past would be misguided, so too would be assuming that the only alternative is enmity. For all of the serious disputes dividing them, Americans and Turks share an interest in limiting Russian influence in the region, countering Iranian adventurism, and preventing nuclear and missile proliferation

Yet the reality is that for the foreseeable future, even if the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be stabilized, it will be more transactional than in the past. This will require a greater willingness than exists at present to prioritize, to work out compromises quietly, to consult early to prevent disputes from arising, and to prevent every disagreement from turning into an existential threat to the relationship.

Biden, in his years as a senator and vice president, acquired a reputation for working out behind-the-scenes compromises. Quiet consultation may not be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s usual approach to the West, but the election of a new Democratic U.S. president may give him enough pause to seek the more amicable, workmanlike relationship with Washington that would serve both the United States’ and Turkey’s interests.

#### \*\*\*Insert Specific Link\*\*\*

#### NATO expansion key to European and Asian stability --- limits further invasion in Europe by Russia

Mitchell, 22 – senior advisor for the Russia and Europe Center at USIP [A. Wess, May 26,United States Institute of Peace, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/putins-war-backfires-finland-sweden-seek-join-nato>, Acc 6/23/22, HO]

How would Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accession impact the geopolitics of Europe? Would it ultimately boost European security?

The United States should always be judicious about adding new treaty allies — it’s a serious thing indeed to widen the U.S. global defensive perimeter. In the case of Finland and Sweden, I see the impact as positive; their accession will round off NATO geographically and improve Europe’s defensibility in a crisis. We should be clear that both Sweden and Finland will need to step up defense spending, along with the rest of Europe. But both have serious, professional militaries with specialized capabilities and a long track record of partnering with NATO. Finland has a serious defensive capability, including one of the largest artillery forces in Europe, and nationwide participation in the reserves like the Swiss or Israeli model. Their long border with Russia is dotted with thousands of lakes and is very defensible, as we saw in the 1930s Winter War. Sweden brings significant naval and especially anti-submarine capabilities.

The main positive however is geographic and strategic in nature — bringing these states into NATO will significantly mitigate the alliance’s biggest military vulnerability, which is the exposed geography of the Baltic States. If you look at a map, the Baltic States form an exposed salient in the northeastern corner of the Alliance. It would probably be hard to get reinforcements to them in a crisis. Adding Finland and Sweden to NATO mitigates that vulnerability and makes the Baltic States a much less inviting target. It complicates the Russian theory of victory in the Baltic, which has centered on creating a fait accompli by grabbing a strip of territory and then waiting for NATO to try to get enough troops to the region to evict them. Adding Finland and Sweden to NATO makes the Baltics less isolated, more defensible and easier to support in a crisis, which in turn probably makes Russia less likely to attack them in the first place, and therefore makes war less likely.

NATO accession also removes some unhelpful ambiguity about Finland and Sweden themselves. We saw in 1914 with Belgium how ambiguity about whether and how to defend a neutral can increase the calculation for war on the part of an aggressor. Prior to them joining NATO, how to respond if Russia were to attack one of these two states would have been a difficult question for the United States. That very ambiguity could invite the war we want to avoid. NATO membership removes that ambiguity. It also allows us the incorporation of Finland and Sweden into NATO contingency planning.

Adding these two countries to NATO is also a good thing from the perspective of U.S. global strategy. Washington has to look at Europe not in isolation but alongside the reality of U.S. commitments in the Indo-Pacific. It’s in America’s interest for Europe to be as defensible, uninviting to aggression and defensively capable as possible to assure the stability of Asia as well. To my mind, adding serious, security-minded players like Finland and Sweden to NATO, along with following through on the increased defense commitments that the war has prompted, aids in that goal.

## Uniqueness

### 2nc NATO Unity Now

#### Political unity and interoperability are strong now --- key to deter Russia

Eaton 22 – executive officer and assistant professor of Naval Science for the Navy ROTC Unit serving Rutgers and Princeton Universities [6/22, “NATO, Russia, and Competition for Strategic Influence in the Baltic”, U.S. Naval Institute, https://,www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/june/nato-russia-and-competition-strategic-influence-baltic, access date, 6/19/22 //TJ]

Russia continues to seek to rebuild its influence on the peripheral states where it was once a hegemon. Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrate the threat, and President Vladimir Putin’s own words show the intent. NATO presently acts as an effective shield for allies, with its tremendous political, economic, and conventional advantages over Russia. Despite these strengths, NATO must be mindful that Russia has its own asymmetric advantages in a potential conflict in its near abroad.

NATO has rightly pursued a path to avoid conflict with Russia by maintaining political unity as well as military interoperability and readiness through combined exercises and operations. NATO must continue to maintain that unity and readiness to prevent Russian aggression. Should deterrence fail, swift and credible action to demonstrate collective commitment to NATO defense will be critical to successful defense of the Baltic, and the health of the Alliance as a whole.

#### NATO is working together and strongly supporting Ukraine with resources

Blinken, 22 – US Secretary of State [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-at-a-joint-press-availability/>; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]

We’ll strengthen our relationships with the European Union and with partners in the Indo-Pacific. We will bolster NATO’s budget. And we will renew our Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Of course, the strategic concept will reflect what we are now dealing with, and that is a new security landscape in Europe and President Putin’s decision to launch a senseless war of aggression on Ukraine, now in its fourth month.

The people of Ukraine continue to fight with extraordinary courage and skill and with military, humanitarian, and financial support from the United States and countries around the world, including virtually all of the members of NATO. Just this morning President Biden announced a significant new security assistance package to arm Ukraine with additional capabilities in advanced weaponry, precisely what they need to defend themselves against the ongoing Russian aggression. That includes more advanced rocket systems so that they can strike key targets on the battlefield in Ukraine from longer distances. This is a continuation of a strategy that began even before Russia’s invasion. We moved quickly to send Ukraine significant amounts of weapons and ammunition so that they can repel Russia’s aggression and, in turn, can be in the strongest possible position at any negotiating table that may emerge.

This isn’t only the commitment of the United States. As I said, all NATO Allies remain engaged, aligned, committed to ensuring that Ukraine can protect its sovereignty, its democracy, its independence. Our countries, along with other partners, imposed severe consequences on the Russian Government and its enablers with unprecedented sanctions, export controls, and diplomatic pressure. Together we responded to the humanitarian crisis provoked by Russia’s war of aggression. More than 6 million Ukrainians forced to leave their homeland, many others displaced within Ukraine. Countries across Europe and beyond, including the United States, have welcomed Ukrainians fleeing the violence. And countries worldwide are helping provide essential services to communities close to Ukraine that have taken on the most refugees.

President Putin hoped that his war on Ukraine would divide NATO. Instead, he’s united NATO in support of Ukraine and in defense of its own members. He’s brought countries around the world together to support the fundamental principles of sovereignty and independence. They see what’s happening in Ukraine as a direct result – excuse me, a direct assault on the foundation of their own peace and security. That is why we will continue to stand with a democratic, independent, sovereign Ukraine until this terrible war is over, and for that matter, long after.

NATO will be prepared to face challenges like these with secure cyber defenses, cutting-edge technology, and enhanced partnerships, as I said, with countries around the world. We’ll make sure that we defend every inch of NATO territory. The Allies have reinforced our collective defense posture. Since the war began, we’ve deployed more than 20,000 additional troops to NATO’s eastern flank.

#### US-NATO relations strong – Ukraine war proves unity

Blinken and Stoltenberg, 22 – US Secretary of State and the NATO Secretary General [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-at-a-joint-press-availability/>; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]

And let me just also, if I could, before I turn it over to Jens, I do want to say one thing about the question that you addressed to the Secretary General. Here again, at every stage of this Russian aggression – before the aggression, when it started, and in the months since – at virtually every stage we have heard doubts expressed about what the Alliance would do, what countries would do in terms of support for Ukraine, and whether that was actually going to happen. We have demonstrated that it would, and that it has; concerns and doubts about whether we could really deliver on what we said we would do – massive consequences for Russia’s aggression with unprecedented sanctions. Well, we’ve delivered on that. And I would suggest that there are always going to be stories about differences in any particular moment.

But when it comes to the strategic direction that we have taken together as Allies, as partners, both within Europe and beyond, this, at least in my experience, has been unprecedented in its solidarity in the common determination both to support Ukraine with security assistance, economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, to put extraordinary pressure on Russia to cease its aggression, and to shore up the defenses of our Alliance.

And so, again, I’d invite you to go back, look at the questions that were raised starting last fall. They’ve been answered – then again, when Russia committed the aggression in the first place, and even to this day. And I am very confident that the common purpose that we’ve shown over many months will continue.

SECRETARY GENERAL STOLTENBERG: I can just follow up on that, because what you have seen over the last months is an unprecedented level of unity among NATO Allies and partners in the response to Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine. We have seen that when it comes to the provision of military support, humanitarian support, economic support, but also the – in the way we have seen NATO Allies, partners, the European Union implementing heavy economic sanctions, sanctions we have not seen anything similar to imposed on any major country ever before. So actually, what we have seen is an unprecedented level of unity among NATO Allies and partners.

Of course, these are difficult decisions, hard decisions, and therefore there is a need for consultations, and therefore I would also like to commend the United States for consulting so closely with Allies not only after invasion on the 24th of February, but actually before. The United States consulted closely, Secretary Blinken consulted closely with NATO Allies throughout the autumn. We warned, we shared intelligence. There’s hardly any other military invasion that has been more predicted than this one, and that not least because the United States shared so much intelligence with NATO Allies in the months leading up to the invasion in February.

European allies – of course, as the United States – have imposed sanctions. They have a price also for us. They are hosting millions of refugees. But the alternative not to support Ukraine, that will actually enable President Putin to win. That will be dangerous for all of us, and the price we have to pay will actually be higher than to now invest in the support for Ukraine.

Let me end by saying that President Putin made a strategic mistake. He totally underestimated the strength and the will and the ability of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian armed forces to defend themselves, and he underestimated the unity of NATO and NATO Allies and partners to support Ukraine. And again, what we see is U.S. leadership helping this to happen, both on the political-diplomatic level, but also when it comes to organizing and coordinating the military support through the Support Group for Ukraine.

### 2nc Uniqueness – NATO Expansion

#### Turkey will be motivated to support NATO expansion but it isn’t a sure thing

Engelbrekt, 6/3/2022 --- military expert and professor at the Swedish Defense University in Stockholm (June 03, 2022 05:50 GMT, Interview by Reid Standish of Kjell Engelbrekt, “Interview: What's Next For Finland, Sweden's NATO Bids?” <https://www.rferl.org/a/sweden-finland-nato-bids-interview/31880579.html>, LKK)  
RFE/RL: So do you think NATO is going to be able to declare that Sweden and Finland are on track to become members at the summit, even if they can’t fully accept them then?  
Engelbrekt: As far as we understand, that may be a bit too far in terms of the formal process. But I think there will be some expression of support at the summit. We've seen it already from the U.S. side, and I think there will be more countries also coming out in [support of their applications in] Madrid.  
Perhaps there'll be separate press briefings with basically all European Union countries expressing support, which in turn will put additional pressure on Turkey to back down. So that's what I envisage as the most likely scenario, but I would be surprised if they can resolve this before the summit.  
RFE/RL: To summarize, we shouldn’t assume that this is a done deal?  
Engelbrekt:Done deal is probably putting it a bit too strongly, but I'd expect that this gets resolved later this year.

#### Biden pushing to quickly integrate Finland and Sweden into NATO --- working to assuage concerns from Turkey

Samuels, 22 (05/18/22 11:56 AM ET, Brett, “Biden says he will press Congress, allies on NATO membership for Sweden, Finland,” https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3492842-biden-says-he-will-press-congress-allies-on-nato-membership-for-sweden-finland/, JMP)

President Biden on Monday voiced his support for Finland and Sweden applying to join the NATO alliance and said he would work with Congress and other member nations to “quickly” approve their membership.

“Sweden and Finland have made the important decision to seek NATO membership after thorough and inclusive democratic processes in each country,” Biden said in a statement.

The alliance has become a focal point of international discussion in the months since Russia invaded Ukraine. Article 5 of the NATO treaty states that an attack on one member will be interpreted as an attack on all members, providing some protection for neighboring nations of Ukraine such as Poland.

Others in the region, including Sweden and Finland, have pushed to join the alliance in hopes of providing a stronger defense against the threat of Russian aggression should Moscow choose to expand its offensive.

Both countries have announced in recent days that they are seeking NATO membership, and Biden will host Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson at the White House on Thursday to discuss the issue.

“NATO guarantees the security of 1 billion people in Europe and North America — united by our shared commitment to democratic principles and our vision of peace and prosperity in Europe and around the world. And my commitment to NATO and Article 5 is ironclad,” Biden said.

“While their applications for NATO membership are being considered, the United States will work with Finland and Sweden to remain vigilant against any threats to our shared security, and to deter and confront aggression or the threat of aggression,” the president added, calling the two nations “stalwart partners of the United States.”

The administration is trying to assuage concerns from Turkey, another NATO member that has objected to Sweden and Finland seeking membership in the alliance.

#### Turkey can be convinced to support Finland and Sweden in NATO

Blinken and Stoltenberg, 22 – US Secretary of State and the NATO Secretary General State [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-at-a-joint-press-availability/>; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]

SECRETARY GENERAL STOLTENBERG: On Finland and Sweden, I and my staff, we are in close contact of course with Turkey, an important NATO Ally. And the two countries that have applied for NATO membership, Finland and Sweden, we have met with them and I’m going to convene the meeting in a few days with senior officials and then follow up to ensure that we make progress on the applications of Finland and Sweden to join NATO. My intention is to have this in place before the NATO summit. At the same time, I know that to make progress we need 30 Allies to agree.

Finland and Sweden has made – have made it clear that they are ready to sit down and to address the concerns expressed by Turkey. And all NATO Allies are of course ready to sit down and address those concerns, including the threats posed to Turkey by PKK. And this is terrorist threats, which of course is something we are taking very seriously. We know that no other NATO Ally has suffered more terrorist attacks than Turkey. And Turkey is an important Ally, not least because of its strategic geographic location bordering Iraq and Syria. They have been important in our fight against ISIS, and also Black Sea country, close to Russia.

So all of this makes Turkey an important Ally. When they raise concerns, of course, we sit down and we look into how we can find the united way forward.

MR PRICE: We’ll take a final question from Stefan Asberg of SVT Sweden.

QUESTION: Secretary Blinken, two questions. Specifically what is the U.S. willing to do to facilitate the negotiations between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: Were there two questions?

MR PRICE: Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: I kind of want to ask one a time.

SECRETARY BLINKEN: One at a time. Okay. Thank you. You’ve heard from the secretary general Finland and Sweden are working directly with Turkey. NATO is supporting this effort. The secretary general will bring the parties together. We very much support those efforts. There is a strong consensus within NATO broadly for the rapid accession of Sweden and Finland to the Alliance. I remain very confident that that will happen, that we’re going to move forward. As I’ve said before, this is a process, and in that process, if Allies have concerns, they raise them and then we deal with them. NATO is dealing with them. But in particular, concerns that Turkey has raised directly with Finland and Sweden are being addressed by the Fins and the Swedes with the assistance of NATO. We want to make sure that all Allies have their security concerns taken into account, and that, of course, includes Turkey, but I’m confident this process will move forward.

QUESTION: Are U.S. willing to export fighter jets to Turkey, for instance, to easen up the situation?

SECRETARY BLINKEN: These are separate questions. We have a longstanding and ongoing defense relationship with Turkey as a NATO Ally. And as we have in the past, as we’re doing now, as we will in the future, we’ll continue to work through cases as they arise with regard to systems that Turkey seeks to acquire.

QUESTION: And Secretary Stoltenberg, how confident are you that Turkey will approve Sweden and Finland?

SECRETARY GENERAL STOLTENBERG: I’m confident that we will find a way forward. And I am confident because all Allies agree that NATO enlargement has been a great success, helping to spread democracy, freedom across Europe for decades. And therefore we need to sit down, as we always do when there are different views in NATO, and find a way to go forward together. So this is not the first time in NATO that some Allies expressed concerns, that there are some differences, some disagreements, but we have a long track record in NATO also to be able to overcome those differences and then agree on how to move forward.

### AT: Turkey Won’t Every Support

#### Turkey’s opposition is not insurmountable --- analysts predict they could change their mind

Turak, 22 -- CNBC correspondent (5/17/22, Natasha ‘The stakes here are now massive’: Turkey is threatening to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/will-turkey-block-nato-membership-for-sweden-and-finland.html>) //AB

“The stakes here are now massive,” Timothy Ash, emerging markets strategist at Bluebay Asset Management, said in a note Tuesday. “It feels like a major crisis is looming in Turkey-Western relations over Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid.”

“Other NATO members will be furious with Turkey given the now clear and present danger to Europe presented by Putin in Ukraine,” Ash added. “Turkey will be seen an an unreliable partner. This will leave even more bad blood/faith between the two sides — gone will be any remnants of a Turkish EU accession bid.”

Turkey’s highly strategic Incirlik air base is home to 50 of the U.S.′ tactical nuclear weapons, which some U.S. officials have suggested removing due to increasing tensions with Washington and Ankara in recent years. Those tensions were centered partly on Erdogan’s warming ties with Russian President [Vladimir Putin](https://www.cnbc.com/vladimir-putin/) and its controversial decision to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense system, which saw it kicked out of NATO’s F-35 program.

While Turkey has supported Ukraine by sending it weapons, in particular its lethal Bayraktar drones, and has tried to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv, it has so far refused to join its NATO allies in sanctioning Russia.

Some analysts are skeptical of Erdogan’s tough talk, convinced he won’t actually block the NATO membership bids — rather, they predict he will simply use his country’s leverage to extract concessions and boost his own waning popularity at home.

“Despite its objections, Ankara will not block the countries’ entry into NATO,” analysts at political risk consultancy Eurasia Group wrote in a research note late Monday.

“Erdogan is likely looking for concessions for green-lighting NATO’s expansion, mainly from Sweden. These might include the easing of Stockholm’s bilateral arms embargo on Turkey and some recognition of PKK as a terrorist organization to curtail its fund-raising and recruitment activities,” the note said.

Erdogan’s top foreign policy advisor, Ibrahim Kalin, over the weekend reassured allies by saying in an interview with Reuters: “We are not closing the door. But we are basically raising this issue as a matter of national security for Turkey,” concerning NATO accession for Sweden and Finland.

### AT: Congress Won’t Support NATO Expansion

#### Congress will support Finland and Sweden joining NATO

DESIDERIO 22 – congressional reporter [ANDREW, 05/19/2022, “Senate on track to approve NATO bids of Finland and Sweden” <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/nato-finland-sweden-republicans-russia-00033749>, Acc 6/21/22 ER]

GOP senators who opposed new Ukraine aid are eager to push back on Russian aggression in another way: supporting Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO.

Senators in both parties are already taking steps to fast-track a defense treaty for the two countries’ memberships in the alliance, as the U.S. and its allies look to strengthen their posture against Russia and send a message of unity to Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, both bids are on a glide path to the required two-thirds Senate approval.

According to nearly a dozen interviews with senators, most of the Republicans who opposed new military aid to Ukraine are unlikely to block Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO — further easing the bipartisan push amid concerns that some Republicans were growing uneasy with the U.S. commitment to Europe’s security.

“That’s one of the prices that Putin should pay. … The more the merrier that we get into NATO,” said Sen. Mike Braun (R-Ind.), who was among the 11 conservatives who opposed the $40 billion Ukraine aid package due to the high price tag. “It strengthens them and puts less of a burden on us. I’m for anybody who wants to join.”

“We’ll welcome them both with open arms,” added Sen. Roger Marshall (R-Kan.), who also opposed the aid bill but said he would vote “without hesitation” in favor of their NATO bids.

The two countries’ bids to become the 31st and 32nd members of NATO highlight the irony of Putin’s war in Ukraine: The Russian leader unintentionally hardened the alliance — and possibly expanded it. To drive that message home, Senate Armed Services Chair Jack Reed (D-R.I.) said, “there’s a sense of trying to move very quickly” on the treaty process.

“It needs to happen fast,” added Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.), who traveled to Ukraine last month. “It should be unanimous. It’s important in this moment in history that the United States Senate stands firmly with our NATO allies and those who seek to join NATO.”

#### Several US senators agree that Finland and Sweden joining NATO will help create a stronger alliance

DESIDERIO 22 – congressional reporter [ANDREW, 05/19/2022, “Senate on track to approve NATO bids of Finland and Sweden” <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/nato-finland-sweden-republicans-russia-00033749>, Acc 6/21/22 ER]

“[Sweden and Finland are] in a gray zone right now, and they are rightfully concerned,” said Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.), who chairs the Senate’s NATO Observer Group, in a brief interview. “It’s not that we expect any encroachment of their borders, but there are other things like hybrid warfare that they’re concerned with. Us being there is reassuring to them.”

Even before Russia’s stepped-up aggression in Eastern Europe, there was broad consensus in Washington that NATO is the most successful defensive alliance in history. That Finland and Sweden decided to apply for membership in the 30-member group after decades of neutrality underscores what the West views as the necessity of conveying a united front against threats to the liberal order.

## Top Level Links / Internal Links

### Emerging Tech Link

#### Divergent interests and consensus building structure makes policy changes on technology difficult

Cook and Dowd, 22(5/13/22, Cynthia R. Cook directs the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Defense-Industrial Initiatives She formerly spent 25 years at the RAND Corporation, where she worked on and oversaw a wide range of acquisition studies for components across the U.S. Department of Defense.Anna M. Dowd is a senior international security and defense policy expert, an adjunct at the RAND Corporation, and co-founder of the Digital Innovation Engine. From 2014 to 2020, she served as principal officer and head of industry relations at the NATO Communications and Information Agency. Prior to joining NATO, she was a fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and served as senior policy officer at the European Defense Agency and senior analyst at the Polish Ministry of Defense. “How to Get NATO Forces the Technology They Need.” <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-to-get-nato-forces-the-technology-they-need/>) //AB

In a Feb. 26 Twitter post, Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s vice prime minister and minister for digital transformation, asked the SpaceX chief executive, Elon Musk, to provide Ukraine with Starlink terminals to enable satellite-based communications. In less than 48 hours, Starlink user kits arrived in Ukraine, immediately improving the command-and-control ability of Ukraine’s military.

For those of us who study the NATO acquisition process, it is almost impossible to imagine the alliance identifying a requirement and adopting a solution so quickly, no matter how urgent the circumstances. Among the many challenges would be the alliance’s elaborate, consensus-based governing structure, as well as the divergent interests and funding mechanisms among the 30 member states. This is why, in 2016, the International Board of Auditors concluded that NATO struggles to provide commanders with required capabilities on time and estimated that common-funded capabilities required an average of 16 years from development to delivery.

The complexity of modern weapons systems and the challenges of interoperability mean that any active engagement will lead to the identification of new technical requirements for NATO. The alliance needs the processes and structures in place to rapidly identify these requirements and procure solutions. This includes giving commanders the authority to make decisions without the lengthy consensus-building approach that may be reasonable, if slow, in peacetime but is not effective during war.

First Steps

NATO has previously sought to improve the governance, speed, and efficiency of its capability-delivery process. For example, in 2018 NATO adopted a new governance model for common-funded capabilities. It has undertaken efforts to enhance collaboration between strategic commands (Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium and Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA), called for the exploration of alternative acquisition strategies to support technology development, and created the Office of the Chief Information Officer to accelerate the delivery of computer and information systems. Furthermore, in October 2021 NATO launched the first $1.1 billion Innovation Fund, and last month announced the creation of the first ever Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic to harness cutting-edge technologies as part of the NATO 2030 agenda.

These are valuable steps, but they do not address the fundamental challenge of rapidly acquiring common capabilities. There are still many residual processes where consensus-based control is inherently prioritized over speed, flexibility, innovation, and the deployment of prototypes at the end of their development phases.

NATO leaders recognize the ongoing challenge. In a recent speech to the North Atlantic Council, the supreme allied commander transformation, Gen. Philippe Lavigne, stressed that one of his key priorities is to ensure the timely delivery of new and critical capabilities, adding that “we need to change the rules and make them work for us, not against us.” But NATO leaders cannot fix this alone — the alliance’s 30 member nations are the ones that will have to agree on the solution. Exploring alternatives and getting the allies to agree on a solution will be difficult. It can happen on a NATO-wide basis, or some subset of member nations can take on the challenge and lead the effort, which may then be adopted by others.

What Works

Access to adequate funding is a necessary starting point, and NATO has a track record of funding common capabilities. In 2021, NATO was implementing over 3,000 common-funded projects, worth approximately $17 billion (of which the United States funds about 22 percent). These include providing critical technology that supports the planning and execution of all NATO air operations, and the Air Situation Data Exchange that enhances situational awareness at NATO’s borders with partner nations, including Ukraine.

But the capability-fielding process is still subject to delays, which would be dangerous when addressing needs identified during combat operations. To avoid this, alliance members should commit to providing funds for a rapid-acquisition organization on a preauthorized and discretionary basis, in essence creating a bank account that can be drawn upon when needed. Even if this were a credit line that members committed to, rather than a standing pot of funds, it would limit setbacks caused by the slow and political processes of identifying and appropriating funding.

Ensuring adequate funding is not the only answer. Commanders also need the authority to streamline the identification of urgent needs and a standing mechanism, not an ad hoc approach, that can provide the flexibility and authority to address them. This exists for some alliance members on a national basis. The commander of the Dutch Defense Materiel Organization’s Computer Emergency Response Team, for example, has a pre-authorized budget and the power to expedite acquisitions of up to 500,000 euros for urgent cyber capabilities within 14 days. However, there is no NATO-wide approach.

The U.S. Department of Defense offers a variety of acquisition approaches that NATO could draw from. The United States has a model where the military services are largely responsible for acquiring weapon systems and providing them to the joint force commanders. There are also several Department of Defense organizations that have been stood up to address cross-service challenges. This means that there are both joint department-wide and service-level acquisition organizations procuring materiel to serve as examples.

Over time, the Department of Defense has developed processes to allow requirements identified on the battlefield to be quickly addressed. Different parts of the department have also embarked on different forms of organizational innovation.

One example is the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office, which was formed in 2003 to “expedite important, often classified programs while keeping them on budget.” The office has a unique management structure — it reports to a board of directors that is chaired by the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment and includes the most senior leaders of the Air Force and the under secretary of defense for research and engineering. These senior leaders can both set priorities for spending and work to find the necessary funding. Furthermore, acquisition experts at the Rapid Capabilities Office are carefully selected to maintain a culture where “lean, agile, and forward-looking technology development” is possible. Along with the Air Force’s new stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider, the office oversees the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle, “an experimental test program to demonstrate technologies for a reliable, reusable, unmanned space test platform.” The effectiveness of the Rapid Capabilities Office is affirmed by the decision to put these two extremely important programs there rather than within more traditional Air Force acquisition organizations.

Another concept comes from the Defense Innovation Unit, which was designed to work across the Department of Defense to identify and understand critical national security challenges that can be solved with leading-edge commercial technology within 12 to 24 months. The Defense Innovation Unit connects with non-traditional suppliers in innovation hubs, including Silicon Valley, and uses flexible acquisition models to issue contracts in as little as 2 to 3 months. It then publishes a catalog of commercial “solutions” ready for purchase from a range of companies, many of whom are not traditional defense suppliers. These include the Next Gen Explosive Ordnance Disposal Underwater Response Vehicle, a remotely operated underwater vehicle that searches for mines, and Hunt Forward, a set of tools for forward-deployed cyber operations. Although implementation has not always been smooth, the Defense Innovation Unit has nonetheless provided battlefield commanders with a range of innovative solutions that they can turn to.

The Rapid Capabilities Office empowers its leadership to finalize requirements and rapidly commit funding, a crucial component of its success. The Defense Innovation Unit focuses on creating a pipeline of new technologies. And these organizations are not unique. There are others across the services, such as NAVALX, the Army Applications Lab, and AFWERX, that are aimed at adapting innovations from both traditional and non-traditional suppliers. The United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force has its own Rapid Capabilities Office, which has also shown promise.

These U.S. models prove that a bureaucracy as resistant to change as the Department of Defense can still develop new organizational structures and processes. The Dutch and British models show that attempts at organizational innovation are not limited to the Pentagon. NATO may choose to adapt one of these or to develop its own unique approaches. The goal should be to provide its commanders with the flexibility and the authority to “validate requirements” — that is, to formally approve what the warfighter needs to execute the fight — and to make resources available. The decision structure could be a small rotating board of senior leaders, perhaps with time limits for approving or rejecting requirements to force rapid decisions.

NATO also needs a way to connect with industry partners across the alliance, capitalizing on innovations from small businesses and startups using new and flexible contracting mechanisms. The alliance currently lacks the tools to rapidly adopt commercial technologies. Two related policies would help to enhance the ability of new technologies to connect with existing systems. To increase operational effectiveness, NATO should leverage interoperability standards that allow different systems to operate seamlessly in a multi-domain environment. A related approach would be to adopt open systems architecture approaches for NATO weapons. This would provide design information to companies for developing components that could work with existing systems using a “plug and play” approach. Both of these policies would build upon the traditional NATO strength of developing standards while making these standards relevant to innovative companies.

All these process changes and organizational innovations will take effort — and the journey may be slowed by NATO’s consensus-building culture. Transformation takes time, but it only begins when there is a clear case for change. The scale and scope of Russia’s attack on Ukraine provides that case, and the delivery of Starlink provides an example of what could be possible if NATO had a more flexible approach to acquisitions.

### 2nc Link – Game Theory

#### Allies misrepresent their actual preference to gain leverage, but overshoot, producing gridlock

Dr. Ping-Kuei Chen 16, Doctor of Philosophy in Government and Politics from the University of Maryland, "Holding Hands While Parting Ways: Examining Alliance Treaty Renegotiation", Doctoral Dissertation, 2016, https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/18546/Chen\_umd\_0117E\_17257.pdf?sequence=1

During bargaining, alliance members interact and communicate their demands for future security cooperation. Allies not only try to determine a set of mutually acceptable solutions, but also evaluate whether the alliance is worth preserving. In the attempt to find a solution to their differences, members may encounter difficulties during negotiation, since their interests are unlikely to overlap completely.

Morrow (1994) suggests that two problems may hinder coordination in alliance politics. First, a distributional problem occurs when members have different preferences among all available solutions. The other problem is informational problem. Allies may conceal available options from each other in order to advance their own interests. These two problems intertwine. As Morrow argues, “Distributional interests prevent the honest sharing of information.” This dictum applies to intra-alliance bargaining because, even in a security alliance, members are not fully aware of each other’s intentions. Members sometimes have an incentive to misrepresent or hide their true intent in terms of maximizing their own security benefit, and so may withhold information regarding their security interests or falling short of their commitments in order to achieve unexpressed policy goals.

These distributional and informational problems give rise to three predicaments during intra-alliance bargaining: alliance members may (1) be unaware that they have an interest divergence; (2) acknowledge the existence of interest divergence, but be uncertain about a mutually acceptable solution; or (3) be unsure whether other members will keep their commitments in the future.

To overcome these difficulties, allies rely on information revealed during intraalliance bargaining when deciding on the future of an alliance. First, both sides need to recognize the existence of interest divergence and the need for a solution. Bargaining needs to focus on clarifying the problem when one or more partners fail even to see it, and sometimes this act of clarification can in fact be the most difficult discussion involved in bargaining.

Second, if both members recognize the interest divergence, they can move on to negotiate an arrangement. Successful bargaining requires allies to agree on one among a set of mutually acceptable options. A distributional problem may occur, however, when allies have uncertainties regarding each other’s updated security interests and hence regarding what arrangements might satisfy these interests. Dialogue can clarify matters, but a member may become suspicious about the claims that an ally makes if these claims differ from its own reading of the situation. Since an alliance relationship allows allies to interact more frequently, each ally is confident of its own understanding of the evolving security needs of its partners. When there is a perception gap among members concerning the security benefit that one or another enjoys or about the kind of cooperation that best furthers the alliance’s common interests, agreement may be difficult to reach. Allies must genuinely communicate their own preferences and be able to verify each other’s claims.

Finally, members naturally want to know the extent to which the other members value and are committed to the alliance. When their security interests have changed, they will not agree to negotiate unless they still consider each other reliable. When members agree to revise a treaty, a major goal is to ensure that any new obligations will induce sustained cooperation. An alliance will soon fall apart if bargaining reveals that a member has no interest in maintaining it.

When allies are consistently candid during renegotiation, their differences are likely to be resolved. However, as mentioned in the context of studies of burden sharing, allies have incentives to take advantage of their partners that are founded on the assumption that the interests of the latter in maintaining the alliance will lead them to grant concessions during negotiations as a means to salvage the imperiled relationship. In other words, some members may enter into renegotiation with the belief that abrogation would be too costly for the other members. In addition, an uncommitted partner is unlikely to engage in negotiation and more likely simply to abandon the alliance immediately. A member that is willing to renegotiate, by contrast, still values and therefore seeks to preserve the alliance. Each member thus starts bargaining under the assumption that the others are unlikely to give up easily, a situation that leaves rooms for allies to misrepresent their security interests and levels of commitment.

Even in an alliance relationship, a member’s commitment to the alliance is private information. Both the challenger and the partner have an incentive to misrepresent their true intentions in the pursuit of leverage during bargaining. Expressing discontent may gain concessions from other allies as well as testing the loyalty of each. A challenger may, in the course of renegotiation, threaten to withdraw from the alliance when it is in fact willing to accept an arrangement; a partner may misjudge a challenger’s resolve and fail to accommodate its needs; a challenger may misperceive its partner as dissatisfied and decide to withdraw from the alliance preemptively. Therefore, even though intra-alliance bargaining stands a good chance, and may represent the only chance, of resolving disagreement among members, there is no guarantee that this process will succeed.

### 2nc Link – Consultation

#### Just informing NATO undermines cohesion --- only genuine consultation can limit tension among members

Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf>, accessed 6/23/22, NB]

NATO has been able to adapt to profound changes in international relations largely due to its consultation mechanisms. During the Cold War, consultation enabled NATO to adjust its strategy to the Allies’ changing perceptions of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, consultations facilitated NATO’s adjustment to new threats that required out-of- area interventions and engagement in the fight against terrorism. Today, the Alliance is again trying to adjust to a new reality. With US policy in NATO likely to be determined by the rise of China, the Allies will have to consult to come up with a coherent approach to reconcile US global and European regional security interests.

NATO was created as a collective defence organisation soon after World War II to counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union. The Alliance’s military credibility was guaranteed by the economic, political and military potential of the US and supported by American military presence in Europe. In case of military attack, the Allies could invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to trigger a collective military response. The credibility of this mutual security guarantee has been strengthened by consultation mechanisms. Article 4 of the Washington Treaty gives Allies the right to call for consultations if their “territorial integrity, political independence or security ... is threatened.”1 Rather than rely on ad hoc consultations during crisis, NATO created the North Atlantic Council—its main decision making body, which meets at least weekly at the level of permanent representatives (ambassadors) and regularly at higher political levels (foreign ministers, ministers of defence and heads of state and government). Over the years, NATO has developed habits, norms and institutional mechanisms that enable almost continuous consultations on the whole range of issues affecting their security. These have facilitated the development of a common strategy and necessary capabilities to support it, and limited tensions among member states with sometimes differing national interests, strengthening the Alliance’s political cohesion. As NATO decisions are made by consensus, the consultation agenda also has to be approved by all Allies. Informal discussion among various groups of states and the weekly informal lunch of all representatives can help to build a consensus on what should be discussed during formal meetings, perhaps leading to politically binding decisions

THE COLD WAR ERA

The 1956 report of three ministers (the ‘Three Wise Men’) offered clear practical suggestions for consultation, stating that it “means discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed.”2 The report significantly influenced the development of NATO’s consultation norms. It made clear that consultations are not about informing other Allies about decisions that have already been taken, but entail frank discussion and the possibility of influencing national choices that affect mutual security.3

#### Genuine consultation can overcome differences and produce coordinated responses

Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf>, accessed 6/23/22, NB]

Although Allies will always have some different interests, they can use consultations to limit their negative, political impact. They can also adjust consultation mechanisms to changing strategic realities, further limiting the risk of tensions and increasing the probability of a common, coordinated response. The Allies should thus agree a set of principles to guide their consultations in the coming decade. These might include:

• Consultations must not be merely notifications or briefings about decisions already taken. They must entail frank discussions and the chance to influence an Ally’s actions.

• Consultations with Allies should always precede discussions with rivals.

• Allies must consult before they take any decision that could undermine the credibility of collective defence.

• When time permits, Allies should consult on actions out-of-area, which could affect NATO security.

• When Allies agree on common actions out-of- area, there must be full consultations on matters that may affect the common mission.

Allies can also take measures to influence their cost-benefit calculations regarding timely discussions of crucial issues. They should:

• Commit, in a highly visible political declaration, to observe agreed norms.

• Formally assess whether the norms of NATO consultations, which require frank discussion on matters affecting collective defence, have been violated. This will be necessary to restore confidence in the consultation mechanism in its most important dimension and to limit the risk of future unilateral actions.

Create an incentive for consultations on issues that extend beyond collective defence. Even though support for out-of-area actions cannot be guaranteed, Allies could commit to not publicly criticise the actions of an Ally that has used the consultation mechanism.

Small- and medium-sized countries, including the Baltic states and Poland would be the biggest beneficiaries of enhanced consultations. It is in their clear interest to use consultation to strengthen NATO’s political cohesion.

The Allies should also consider recasting their NATO+1 bilateral relations with partners from the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand) as a new NATO+4 multilateral cooperation format, perhaps branded the NATO-Pacific Forum.11 Regular consultations would provide Allies and partners with better situational awareness about evolving threats from both China and Russia, facilitating a coordinated response in numerous areas, including cyber, space or arms control.

Some Allies might wish to promote a reset with Russia under the pretext of not pushing it into an alliance with China. This would not be in the interests of the Baltic states and Poland, as any reset would inevitably be at the expense of credible collective defence and deterrence in Europe. NATO+4 consultations would, in exploring the common strategic goals of China and Russia in undermining the rules-based international order, limit the risk that Allies would view a Russia reset as a simple answer to a complex problem, and facilitate a discussion on effective responses to the challenges posed by both Russia and China as part of a broader NATO strategy.

### 2nc Delay Bad

#### Delay allows Russia to derail the process by manipulating the public or ramping up threats

Auerswald 22 – Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College [David Auerswald, May 17, 2022, “How the US Senate could slow down Sweden and Finland’s NATO future” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-senate-could-slow-down-sweden-and-finlands-nato-future/ Acc 6/21/22 ER]

With the announcements that Finland and Sweden will apply for NATO membership, attention now turns to the existing members of the Alliance. Adding new members requires amending NATO’s founding treaty, which then needs to be ratified by each of its thirty members. Proponents within the Alliance—to say nothing of the two aspirant countries—will want that process to happen as fast as possible. The longer it drags on, the more opportunities exist for Russia to derail the expansion process by manipulating public opinion, engaging in petro-coercion, or increasing its military threats.

### 2nc AT: No Spillover

#### \*\*\*note when prepping file --- this is ev in the 1nc DA Unity but is also useful for the NATO Expansion DA

#### Disagreements spillover and tube cooperation on an entire NATO program

Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis

NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38

While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40

The question for allies is what must the role of the Alliance be in reinforcing its core values when they are under assault from within. NATO is both a political and a military alliance. It is not enough to be bound together by a commitment only to Article 5 collective defense. The values in the Treaty and the adherence of NATO allies to those values is fundamental for Alliance cohesion. That shared commitment to values in turn makes credible the Article 5 commitment. The Washington Treaty is binding for both its political and military commitments.41 Allies cannot ignore the failure to abide by political commitments including values and expect military commitments to be unaffected. In short, NATO allies should not expect that they could violate democratic values without consequences, while resting assured that NATO cohesion is intact and other commitments in the Treaty will be upheld. The Treaty is not a menu of options from which allies can select some obligations while ignoring others.

The NATO Treaty has no provision for policing members that drift from common political values, unlike the European Union Treaty’s Chapter 7 that has been invoked recently toward several EU member states with some success.42 While it would be impossible to achieve consensus to impose penalties on wayward allies, given that the ally in question could veto any penalties, a range of escalating political initiatives on the part of the Secretary General and a coalition of the other allies could assert pressure. As a start, the Secretary General should express concern in his bilateral meetings with the anti-democratic governments, with the support of key allies and in partnership with the European Union. To increase awareness within the Alliance and among the public, foreign ministers could review annually indicators of democracy for all twenty-nine allies, perhaps prepared by an informal high-level group of experts drawing on Freedom House data. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and coalitions of allies can amplify the message.43 To increase pressure, NATO could suspend hosting of visits, official meetings and even military exercises with these nations. In severe cases, NATO infrastructure spending and even access to military schools and information sharing could be affected. An indirect way to express concern among allies is to increase the prominence of core democratic values when considering NATO enlargement decisions in the future.44 None of these steps is without political cost and risk, even if calibrated carefully. But the costs and risks of the gradual erosion of Alliance cohesion as member states drift from the founding values are even greater. NATO cannot expect to remain coherent and relevant and able to address the full range of challenges it faces, if it ignores the internal drift from democracy within some member states. This drift is a fundamental issue for the Alliance.45

Streamlining NATO Decision-Making

Finally, the challenges facing NATO today demand more flexibility in executive decision-making. As a core principle in preserving NATO cohesion, consensus decision-making must remain the basis for major NATO actions.46 The Treaty requirements for consensus on collective defense decisions (Article 5) and enlargement decisions (Article 10) remain sensible. Major policy decisions like the Defense Investment Pledge or the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force rapid reaction capabilities require consensus. But today with NATO enlarged to twenty-nine members and facing increasingly diverse and complex challenges, it is time to consider how other, more routine, administrative decisions can be taken more efficiently. But this should be a management function, not derogation from the consensus principle.

We recommend strengthening the Secretary General’s role as the chief executive of the Alliance with broader authority to carry out routine business without seeking consensus among the twenty-nine members. For example, the Secretary General should consult allies on matters such as agendas and timings of Ministerial Council meetings, but not be required to seek consensus agreement. Today the agenda and even the dates of a Foreign Minister meeting or a NATO-Russia Council meeting can consume hours of formal Council time seeking consensus at the ambassadorial level, consuming headquarters’ bandwidth and crowding out more substantive and urgent topics, including many outlined in this paper. Further, the Secretary General’s flexibility on international staff personnel changes and NATO budget matters should be increased. Today, for example, the Secretary General is severely constrained from adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges by making meaningful shifts in personnel and budgetary resources.47 While nations will continue to want a critical role in all these decisions, criteria should be developed that will provide for more flexibility while ensuring that all allies gain a fair share of opportunities and allocation of resources.

A related problem is the tendency of some allies to bring into the Alliance bilateral issues that impede progress on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might hold up agreement on the entire NATO military exercise program because of an unrelated bilateral dispute with a NATO partner who wishes to participate in an exercise.48 This practice erodes Alliance cohesion and should not be permitted. After appropriate consultation, we recommend the Secretary General should have the authority to exclude such external issues from consideration in the Alliance, even if it means moving forward without full consensus.

### U.S. & NATO Diplomacy key to Turkey Support

#### U.S. and NATO diplomatic overtures are necessary to break the deadlock with Turkey

Stavridis, 22 – former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO (June 20, 22; James Stavridis; “NATO must bring Finland, Sweden, and Turkey together”; <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-must-bring-finland-sweden-and-turkey-together/2022/06/20/2c4516da-f078-11ec-ac16-8fbf7194cd78_story.html/>, AI)

This is a deeply meaningful moment for NATO. The secretary-general or deputy secretary-general should consider undertaking shuttle diplomacy between Ankara, Helsinki and Stockholm. Senior military leaders must help their political counterparts see the operational value of bringing the two Nordic nations into the alliance. NATO’s supreme allied commander, the highly regarded US Air Force General Tod Wolters, should be quietly and respectfully making the case in Ankara for this accession.

Finally, as the most powerful member of NATO, the US, has a special responsibility to finding a path to untying this Gordian knot. Simply cutting through it by force won’t solve the underlying tensions which have been exacerbated by the EU’s long rejection of Turkish membership. There may be incentives the US can offer Turkey, ranging from military purchases to economic support for refugees they host from Syria.

The path forward is narrow, and will require effort by all sides to bring these two superb candidates to membership. This mission needs to be at the top of the list for the US State and Defense Departments, both for the military capability it will add to NATO and for maintaining the political unity that is required to keep the alliance healthy.

### U.S. Must Consider Turkey Concerns to Rebuild Relations

#### U.S. must listen to Turkey’s concerns in order to rebuild relations

Hess, 22 – a Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (June 22, 22; Maximillian Hess; “Why the West should make peace with Erdogan now”; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/, AI)

For Erdogan’s drift away from the West and closer relations with Moscow to be reversed, it is important to understand what motivated it. Today, the West is paying a price for failing to listen to his concerns. The drift initially began in 2011, as the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East. Erdogan was ebullient, as the uprisings offered the prospect of bringing Islamists similar to himself to power across the region. He felt betrayed when then-U.S. President Barack Obama failed to uphold his redlines in Syria and abandoned then-Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and publicly backed by Erdogan, when the Egyptian military ousted Morsi in a coup. “Turkey has learned the hard way that the U.S. is unwilling to invest in the region,” Muhammet Kocak, an international relations specialist based in Ankara, told me. Similarly, “Turkey’s security concerns have not been perceived as a particularly relevant issue in the NATO agenda,” said Elizabete Aunina, a doctoral researcher at the University of Amsterdam focused on Turkish security policy.

But what accelerated Erdogan’s drift away from the West—and shift to Moscow—was his sense of betrayal after the 2016 failed Turkish coup, which he publicly accused the United States of fostering. He also felt abandoned by his NATO allies when Washington withdrew its Patriot missile defense systems from Turkey and when NATO barely even reacted after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter aircraft intruding on its airspace, the first such incident involving NATO and Russian or Soviet airpower in 60 years. Since then, Erdogan felt that Moscow offered a better route to improving his regional and domestic position.

Turkish-Russian cooperation since then includes the TurkStream pipeline, plans for Russia to build a $20 billion nuclear power plant in Turkey, and the 2017 announcement that Ankara would buy Moscow’s S-400 missile defense system. And although Turkey and Russia have occasionally sparred—they back differing sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, for example—relations have remained broadly warm and manageable. That only increases the potential strategic leverage the West would gain if it reversed Erdogan’s orientation.

What carrot could the West offer Erdogan for abandoning Moscow? Turkey’s economic crisis may be just the opportunity. With annual inflation reaching 73.5 percent in May, currency reserves near all-time lows, and the Turkish lira down by 30 percent versus the dollar year-to-date following a 44 percent drop in 2021, Turkey’s risk of default has spiked. Foreign investors have fled the market. Desperately searching for fresh foreign capital, Erdogan even patched up relations with his key regional rival, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It would be better for the West to offer Erdogan an economic lifeline than to allow Moscow to do so. The U.S. Federal Reserve and European Central Bank, for example, should consider offering Erdogan a currency swap line, a stabilizing instrument they have significantly expanded in recent decades. Access to dollars and euros could alleviate many of Ankara’s mounting economic challenges and set the stage for a more cooperative partnership.

Erdogan knows he has a strong hand and is likely to make other demands. He has already exerted his leverage over Sweden’s and Finland’s desired accession to NATO, linking it to a freer hand for Turkey against the Syrian Kurds, who have been the West’s valiant allies in the fight against the Islamic State. Earlier this month, Erdogan announced plans for a new operation targeting them. He may well make demands about other regional interests, and he will certainly seek to blunt Western criticism of his domestic governance. These concessions could prove costly to other Western interests.

There is clear hesitancy to engage Erdogan at the moment. The West’s strategy appears to be to “count on the possibility Erdogan will lose the [June 2023] elections,” according to Kocak. Counting on Erdogan to allow a free and fair election and a potential peaceful transfer of power a year from now is idealistic at best and hopelessly naive at worst.

Erdogan is an unsavory character and will likely remain one. But it is in the West’s interest that he be on its side—not Russia’s—in order to weaken Putin and ensure Ukraine’s survival. The opportunity is there, and it would be unwise of the West not to try.

## Artificial Intelligence

### 1nc AI Link – Unity Specific

#### The plan has to tackle domestic politics in NATO states that prevents cohesion and interoperability --- many nations cannot commit to AI

* Each member state can have different equipment, policies, and tactics
* reluctant to share sensitive operational and intelligence information
* different languages and military cultures

Lin-Greenberg, 2020 - member of the MIT Security Studies Program [Erik Vol 3, Iss 2 Spring, Texas National Security Review “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making” http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8866 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

Although alliances and multilateral coalitions can bolster the security of member states and the efficiency of their military operations, membership can create complications for decision-making and the coordination of military operations. First, alliances and coalitions must overcome operational challenges surrounding the integration and coordination of military forces. Modern military operations require the close coordination of participating forces, shared intelligence to guide planning and mission execution, and weapon systems capable of communicating with and operating alongside each other. The military of each alliance or coalition member state brings with it different equipment, policies, and tactics, meaning that a state’s forces may not fully integrate with the forces of its allies.42 Moreover, partners are often reluctant to share sensitive operational and intelligence information.43 Beyond these institutional issues, more commonplace matters — such as the different languages and military cultures of each member state — can hinder interoperability during contingency operations.44 Second, alliance and coalition leaders may have trouble deciding what policies their coalition should pursue. Although allies typically face a common threat and share many policy objectives, each state still maintains its own priorities and goals. State leaders therefore respond to domestic constituencies and pursue their own national interests, which, at times, may be at odds with alliance goals.45 At best, these divergent interests result in coordination problems that draw out decision-making timelines.46 At worst, they generate mistrust between partners and raise concerns of being abandoned during a crisis or “chain-ganged” into unwanted wars.47

#### Procurement changes forces the expenditure of human and political capital

Gilli, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College [Andrea, NDC Research Paper No.15 – December ““NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1514 Acc 4/21/22 TA, reunderlined by JMP]

Defence procurement is particularly complex, given the range of strict requirements and specifications with which contractors have to comply.251 This is why traditional weapons manufacturers generally have an advantage when it comes to approaching defence buyers.252 AI, however, will entail a paradigm shift because the capabilities will continuously evolve. For AI-enabled autonomous systems in particular, as mentioned above, decision-making is “non-deterministic” and depends on the “dynamic environment” in which the system operates.253 This means that “traditional development and procurement approaches, based on full-path regression, are unfit”.254 This means that R&D also continues in the product deployment phase, as data and algorithms keep providing information and feedback that have to be integrated in order to achieve initial operational capabilities. Current “waterfall” procurement paradigms are set up so that engineers test prototypes according to defined specifications, and then subsequently move to production.255 With machine learning, the specifications will keep evolving as algorithms are fed new data.256 By extension, this means that testing cannot be treated as a singular phase prior to production and development. For NATO Allies, a more iterative procurement paradigm that does not depend on the sequential “waterfall” entails unique challenges. The integration of enterprise AI requires specific technical, legal, and organizational capabilities. This is linked to human-capital challenges in requirements, procurement and operations communities, as organizations leveraging AI “need their own people who know how to structure the problem, handle the data, and stay aware of evolving opportunities”.257 The development of AI-centred major weapon systems similarly calls for reform, or at least a remarkable adaptation, of defence procurement.258 Significant political, organizational and human capital will have to be invested. This is an additional reason why a centre such as the proposed A3IC could support the transition, through best practices, lessons learned and similar initiatives.

### 2nc AI Link – Unity Specific

#### There are many obstacles to US-EU cooperation on AI

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA] reunderlined by //AB

Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations Full US-EU collaboration faces five distinct, but interconnected obstacles (see Figure 1 below). At the highest level, the United States and European Union have some diverging geopolitical interests (section A) illustrated by: America’s increasing isolationism, the European Union’s rebalancing to become a third power, the European Union’s resistance to adversarial discourse about China, and domestic political demands to focus resources on COVID-19 responses. Flowing out of the geopolitical landscape and political interests are three overarching considerations that are bolstered by differing beliefs about the role and size of government and can fuel US-EU disagreements around AI. These US national interests and EU common priorities are (section B): AI’s impact on national security and economic interests, as well as the ethics and values that guide AI’s development and use. Finally, aspects of the AI operating environment (sections C, D, and E), such as regulation and governance (including standards and operationalizing principles), funding, data spaces, hardware, and computing resources, provide tactical areas for disagreement or misalignment.

#### Significant political obstacles block NATO cooperation and leadership on Responsible AI use.

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University[Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA] reunderlined by //AB

On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.

#### The plan has to overcome significant legal and policy challenges to forge agreement and cohesion

Trabucco, 2020 - Research Assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen [Lena, May 10 “AI Partnership for Defense is a Step in the Right Direction – But Will Face Challenges” http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/ Acc 4/17/22 TA, reunderlined by JMP]

Which brings me to the third challenge. The AI partnership symposium did not offer a coherent strategy for the partnership beyond advancing core values the participating nations find important to the AI pipeline. Peter Singer, New America Foundation fellow and strategist, noted that the US has not yet offered a coherent strategy to contrast its “near peers.” In one article, Singer said, “China has a fairly clear and robust vision of this [AI and its applications] and it is actively exporting that vision. There is absolutely no way the US can compete without offering a different and compelling vision and one that involves our friends and allies.” On the one hand, the absence of an overarching strategy gives the DoD and the AI partnership latitude to address inevitable issues that will arise. Secretary Esper noted in his address that this kind of partnership is the first of its kind and needs time to operate in the face of unforeseen challenges. But to accomplish the goal as the preferred security partner in AI, the partnership will need to substantiate its agreement with a vision more concrete than just ethical values. The AI partnership accomplishes getting some allies on board, but does not clarify what vision is driving the newfound partnership. At some point, this will need to change. In essence, the AI partnership is a necessary and welcome development in the US AI strategy, but significant legal and policy challenges are on the horizon. The three outlined here – legal interoperability, trans-Atlantic cooperation, and an uncertain coherent strategy – are certainly not exhaustive. But they represent a span of legal and policy issues the partnership are sure to encounter as it moves forward.

#### France is an independent link --- it’s committed to digital sovereignty that prevents collaboration.

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA, reunderlined by JMP]

On this note, the French conception of controlled AI goes a step further and ties auditability to the core value of sovereignty in French strategic culture.54 This is because the relationship between auditability and control stems from geopolitical concerns. The strategy states, “France cannot resign itself to being dependent on technologies over which it has no control. […] Preserving digital sovereignty therefore also involves controlling the algorithms and their configuration, and the governance of data.”55 This need for control comes from a desire to exert independence from the “stranglehold on AI exerted by China and the United States,” including by strengthening European cooperation.56 While the geopolitical aspects and prospects of France to assert this independence are beyond the scope of this study, it is notable that they trickle into the French approach to trace the provenance of models and data. In particular, weapons are “critical applications” that will need to be auditable.57 If enforced, this means that questions about data rights and legal authorities to transfer data (including from foreign suppliers) could render AI “uncontrolled” per the French definition. Here, protectionism straddles the line of ethics and adoption, with digital sovereignty as a potential factor that determines acceptability of both. This can also be seen in the imperative to maintain “freedom of action.”58

#### NATO’s range of members will have difficulty forging consensus – disparate capabilities and historically true

Pepe, 20 – Senior Coordinator for Research and Conflict, Security and Development Analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (November 14, 2020; Erica Pepe; “NATO and Collective Thinking on AI”; <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/11/nato-artificial-intelligence/>, AI)

By the end of 2020, NATO may have in place broad thinking on artificial intelligence (AI) as part of a wider implementation strategy on how to benefit from emerging technologies. The Alliance could play an important role in establishing interoperability standards along with supporting norms of use in the military application of AI. NATO, however, has not always been successful in establishing standards, nor in getting member states to comply. This makes the recently set-up NATO Innovation Board, and its intended year-end emerging-technologies implementation strategy, potentially all the more important. An AI White Paper, including a proposed five-year roadmap, is already with Alliance governments, having been submitted in July. This could lead to a more detailed NATO AI strategy emerging sometime in 2021. The AI challenge The Alliance has the advantage of having 30 members spending some US$1 trillion (2020) on defense. Its wide membership, however, is also a possible weakness if even a top-level common approach to AI cannot be agreed. The Innovation Board’s chair, NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană, has the task of coordinating ongoing AI-related work across the Alliance in attempting to shape a shared vision of how to utilise AI. This will include working to identify capability needs and potential projects for collaboration. NATO already has some AI-related projects under way, including the Military Uses of Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and Robotics project and the NATO Data Science Centre. The former project is part of the United States-led Multinational Capability Development Campaign and is intended to look at possible applications in areas such as air and missile defense. The Data Science Centre’s aim is to bring together existing data-science expertise within NATO under one structure. The Alliance views AI as one of several of what it calls ‘emerging and disruptive technologies’, which it considers will likely have the greatest impact in combination. NATO’s March 2020 ‘Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040’ report pointed to the mix of autonomy, big data and AI, for example being used to generate decision-relevant information from vast quantities of raw data, as having far-reaching implications for defense and security. The report also identified an array of ‘serious challenges’ that NATO faces in managing AI, including policy, legal, ethical and interoperability issues. It further identified the need for a common approach to how the performance of AI-software-based systems is verified, and in turn how the verification process is itself validated. In some ways NATO might seem a natural forum for these deliberations, not least in a transatlantic context. It also has a lot of experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces: not only 30 members with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and potential adversaries may hold significant advantages. Interoperability issues may be thorny, but they need to be resolved if AI-dependent capability gaps between members are not to widen. Early discussions regarding the establishment of common technical standards on the design and development of military-applicable AI would at least reduce this risk.

#### France is committed to digital sovereignty

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

54 The French imperative to maintain technological independence is stronger than any other European ally, and largely motivates French defence industrial policy as well as the political agenda of “strategic autonomy” and “digital sovereignty” at the national and European levels. Other documents that reinforce this include those referenced in footnotes 47 and 49, as well as the 2019 Defence Innovation Orientation Document (2019) and the Ministry of Armed Forces Digital Transformation: Key Concepts (2020). 55 AI Task Force, Artificial Intelligence in Support of Defence, 10. 56 This strong language intends to set the political tone for adoption, and is not purely about ethics. Further, while the “stranglehold” motivates sovereignty, there are few specifics in the strategy about hardware components or cloud capabilities, beyond the recognition that these are not French or European strengths. Auditability is only tied, here, to models and data. AI Task Force, Artificial Intelligence in Support of Defence, 10, 24.

#### Disagreements among NATO members could derail its AI strategy

Heikkilä, 21 (3-29, Melissa, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO; DOA: 6-17-2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/) SMTX//BSA Senior Reporter for AI at TechReview, Formerly Politico Europe and The Economist. Forbes 30 Under 30.

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context.

The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies.

“It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said:

That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.

The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently.

There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control.

Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology.

These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban.

Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”

Staying relevant

These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said.

She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body.

That could have consequences for human rights, too.

“NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign.

“Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “**ethical** **vacuum**,” Coyle said.

Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics.

“If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

#### Divergent public opinion on AI in NATO countries requires a diplomatic campaign by the U.S. to forge a consensus

* Political differences over whether AI collaboration should be civilian or military focused
* Varied timelines for militaries adopting AI
* Incompatibilities in legal and regulatory structures

Mahoney, 22 --- Nunn-Lugar Fellow in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and in AT&L from 2013 to 2017 (April 30, 2022, Casey - U.S. Institute of Peace–DoD Minerva Peace & Security Scholar and a Ph.D. Candidate in political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Shared Responsibility: Enacting Military AI Ethics in U.S. Coalitions; America needs to enlist its oldest allies and new partners to build a safer and freer world for the AI era,” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/techland-when-great-power-competition-meets-digital-world/shared-responsibility-enacting>, JMP)

Strength In Diversity?

Many of the national AI strategy documents of NATO allies and U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific prioritize responsible governance over AI in and, in some cases, AI-enabled warfighting. This apparent, high-level harmony notwithstanding,[public polling data from 2019](https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/human-rights-watch-six-in-ten-oppose-autonomous-weapons) and[2021](https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/global-survey-highlights-continued-opposition-fully-autonomous-weapons) suggest that among U.S. security partners, specific concerns about the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems vary widely.[Data from this year](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2022-01/Global-opinions-and-expectations-about-AI-2022.pdf) show that the public’s trust in AI more generally varies from quite high among some partners, as in India and Turkey, to quite low, among traditional NATO allies and Japan.

U.S. leaders should thus not assume their allies will be reading from an identical political or ethical playbook in future coalition operations with AI in the mix. Once shooting begins, coalition members frequently find they actually disagree about the policies and strategies that should guide operations. Domestic politics are often what shape the scope and[limits of coalition members’ contributions](https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/56/1/67/1941598) to operations, and they can[impact leaders’ strategic decisions](https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/44/3/163/12282/Presidents-Politics-and-Military-Strategy) in complex ways. This makes it worth thinking carefully about the benefits and risks of working in a coalition where views about military AI use and governance vary.

Intuitively, a diversity of perspectives is useful for creative problem-solving. In plotting a course for research and development on military AI,[DoD set the goal](https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/27/2002730593/-1/-1/0/IMPLEMENTING-RESPONSIBLE-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-IN-THE-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE.PDF) of building “a robust national and global [responsible AI] ecosystem” among partner government, private sector, and academic institutional partners to maximize creative potential and interoperability.

In operational contexts, however, the stakes of navigating differences of the ethical frameworks and policies that inform leaders’ and commanders’ decisions are much higher. Without appropriate ways of managing coalition contributions, unforeseen mismatches in the skill levels and specialized capabilities of partner forces can have [major negative effects](https://stanford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.11126/stanford/9780804753999.001.0001/upso-9780804753999-chapter-8) on military effectiveness. [National political differences](https://ecfr.eu/publication/not_smart_enough_poverty_european_military_thinking_artificial_intelligence/) about whether AI collaboration should be civilian- or military-focused, varied[timelines over which militaries are adopting AI](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%203%20AI_0.pdf), and[incompatibilities in legal and regulatory structures](http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/05/ai-partnership-for-defense-is-a-step-in-the-right-direction-but-will-face-challenges/) could all present challenges to U.S.-led coalitions cohesively enacting shared notions of military AI ethics. Is there a way to find operational strength in this diversity?

A Responsible AI Coalition

It is in the U.S. interest to leverage the creative potential of a diverse AI “ecosystem.” However, it is also necessary to establish habits that mitigate the risk that political, cultural, and organizational differences among future coalition partners might undermine collective, responsible AI use.

To do this, the Defense Department can take steps now to increase the reliability with which future coalitions will operationalize the foundations of international cooperation on military AI. The DoD should pursue the three objectives and consider specific actions to pursue them. Building these goals into the charter of the DoD’s new Office of the Chief Data and AI Officer (CDAO) that Deputy Secretary Kathleen Hicks [directed](https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/02/2002931807/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ON-THE-INITIAL-OPERATING-CAPABILITY-OF-THE-CHIEF-DIGITAL-AND-ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE-OFFICER.PDF) be prepared by June 1, 2022, would help align institutional incentives to accomplish them.

Establish a common language. First, policymakers, commanders, and technical and legal experts in future coalitions must be able to speak a common language to communicate about how AI systems ought to be used on the battlefield—let alone about how they are developed and validated. A December 2021 report by the Center for Naval Analysis [identifies](https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Dimensions-of-Autonomous-Decision-making.pdf?utm_source=Center+for+Security+and+Emerging+Technology&utm_campaign=1280c55e66-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2022_01_27_02_11&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_fcbacf8c3e-1280c55e66-438318142) 565 unique policy and ethics “risk elements” the use of autonomous systems pose in military applications. But, given the “bias that occurs when operating in coalition and allied environments … that stems from different sets of treaties, ROE, or cultural norms,” one imagines that the opportunities for miscommunication in the absence of agreement on the terms of debate will grow exponentially.

Despite China’s efforts to[lead in setting international AI technical standards](https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/04/china-s-new-ai-governance-initiatives-shouldn-t-be-ignored-pub-86127), it is clearly in the U.S. interest to pursue its own standards under which it collaborates with military partners. The DoD should task the CDAO to oversee a process to identify what resources would be necessary to engage partners to develop and baseline U.S. programs around a technical glossary for AI. Doing so would set the terms of debate among the international partners DoD seeks to recruit to the responsible AI ecosystem it seeks to establish. Without[shared language](https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/strategy-in-the-artificial-age-observations-from-teaching-an-ai-to-write-a-u-s-national-security-strategy/), communicating about partners’ capabilities and intent to use AI responsibly will be difficult, posing risks for the strategic effectiveness and political cohesion of future coalitions.

Regularizing international collaboration. Second, AI systems need to be built for purpose and stress-tested in situations that approximate coalition use contexts. In the pipeline from research and development (R&D) and testing, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV) to operational use and sustainment, it is not clear how the DoD is considering the unique coalition command-and-control challenges of AI-enabled systems. The sample of ongoing DoD activities with partners described above tend to be country-, service-, or acquisition program-specific efforts. To systematically ensure lessons learned are not lost and forgotten in the massive Pentagon bureaucracy, the DoD needs to first identify when program offices, service branches, and country desk officers interact with partners in ways that should inform AI system development, testing, and fielding.

Until now, the department has not needed to understand how its vast network of partner governments and militaries are absorbing a general-purpose technology like AI. A February 1 DoD memorandum identifies roles the CDAO and the undersecretaries for Policy, Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), and Research and Engineering (R&E) will play in international cooperation on AI. But, DoD lacks a cross-cutting process for collecting technical and policy knowledge derived from these international interactions and integrating it into coalition policy, planning, or technical cooperation efforts on a country-by-country or weapons system-by-system basis.

The DoD should task the CDAO, Policy, A&S, and R&E offices to create one. These offices should establish metrics in R&D, TEVV, and acquisitions processes that incentivize the bureaucracy to prioritize technical and organizational interoperability and consider unique requirements that might arise from ethical or policy questions likely to arise in multinational use scenarios. This would help channel international partner input to relevant points of contact across the department, optimizing the value of the international “responsible AI ecosystem” to U.S. coalition efforts.

Engage allied publics. Last, differences in public opinion about the inherent legitimacy and desired forms of accountability for AI-based weapons reflect real divides within and between the polities that comprise America’s alliance network. Bridging these gaps by[monitoring public discourse](https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/IF11294.pdf) and[enhancing public diplomacy](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/10/11/biden-administration-needs-up-its-game-public-diplomacy/) about military AI would have the effect of both educating the public at home and abroad and help raise expectations that transparency is the norm. In an era in which states select and enact military strategies before a global public audience, it is important for Americans, allies, and others to see that if the U.S. military technological edge must be used in conflict, its leaders and its partners choose to do so responsibly.

As China and Russia continue to use AI tools to enhance authoritarian control at home, it is becoming commonplace to argue that the values America and its allies share for responsible AI can represent a [competitive edge of soft power](https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Agile-Alliances.pdf). This might well be the case. Only if America and its allies are capable of enacting these values on the AI-infused battlefield together, though, will this advantage serve to help legitimize U.S.-led operations in the world’s eyes. A coalition’s ability to uphold the laws of armed conflict is ultimately bounded by the capability and willingness of its least able members to do so.

### 1nc Autonomous Weapons Link – Unity Specific

#### The plan puts the cart before the horse --- it’s a tough sell because member states have much different priorities and budgets so starting with basics will create good procedures and set precedents that can later be used to tackle controversial topics like autonomous weapons

HEIKKILÄ, 21 (March 29, 2021 4:14 pm, MELISSA HEIKKILÄ, “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics; Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive,” <https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/>, JMP)

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.

The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.

“We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO.

The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight.

David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus.

"I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said.

Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.

For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications.

The pitch

NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said.

The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said.

The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems.

“If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said.

“We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued.

Mission impossible?

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She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body.

That could have consequences for human rights, too.

“NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign.

“Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said.

Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics.

“If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

### 1nc Autonomous Weapons Link – Turkey Specific

#### Turkey develops and deploys autonomous weapons --- it has eschewed regulations AND consensus based approaches empirically break down

Trager & Luca, 22 --- \*associate professor and graduate student in political science respectively at UCLA (MAY 11, 2022, 1:46 PM, Robert F. & Laura M., “Killer Robots Are Here—and We Need to Regulate Them; Once lethal autonomous weapons systems begin to spread, they will be difficult to control,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/>, JMP)

Swarms of robots with the ability to kill humans are no longer only the stuff of science fiction. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) are here. In Ukraine, Moscow has allegedly deployed an artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled Kalashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition, while Kyiv has used Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have some autonomous capabilities. Although it’s always hard to determine whether a weapon’s autonomous mode is used, these technologies have reportedly been employed in at least one conflict: Last year, a United Nations report suggested Turkey used autonomous firing by its Kargu-2 drones to hunt fleeing soldiers in Libya’s civil war (though the CEO of the Turkish company that produced the drone denies it is capable of this).

Unlike traditional drones, these systems have the ability to navigate on their own, and some can select targets. Although a human controller can still decide whether or not to strike, such weapons are acquiring ever more autonomous capabilities. Now that militaries and paramilitaries worldwide have taken note, these technologies are poised to spread widely. The world today stands at the very moment before much more advanced versions of these technologies become ubiquitous.

So far, at least Israel, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey have reportedly deployed weapons with autonomous capabilities—though whether this mode was active is disputed—and Australia, Britain, China, and the United States are investing heavily in developing LAWS with an ever-expanding range of sizes and capabilities.

Already, some LAWS can loiter in an area to find targets that machine-learning algorithms have trained them to recognize, including enemy radar systems, tanks, ships, and even specific individuals. These weapons can look vastly different: For instance, the Turkish Kargu-2 drone, which was introduced in 2020 and used in Libya’s war, is 2 feet long, weighs around 15 pounds, and can swarm in groups. Autonomous systems can also be much larger, such as unmanned AI-driven fighter jets like the modified L-39 Albatros, and much smaller, such as rudimentary commercial drones repurposed with autonomous software.

Once these technologies have spread widely, they will be difficult to control. The world thus urgently needs a new approach to LAWS. So far, the international community has done nothing more than agree that the issue needs to be discussed. But what it really needs to do is take a page from the nuclear playbook and establish a nonproliferation regime for LAWS.

Currently, countries at the forefront of LAWS development resist any calls for their ban. The United States has claimed that existing international humanitarian laws are sufficient to govern LAWS; the U.S. Defense Department’s policy is that they must be designed to ensure “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.” China has remained ambiguous, stating the importance of “full consideration of the applicability of general legal norms” while insisting on a narrow definition of LAWS. Russia, meanwhile, refuses to even consider the issue, using diplomatic procedural tools to stall and reduce the time the United Nations devotes to debating the subject.

But most countries have called for a ban on developing and using LAWS—or, at a minimum, regulating them. In 2019, U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said LAWS are “politically unacceptable, morally repugnant, and should be prohibited by international law.”

There are many reasons countries, international nongovernmental organizations, scholars, and AI experts worry about LAWS. Although they do not all agree in their predictions of how such weapons could affect society, there’s a growing consensus that their spread could bring substantial and harmful consequences.

First, LAWS could facilitate violence on a large scale since they’re not restricted by the number of people available to man them. Second, in combination with facial recognition and other technologies, they can target individuals or groups that fit certain descriptions, which could appeal to violent groups and state militaries committing political assassinations and ethnic cleansing. Third, LAWS may make it easier for those who control them to hide their identities. LAWS thus have the potential to upend political orders and enable tighter authoritarian control. In addition, they can always malfunction, including by mistaking civilians for combatants.

So far, the international community has attempted—and failed—to regulate LAWS. In December 2021, after eight years of technical discussions, government and civil society representatives met at the U.N. in Geneva to set an agenda for regulating LAWS for the first time in what was billed as a “historic opportunity.”

Most attendees favored legally binding rules that apply equally to all states to govern the development and use of these technologies. Yet, by any standard, the meeting failed. Despite years of preparatory discussions within the framework of the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—a forum for restricting the use of weapons considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately—the attendees barely managed to agree on 10 more days of discussion this March and July. This outcome was to be expected given the positions of the major powers and the CCW rules requiring consensus before action is taken. (Disclosure: Both authors have been affiliated with the CCW.)

In response, a wide array of actors—from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to some of the states in favor of a LAWS ban, including Argentina and the Philippines—are calling for a process to develop legally binding prohibitions on these weapons outside of the CCW. Alternative approaches to prohibition treaties have had some success in the past, such as when countries agreed to give up land mines through the 1997 Ottawa convention; cluster munitions through the 2008 Oslo Accords; and even nuclear weapons through the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was the first treaty to completely ban nuclear weapons in line with international humanitarian law and establish pathways for current nuclear weapon states to renounce them. However, while many states signed these treaties, most of the powerful states did not.

Unfortunately, even this limited success is likely to be elusive in the case of LAWS. The primary reason is that states are increasingly aware that these non-substitutable technologies may become crucial to their security and are thus unlikely to unilaterally abandon them. If states’ adversaries have them, they will likely believe they need them—and absent the sort of nonproliferation regime that exists for nuclear weapons, their adversaries will, in fact, continue to rapidly develop LAWS without much oversight.

Nonproliferation has yet to receive much attention in the case of LAWS, but it has worked to varying degrees in the past with the missile technology control regime, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and, of course, nuclear weapons.

The landmark Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, met the requirements of major and lesser powers: It did not require those who possessed nuclear weapons to renounce them immediately, allowed other states access to the benefits of civilian use of nuclear power, and relied on a trusted international organization that was charged with the dual responsibility of promoting and controlling nuclear technology.

A similar nonproliferation regime for LAWS could facilitate regulation of their development, transfer, and employment—even by the powers that do not give them up. It would reduce the use of these technologies for authoritarian control and terrorist actions worldwide and, as in the nuclear case, create the possibility of developing norms against LAWS use that apply to all.

This would admittedly be complicated. The nuclear nonproliferation regime has thus far been largely successful because it has been a central pillar of major powers’ grand strategies. Indeed, detente in the Cold War involved superpowers agreeing to police proliferation in their spheres of influence. Security guarantees mollified countries that otherwise would have felt too insecure to forgo nuclear weapons. Threats and promises convinced countries, such as Iran when it signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to accept stricter limits on its nuclear program than it would have otherwise.

Without this focused attention, nonproliferation and arms embargo regimes regularly fail. Indeed, the autonomous weapons used in Libya were exported by Turkey in violation of a U.N. arms embargo. A successful LAWS nonproliferation regime would thus require states to prioritize the issue more than they currently do in their national security strategies, especially as the technologies become more widespread and effective.

### 2nc Autonomous Weapons Link – Turkey Specific

#### Turkey is developing and selling drones --- its emboldening Erdogan and impacting larger US-NATO-Turkey relations

Forrest & Marson, 21 (4 June 2021, Brett Forrest, James Marson, Dow Jones Institutional News, “Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics – WSJ,” Factiva database, JMP)

A soldier idles by a Russian-made T-72 tank. A moment later, a missile fired from a drone slams into the vehicle, exploding in an orange flash, blowing the man off his feet and leaving the tank a smoldering wreck.

The scene is one of dozens of aerial videos that were posted online in Azerbaijan last year showing off a new weapon. Over six weeks, it helped the nation regain territory in the Nagorno-Karabakh region that had been held by Russian-backed Armenian forces for more than two decades. The videos show attacks on tanks, trucks, command posts, mortar positions and radar installations.

Smaller militaries around the world are deploying inexpensive missile-equipped drones against armored enemies, a new battlefield tactic that proved successful last year in regional conflicts, shifting the strategic balance around Turkey and Russia. Drones built in Turkey with affordable digital technology wrecked tanks and other armored vehicles, as well as air-defense systems, of Russian protégés in battles waged in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan.

These drones point to future warfare being shaped as much by cheap but effective fighting vehicles as expensive ones with the most advanced technology.

China, too, has become a leading war drone exporter to the Middle East and Africa. Iran-linked groups in Iraq and Yemen used drones to attack Saudi Arabia. At least 10 countries, from Nigeria to the United Arab Emirates, have used drones purchased from China to kill adversaries, defense analysts say.

"The implications are game changing," U.K. Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said in a speech last year, citing Syria's heavy losses to Turkish drones.

Flying alone or in a group, these drones can surprise troops and disable poorly concealed or lightly defended armored vehicles, a job often assigned to expensive warplanes. The drones can stay quietly aloft for 24 hours, finding gaps in air-defense systems and helping target strikes by warplanes and artillery, as well as firing their own missiles.

Militaries, including the U.S., are upgrading air-defense systems to catch up with the advances, seeking methods to eliminate low-budget drones without firing missiles that cost more than their targets.

The U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory is also developing Skyborg and Valkyrie, lower-cost autonomous aircraft that are part of an innovation program. "Our adversaries are already fielding technologies that will hold our legacy platforms at risk," an Air Force official said in a statement.

Israel and the U.S. have long used high-end drones in counterterrorism operations to target prominent enemies. But the countries have hesitated to sell their top models, even to allies, for fear of proliferation.

Responding to drone deals that China and other producers have struck with countries shunned by the U.S., the Trump administration last July relaxed its export policy somewhat, potentially boosting sales of more capable models than previously allowed. The United Arab Emirates said in January it had agreed to buy 18 U.S.-made MQ-9 drones for nearly $3 billion.

Technological advances and global competitors have produced inexpensive alternatives. The standard-bearer of the latest armed-drone revolution emerged last year on the battlefields around Turkey, the Bayraktar TB2.

Compared with the American MQ-9, the TB2 is lightly armed, with four laser-guided missiles. Its radio-controlled apparatus limits its basic range to around 200 miles, roughly a fifth of the ground the MQ-9 can cover.

Yet it is utilitarian, and reliable -- qualities reminiscent of the Soviet Kalashnikov AK-47 rifle that changed warfare in the 20th century. A set of six Bayraktar TB2 drones, ground units, and other essential operations equipment costs tens of millions of dollars, rather than hundreds of millions for the MQ-9.

The drone's Turkish producer, Baykar, which started in 1984 making auto parts, boasts of more bang for the buck. Qatar and Ukraine are customers. Poland, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member, said last month it would buy 24 TB2 drones. Several other NATO allies are interested, as well as countries in Africa and Asia, Turkish government and company officials said.

Turn the tide

The TB2 drone gained international notice in the skies over Syria in early 2020.

Toward the end of February, the Syrian regime, backed by Russia, was advancing on the city of Idlib, which was held by rebels supported by Turkey. After an air raid killed more than 30 Turkish soldiers, Turkey embarked on Spring Shield, an operation that integrated drones with electronic warfare systems, ground troops, artillery and warplanes.

The drones, quiet and hard to spot on radar, flew for hours seeking gaps in air-defense systems, which fell "like domino tiles" once breached, said Haluk Bayraktar, chief executive of Baykar. The vehicles operated in groups of a dozen or so to attack targets simultaneously, Turkish government and company officials said.

Ismail Demir, head of Turkey's state body overseeing the defense industry, said the low cost of these drones allows military forces to take more risks with them. "If you lose one, two, three," he said, it doesn't matter as long as others find a target.

Last spring, the TB2s helped turn the tide in the Libyan civil war for the Tripoli-based government, which is backed by the United Nations.

Turkey had sent arms in 2019 to stem an assault on the capital by militia leader Khalifa Haftar, who is supported by Russia and others. In 2020, Turkey increased military support. Improved drone tactics honed in Syria provided the upper hand against Russian-made surface-to-air missile systems known as Pantsir, handing the Tripoli government aerial supremacy. By June, Mr. Haftar's forces retreated from Tripoli.

The success of the drones has helped Turkey President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an at-times fractious U.S. ally, to expand his regional influence without risking significant numbers of troops or costly equipment.

While Turkey's enhanced capabilities may benefit NATO, fellow members worry that the ability of Mr. Erdogan to deploy and sell drones could embolden his assertive pursuit of a more independent foreign and security policy.

"The U.S., like a lot of European partners, is leery of Turkey's drone exports and the aggressive way Turkey has been using drones in these conflicts," said Dan Gettinger, a researcher at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, a nonpartisan policy research group in Arlington, Va.

Mike Nagata, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general in special operations, said drones were "part of a much larger challenge regarding the future of the relationship between Turkey and the United States and NATO."

### 2nc Turkey LAWs Reduce Civilian Casualties

#### Turkey autonomous weapons reduce human casualties through precise targeting

Tekingunduz, 21 --- BA focused in International Relations and Political Science from Boğaziçi University (3 JUN 2021, Alican, “A series of autonomous drones gives Turkey a military edge,” <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/a-series-of-autonomous-drones-gives-turkey-a-military-edge-47201>, JMP)

Defense Technologies and Trade Inc. (STM), a Turkish company that manufactures Kargu-2 drones and supplies them to the Turkish military, told the media last year that their drones also have facial recognition technology, which gives a major advantage to the Turkish security forces in identifying individual targets so they could be neutralised without deploying forces on the ground.

Murat Ikinci, the former CEO of STM, was quoted in Turkish media in 2019 as saying that the main advantages of Karagu-2 swarms is that their sheer number can overwhelm targets and they can evade the GPS jammers.

According to the UN report, the Kargu-2 attack in Libya had achieved the desired results. Heavy military installations, convoys and hordes of mercenaries and armed personnel working for Haftar were "hunted down and remotely engaged by lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2".

"The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true 'fire, forget and find' capability," the report reads.

"In the modern world, priority should be given to the protection of intellectual and physical human capital which means a lighter workload on military personnel," Merve Seren said.

According to Seren, access to superior technology like Kargu-2 drones has helped the Turkish military to prevent civilian casualties.

"Turkey has a very clear and successful history of using drones to avoid civilian casualties," she said.

Pinpointing enemy targets with precision have become one of the main hallmarks of Turkish drones. Their appropriate use in Syria and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict proved that they can minimize collateral damage.

Besides attacking, these kamikaze-style drones — Kargu-2, Alpagu, Togan and Simsek — can also carry out intelligence-gathering missions, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

They can attack targets in areas where there was no mobile data or Internet connectivity between the operator and the warhead.

Turkey's success in producing high-calibre drones comes on the heels of its national policy of becoming self-sufficient in defence manufacturing. According to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country had 62 defence projects in 2002 and by 2020 the figure has grown to 700, along with the annual defence budget, which has increased from $5.5 billion to $60 billion.

### 2nc AT: Turkey Doesn’t Use Autonomous Weapons

#### Turkey is developing and deploying autonomous weapons without connectivity to humans

Gurcan, 21 --- served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008 (June 8, 2021, Metin Gurcan, “Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'; The appearance of Turkish artificial intelligence-controlled drones in Libyan skies has rekindled questions on how lethal autonomous weapons will affect regional geopolitics and whether they should be banned,” <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/turkish-drone-sets-international-buzz-over-killer-robots>, JMP)

Turkey’s flourishing drone industry is back in the international spotlight following a UN report suggesting that Turkish-made artificial intelligence-based drones might have been used to kill enemy troops in Libya last year. If confirmed the incident would mark the debut of “killer robots” in the global theater of war.

The report by the UN Panel of Experts on Libya indicates that a Kargu-2 kamikaze drone manufactured by Turkey’s state-owned company STM was likely used in March 2020 in clashes between the forces of the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army of eastern warlord Khalifa Hifter following the latter’s besiegement of Tripoli. Logistics convoys and retreating Hifter forces “were hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 and other loitering munitions,” the report says. “The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true ‘fire, forget and find’ capability,” it noted without specifying whether anyone was actually killed.

#### International negotiations to regulate autonomous weapons are in response to Turkey’s weapons

Gurcan, 21 --- served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008 (June 8, 2021, Metin Gurcan, “Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'; The appearance of Turkish artificial intelligence-controlled drones in Libyan skies has rekindled questions on how lethal autonomous weapons will affect regional geopolitics and whether they should be banned,” <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/turkish-drone-sets-international-buzz-over-killer-robots>, JMP) **\*\*\*Note – STM =Turkey’s state-owned company who manufactured the Kargu-2 kamikaze drone**

While such technologies sound like a revolutionary step in warfare, a global debate has been simmering since the early 2000s on whether lethal autonomous weapon systems should be regulated or banned, given ethical concerns over their ability to select and hit targets without human intervention. The release of the UN report on Libya has rekindled the debate, which had been largely hypothetical thus far.

Another aspect of the debate is how and to what extent autonomous systems will change the character of war. The US journal Popular Mechanics draws a comparison to how the atomic bomb served as a divider between eras, saying the events in Libya “may similarly divide the time when humans had full control of weapons, and a time when machines made their own decisions to kill.”

Many argue that lethal autonomous systems should be banned under an international treaty similar to the 2017 UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, designed as a legally binding instrument aimed at fully eradicating nuclear weapons.

Another argument has it that lethal autonomous systems fall into the scope of indiscriminate weapons and should be banned under an existing UN convention prohibiting or restricting conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.

In 2019, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres urged states to take action to ban autonomous weapons systems. “Machines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law,” he said.

The International Committee of the Red Cross urged governments in mid-May to prohibit the use of autonomous weapons for targeting human beings and impose strict restrictions on other uses. Human Rights Watch, meanwhile, has called for “a new process … to negotiate an international treaty on killer robots,” highlighting the UN report on the incident involving the Kargu-2 in Libya and Azerbaijan’s alleged use of Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict last year.

STM has kept mum in the face of international reactions to the UN report. The company is likely pleased with the publicity in terms of marketing and future exports, but it needs to consider not only the technological aspect of the matter but also its implications in terms of international law, diplomacy and ethical concerns.

Back in 2013, I penned an article — “Drone warfare and contemporary strategy making: Does the tail wag the dog?” — that questioned whether new military technologies are undermining the subjugation of military technique to military strategy and thus policy. The question remains pertinent today in the context of lethal autonomous weapons. Such weapons are likely to change the nature of war, including political and ethical views of war. In the face of one-way determinist views of the impact of autonomous systems, I am inclined to believe that the interaction of autonomous systems with military strategy, ethics, culture and politics has barely begun.

## Cyber

### 1nc Cyber Link

#### Complexity, conflicting interpretations, and fights over intel sharing block agreement

Arts ’18 [Sophie; December 13; senior program coordinator for security and defense policy at The German Marshall Fund; "Offense as the New Defense: New Life for NATO’s Cyber Policy," https://www.gmfus.org/publications/offense-new-defense-new-life-natos-cyber-policy]

While the United States’ announcement that it would contribute its capabilities could help lend credibility to NATO’s cyber deterrence, further clarification is needed within NATO, particularly when it comes to its command structure in the cyber domain. Without clarity on this front, it is hard to imagine that the 29 NATO allies who have different threat perceptions, and face issues of cohesion and trust, could agree on effective response scenarios in a crisis situation. This is particularly critical, because cyber operations will be subject to political approval by the NATO allies.

The new Cyber Operations Center, which should be fully operational in 2023, could play an important role in that respect, but the lack of operational authority may pose a significant challenge.37 According to NATO, the center aims to “strengthen cyber defenses and integrate cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations.”38 But as the U.S. declaration on its potential cyber support to NATO confirms, it appears at this point that the center will serve to coordinate rather than oversee operations. This, coupled with allies’ unwillingness to share intelligence that may be critical to NATO’s strategic efforts, makes it difficult to envision the center as an effective tool in implementing a coherent top-down cyber strategy in the near future.

### 2nc Cyber Link

#### Even if diplomats agree, it’s a huge domestic fight within allies---that stops codification

Ulf Häußler 19, NATO Fellow for the U.S. National Defense University's Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, Assistant Legal Advisor for Operational Law at the Allied Command Transformation (NATO ACT, Norfolk/Va., USA), “Cyber Security and Defence from the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO 250 Treaty”, in Cyber Security and Defence from the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of the NATO Treaty, p. 114-115

Political Policy and Institutional Arrangements

The fact that a given cyber threat or incident crosses the threshold of political concern is without prejudice to its political and legal characterisation for the purpose of developing an appropriate response. Much will depend on political policy perceptions – are cyber threats and incidents predominantly perceived as human rights (i.e. data privacy) issues, matters of law enforcement and/or homeland security300, or matter of national security and defence – and the different roles played by the government agencies involved on the examination and assessment of cyber threats and incidents, and competent to adopt or contribute to actual responses. Accordingly, it may be for multiple reasons that NATO faces challenges in developing consensus regarding the full integration of cyber security and defence in its respective mechanisms, as well as the necessary institutional arrangements.

First, in an environment where any security and defence discourse is to a great extent predetermined by the level of political concern, there may simply have been a limited number of opportunities to actually put cyber security and defence prominently on NATO's agenda. Second, quite similar to threats arising from international terrorism, threats arising in and out of the cyber space may give rise to both internal, or homeland, and external security concerns, and thus trigger the oftentimes complex delineations of competence between the defence, law enforcement, and intelligence sectors which many NATO Nations have developed into strong checks and balances amounting to a separation of powers *en miniature* within their executive branches of government. Whilst obviously such domestic arrangements lack the capacity to affect the interpretation and application of the North Atlantic Treaty301, they may nevertheless *de facto* challenge NATO Nations' Defence Ministries' as well as Armed Forces' ability to put cyber security and defence on NATO's policy, concept, and doctrine agendas. To date, no well-entrenched method, structure or process for overcoming this *de facto* challenge – e.g. through involvement of foreign intelligence, homeland security and/or law enforcement stakeholders – exists within NATO. Third, there is a near complete lack of NATO-wide, standardised doctrine for cyber warfare. The resulting absence, amongst NATO Nations, of a militarily agreed and legally cleared (Article 36 of GP I) understanding concerning the means and methods of cyber warfare may also contribute to the lack of political policy consensus. The appetite for engaging in hostilities which might be perceived as potentially involving legally doubtful means and methods of warfare may be limited. Ultimately, the absence of consensus regarding *jus in bello* may thus have repercussions on the likelihood that consensus can be reached concerning *jus ad bellum* as well as collective security and defence.

#### Even if they support it in the abstract, the plan’s a 180-degree flip-flop from NATO’s recently announced posture

Thomas E. Ricks 17, “NATO’s Little Noticed but Important New Aggressive Stance on Cyber Weapons”, Foreign Policy, 12/7/2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/07/natos-little-noticed-but-important-new-aggressive-stance-on-cyber-weapons/

Not many people noticed it, but last month, NATO made a dramatic change in its cyber policy announced by the NATO Secretary General that arguably was the alliance’s biggest overall policy shift in decades. Having led the policy discussions in several NATO committees for the past four years on the use of cyber capabilities and cyber weapons, I can tell you this was the most hotly debated and contentious decision during my tenure at NATO.

In short, NATO embraced the use of cyber weaponry in NATO operations. This is a marked departure from NATO’s historical stance of using cyber only defensively, mainly to ward off incursions against its own networks. The more aggressive approach was intended as a strong message, primarily to Russia, that NATO intends to use the cyber capabilities of its members to deter attacks in the same way it uses land, sea, and air weaponry.

Russia’s provocative actions during the U.S. Presidential elections, its attempts to influence the French and German elections, and its blatantly aggressive, and on-going cyberwar against Ukraine were likely key determining factors which led the NATO defense ministers to adopt a more assertive stance.

On the surface, NATO’s cyber policy shifts might seem to be little more than incremental changes to its existing policy. However, the fact the alliance is standing up a cyber operations center to integrate cyber capabilities from alliance members sends a message to the world, especially Russia, that alliance members both possess and have the will to use their cyber capabilities and weaponry during military operations.

#### That makes reversal super difficult

Dr. Jarno Limnéll 16, Professor of Cybersecurity, Aalto University, Finland, and Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Senior Research Fellow, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Challenge for NATO – Cyber Article 5”, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies, June, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1119569/FULLTEXT01.pdf

Formulating clear doctrines is frequently preferred by militaries, while politicians and diplomats prefer flexibility in message and response. The Alliance has two paths it can chose in creating the doctrine regarding cyber. It can either chose a public approach, rather similar to its approach when creating its most recent strategic concept. In such a document it could generally describe what constitutes an attack that would qualify for the invocation of Article 5, and what would be an accepted retaliatory action. The other path is to maintain strategic ambiguity, recognizing that formulating clear redlines would invite potential adversaries to push up to the red line. In this case developing the doctrine is still important, but would then be for internal use only. This non-public approach may reduce the objective of improving the Alliance´s cyber deterrence. The pace of development in the field would argue against an overly specific set of guidelines or doctrine, lest it require too frequent and politically challenging updates.

### Cyber Link – Turkey Specific

#### Greece and Turkey will bring up the Aegean---neither will back down

Yotam Gutman 20, Marketing Director at SentinelOne and Retired Lt. Commander in the Israeli Navy, “Battle for Supremacy | Hacktivists from Turkey and Greece Exchange Virtual Blows”, Sentinel One Blog, 1/21/2020, https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/battle-for-supremacy-hacktivists-from-turkey-and-greece-exchange-virtual-blows/

Tensions between Greece and its neighbor, Turkey, are nothing new. Conflict in the Aegean extends back to the days of Homer, who described how a Greek army decimated the town of Troy, located near Hisarlik in Turkey. The animosity between these nations may date centuries into the past, but the weapons and tactics used in the conflict today are cutting edge cyber tools.

Greece and Turkey are now engaged in a diplomatic conflict focused on the maritime boundaries surrounding the Greek island of Crete. The row comes after Turkey and the Libyan government agreed to seek to map out a boundary that would potentially reduce Greece’s maritime territory. This conflict raises patriotic tensions on both sides, some of which have become manifest in cyberspace.

Turkish hackers last week claimed responsibility for cyber attacks on Greek government sites, including those of the Greek National Intelligence Services (EYP), Greek Parliament, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Greek Ministry of Finance among others. Turkish hackers AnkaNeferler said these were in retaliation for the Greek government’s stance on the Turkish agreement with Libya (the Turkish government is providing military support and plans to send its military troops).

Meanwhile, Greece is furious at the pact between Turkey and Sarraj’s government as it threatens to skim the Greek island of Crete, which Greece and its allies say is contrary to international law.

#### That gridlocks NATO

Elisabeth Braw 20, Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, et al., “Judy Asks: Is NATO Paralyzed Over the Greece-Turkey Conflict?”, Carnegie Europe, 9/3/2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/82643 [language modified]

When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, they did so based on NATO members’ assumption that the two countries’ membership of the alliance would pacify their behavior toward each other.

China was invited to join the World Trade Organization in 2001 on the same premise.

But as every relationship counselor tells quarreling couples, you can’t change someone’s personality. Thus, NATO finds itself with two member states that are officially allies, but whose suspicion of each other is never far from the surface. How to broker between two members without taking sides? NATO seems [gridlocked] paralyzed.

But in reality, it’s not. Sure, two quarreling member states will affect an alliance, but NATO is still going strong on its main mission: defending the territorial integrity of its member states against sundry territorial threats from other countries and nonstate actors.

Here, one could in fact wish for more participation from Greece and Turkey. According to NATO’s latest Enhanced Forward Presence figures, for example, neither country contributes to the protection of the Baltic states and Poland. Solidarity goes both ways.

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG SENIOR ADVISER AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATO’s purpose as an organization is to ensure the collective defense of its members on the basis of its founding Washington Treaty. It was never designed to adjudicate disputes between its members. It should therefore not come as a surprise that NATO is [gridlocked] ~~paralyzed~~ over the current Greece-Turkey conflict.

### OCO Link

#### NATO is Divided over OCOs

**Lonergan and Montgomery** 1/25/**22** (Dr. Erica Lonergan (née Borghard) is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. She is also a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Erica previously served as a senior director on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, US Navy, is the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mark previously served as the executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. “PRESSING QUESTIONS: OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS AND NATO STRATEGY” <https://mwi.usma.edu/pressing-questions-offensive-cyber-operations-and-nato-strategy/>) //AB

Additionally, the reality is that several NATO members are already speaking publicly about offensive cyber operations below the level of warfare and their statements and actions have an effect on the entire alliance. In particular, NATO member nations have not reached a political consensus about the role of offensive cyber operations. In 2018, the US Department of Defense and US Cyber Command issued new [strategy](https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF) and policy [documents](https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.pdf) that articulated a role for the military in conducting offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict outside of US-controlled cyberspace (part of the “defend forward” strategy), and there has been some reporting about US offensive cyber operations. For instance, in [2018](https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/what-a-u-s-operation-against-russian-trolls-predicts-about-escalation-in-cyberspace/) the United States disrupted the Russian-linked Internet Research Agency from interfering in the midterm elections. And, more recently, in [December 2021](https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/05/politics/us-cyber-command-disrupt-ransomware-operations/index.htmlPolitics) General Paul Nakasone, commander of US Cyber Command, publicly acknowledged that the military played a role in disrupting ransomware groups targeting critical infrastructure. The United States has also worked with other NATO allies, such as [Estonia](https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2433245/hunt-forward-estonia-estonia-us-strengthen-partnership-in-cyber-domain-with-joi/) and [Montenegro](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/02/us/politics/cyber-command-hackers-russia.html), to conduct “hunt forward” cyber operations on allied and partner networks to uncover and disrupt malicious cyber activity.

Other NATO allies have also been more transparent about offensive cyber operations. In 2020, the [United Kingdom](https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/what-will-britains-new-cyber-force-actually-do/) announced a significant investment in its National Cyber Force, its organizational arm for offensive cyber operations, and its [2022 National Cyber Strategy](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-strategy-2022/national-cyber-security-strategy-2022#contents) emphasized the role of offensive cyber operations. In November 2021, General Nakasone and the director of Government Communications Headquarters—the UK government’s principal signals intelligence agency—[stated](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-59335332) jointly that the two governments were collaborating to “impose consequences” in cyberspace to disrupt adversary operations. The Netherlands has also publicly [alluded](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/08/the-netherlands-just-revealed-its-cybercapacity-so-what-does-that-mean/) to conducting offensive cyber operations.

Next Steps: Addressing Challenges and Mitigating Risks

Given the threat environment facing NATO, as well as the activities of several NATO members, the alliance should deliberately—but purposefully—consider incorporating offensive cyber operations below the level of armed conflict into its deterrence strategy. Any effort to explore a role for offensive cyber operations should also consider the challenges and risks that may come with doing so. A central challenge is that, at the political level, NATO allies lack consensus on the appropriate application of offensive cyber power—especially below the level of armed conflict. Addressing these disagreements among member states is essential because conducting offensive cyber operations often requires maneuvering through or operating on [networks controlled by an ally or allies](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02684527.2020.1729316). Right now, NATO members do not collectively [agree](https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations) on the [protocols](https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/cyber-defence-nato-countries-comparing-models) and processes for partner actions in allied networks—and they also disagree on how to define [sovereignty](https://texaslawreview.org/respect-sovereignty-cyberspace/) in cyberspace, or when an offensive cyber operation would rise to the level of an armed attack.

Offensive cyber operations for NATO also present real interoperability challenges. The role of intelligence in cyber operations is likely to complicate NATO planning processes. Even close allies are likely to be wary about sharing sensitive intelligence for a number of reasons. For instance, they may be averse to sharing information gleaned from signals intelligence collection or because a member state may be using the same exploits for both offensive action and their own espionage—including intelligence collection against [allies](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-security-agency-spied-merkel-other-top-european-officials-through-danish-2021-05-30/). Or, allies may simply be worried that sensitive information may become exposed. On top of this, it’s challenging to adjudicate intelligence requirements among allies and to deconflict intelligence and military priorities. It is also not clear whether the alliance has established consensus thresholds that specify the conditions and timeline under which a state would have to notify others of its activities on their networks—if at all.

## Biotech

### CBT Link

#### CBT could generate controversy with vast changes

Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London, 21 (2/26/21, Alonso Bernal, Cameron Carter, Mohamad Elgendi, Melanie Kemp, Richard Kim, Gabriel Ramirez, Ishpreet Singh, Ujwal Arunkumar Taranath, Klinsman Vaz, Alysia Mirilia Martins and FNU Mallika. : Sophia Mexi-Jones and Bridget Shidok. Under the Supervision of: Lawrence Aronhime, Associate Teaching Professor, and Alexander Cocron, Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University Whiting School of Engineering. “Cognitive Biotechnology: Opportunities and Considerations for the NATO alliance” <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/02/26/cognitive-biotechnology-opportunities-and-considerations-for-the-nato-alliance/index.html>) //AB

The current state and future potential of CBT

Cognitive Biotechnologies are at present focused on three main areas of research: biophysical, biochemical and behavioural. The future direction of these technologies is difficult to predict, particularly as many are still emerging. But they have the potential to significantly disrupt existing assumptions about the evolution of civil society, the economy, and military affairs. It is therefore in the interest of the Alliance to closely monitor the rise of those technologies and applications that are most likely to affect or disrupt current defence constructs and doctrine. Moreover, it will be important to direct early-stage investment into those areas that are particularly promising for the Alliance, or to those which will most likely impact its competitiveness.

Biophysical technologies

Advances in the biophysical area centre on brain computer interfaces (BCI), which can be directly inserted into the human body or via transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS). tDCS is a form of neuromodulation that uses constant, direct currents delivered via electrodes on the head, and can be worn or removed at will. While BCI was originally developed to provide assistive technologies (such as prosthetic arms and mentally controlled wheelchairs), recent developments in bi-directionality have allowed for enhanced sensing, for example, bionic eyes or other enhancements to situational awareness. Further applications of these technologies could lead to mental control of aircraft or ground vehicle systems; mind-guided drones or missiles; or the mechanisation of soldiers via exoskeletons and advanced sensors.

At the same time, tDCS applications have been shown to regulate the human brain itself, affecting the brain’s executive functions, learning mechanisms, memory, language processing, sensory perception, and motor functions. Current work with tDCS focuses on recovery from PTSD and treatment of mental ailments like obsessive compulsive disorder. But the technology also provides for the possibility of raising soldiers’ cognitive and physical capabilities: to analyse scenarios more easily and quickly; to retain and retrieve memories with greater acuity; to modulate perceptions of pain; to improve psychological self-protection; and to embed muscle memory and motor skills more quickly. Another controversial aspect of tDCS is the potential to look inside the mind of the user, to display and play back past memories on an external monitor, or even to insert synthetic memories and images into the mind.

#### Ethical considerations for biotech are unsolved now --- significant issues could emerge

Johns Hopkins University and Imperial College London, 21 (2/26/21, Alonso Bernal, Cameron Carter, Mohamad Elgendi, Melanie Kemp, Richard Kim, Gabriel Ramirez, Ishpreet Singh, Ujwal Arunkumar Taranath, Klinsman Vaz, Alysia Mirilia Martins and FNU Mallika. : Sophia Mexi-Jones and Bridget Shidok. Under the Supervision of: Lawrence Aronhime, Associate Teaching Professor, and Alexander Cocron, Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University Whiting School of Engineering. “Cognitive Biotechnology: Opportunities and Considerations for the NATO alliance” <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/02/26/cognitive-biotechnology-opportunities-and-considerations-for-the-nato-alliance/index.html>) //AB

Ethical issues and responsible use

There are several ethical considerations for CBT that may transcend even AI in their complexity. First is the issue of personal agency. If CBT is able to motivate, enable, and even control human decision making and action, where does individual responsibility end? Are soldiers responsible for their actions when under the influence of advanced CBT, and under what conditions?

Relatedly, how does the Alliance ensure that there is sufficient consent for the use of CBT for individuals tasked to use the technology? These technologies can be invasive, both physiologically and mentally, and have the potential to cause harm, particularly as we do not fully understand their unintended cognitive and biological consequences.

In addition, significant privacy concerns will be raised once these technologies can enter our minds and see our most private thoughts and memories. What are the limits of such searches? And what are the protections for physiological and cognitive data, and who may store and control their dissemination or cause their deletion? More generally, what protections will we have against the potential of mind control, cognitive erasure, and reprogramming?

The Alliance’s success with CBT will depend upon well-designed principles and practices relating to these ethical considerations, since the adoption and integration of these technologies will be based on the consent and acceptance of Allied governments and their societies at large. As in the case of AI, the Alliance and member governments will need to develop principles of responsible use, addressing such issues as privacy, consent, lawfulness, responsibility and governability.

## Impacts

### 2nc NATO Unity Prevents Great Power War

#### **NATO is unified now – prevents great power war**

Garamone, 6/16/22 – Reporter at the Department of Defense [Jim; 6/16/22 U.S. Department of Defense; “NATO Defense Leaders Set Stage for Alliance Decisions at Madrid Summit”; accessed 6/23/22; Lowell-DC]

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III joined 29 other NATO defense ministers in Brussels to set the stage for the alliance's Madrid Summit that will start June 29.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the Madrid Summit of NATO heads of state and government will be a transformative event "at a pivotal time for our security."

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is certainly a transformative event. The international rules-based order set up after World War II was designed to resolve issues peacefully. The order respects sovereignty and is based on the rule of law.

It has been successful. There were still small wars, but there was nothing approaching the great power wars that killed more than 40 million people globally in the 20th century. NATO was instrumental in preventing a great power war with the Soviet Union, and it adjusted after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union to "export" peace.

Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is a direct challenge to this rules-based order, and NATO must adjust and respond.

"Since Russia's indefensible invasion of Ukraine, we have had to face events that we all hoped would never come to pass," Austin said at the conclusion of the second day of the NATO Defense Ministerial. "And this alliance has met the challenge with determination, with resolve and, above all, with unity. Together, we have responded swiftly and decisively to Russia's baseless, lawless and reckless invasion of Ukraine."

Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the rules-based order was successful in preventing a great power war and in preventing large powers from conquering smaller countries with military force.

But now, "Ukraine is under threat. They are at war, and we will continue to support them," Milley said following a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Brussels, June 15. "But the rules-based international order is also under threat due to the actions of Russia in the Ukraine.

"The international community is not allowing this unambiguous act of aggression by Russia to go unanswered," he continued. "To do so risks the world returning to an era when large powerful countries can invade smaller countries at will. That is what the international community is up against. Since the initiation of hostilities in late February, the global community has responded in an unprecedented manner."

The NATO nations are resolute in opposition to this Russian war. But the war still changes the calculus in Europe and around the world. Russia is not the only nation seeking to overturn the rules-based order. China, too, wants to replace the system even though that system has lifted China economically. And Austin said the new NATO Strategic Concept keeps a wary eye on the Indo-Pacific.

Still, the talk of the ministerial concerned Ukraine and the challenge Russia presents. The alliance is looking to beef up deterrence and defense in the Eastern countries of the alliance, Austin said.

"During this enormous crisis in European security, we're proud to stand together to strengthen the rules-based international order that protects us all," the secretary said.

"Together, we have risen to the challenge of [President Vladimir] Putin's war of choice and Russia's assault on transatlantic security," Austin said. "Our allies have activated NATO's defense plans. They've deployed elements of the NATO Response Force. And they've placed tens of thousands of troops in the eastern areas of the alliance, along with significant air and naval assets under direct NATO command, supported by allies' national deployments."

The alliance is looking to the future and NATO leaders are making long-term plans to deter and defend every inch of NATO territory. This is especially aimed at the East, the secretary said.

Many of the ministers' recommendations will be presented to NATO leaders in Madrid. These will include basing decisions, the footprint of forces throughout the continent, all domain combat and more.

The secretary said he was pleased with the work the ministers did during the ministerial but could not elaborate on the decisions. Those will be ratified later. "See you in Madrid," he told reporters.

### 2nc Unity Key to Defeat Russia

#### **Unity key to ensure Russian defeat**

Malinowski, 22 – vice chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee [2/28/22, “Democracy In Danger: The Russian Threat To Ukraine”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/democracy-danger-russian-threat-ukraine, access date 6/19/22 //TJ]

People ask, why is Putin doing this? I’m sure we’ll talk about that a little bit. And I think it’s also become pretty clear. The mask is off this man. It has nothing to do with any kind of legitimate concerns he has about Ukraine joining NATO. There’s no military threat from Ukraine to Russia. Little-known fact of recent history, Ukraine actually promised not to join NATO in 2010. They passed a resolution in their parliament, a resolution of neutrality, that they would join no military blocs, whether led by Russia or by the United States. And four years later, in 2014, Russia invaded them anyway, because – well, because they had overthrown a corrupt Putin-type, Putin-style leader, and established a much more healthy and vibrant democracy.

That’s what threatens Putin above all, that these people who do share a lot of kinship with Russians and a lot of history, who are very close by, who he believes are part of his sphere of influence, have set an example for the Russian people that you can boot out a corrupt and authoritarian leader, because they’re choosing to align themselves with Europeans. They want to be part of the European Union. That is actually much more threatening to Putin than NATO membership. And so he’s just decided that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to exist, unless it’s completely subjugated by Russia. That’s what he’s fighting for here.

And I think that is – it’s both awful and evil, but it’s also a weakness for Putin, because it’s not an obsession. His obsession with ending Ukraine as a country, with reconstituting the Soviet Union, is not an obsession I think that most Russians share. I think it may not even be an obsession that most Russian officials working for Putin share. If you – if anybody caught that surreal meeting of the Russian national security council that Putin staged just before the invasion, in which he humiliated his own officials and forced them to, in effect, ask him to do this thing on live television, they didn’t look very happy. (Laughs.) They didn’t look like this is – this is where they would be leading their country at this moment.

So I think, you know, although the Russian military has enormous strength compared to the Ukrainians, they clearly have superiority on the battlefield. They’re probably going to win a lot of tactical victories. They may take the capital of Kyiv, and all of that will be awful, I do think that strategically our side has more advantages than the Russian side**.** As long as we’re unified across the Atlantic, as long as we’re unified within the United States, as long as we understand the stakes and have the staying power to stand by the Ukrainians through what could be a long and difficult fight, I think a tactical victory for Putin could turn into a very significant strategic defeat. And that needs to be out goal. Thank you so much.

### 2nc Unity Prevent Miscalc

#### NATO unity and military strategy prevents Russian miscalc and escalation

Stoltenberg, 22 – NATO Secretary General [Antony J., Jens; 6/1/22; “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg At a Joint Press Availability”; <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-at-a-joint-press-availability/>; accessed 6/21/22; Lowell-DC]

SECRETARY GENERAL STOLTENBERG: Thank you so much, Secretary Blinken, dear Tony. It’s great to see you again, and thank you for your strong personal engagement for our transatlantic bond in this pivotal time for our security. And this is very much reflected in your frequent visits to Brussels. You are welcome back there again, but now I really appreciate this opportunity to meet with you here in Washington.

The United States is playing an indispensible role in our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, let me commend the United States for your very significant support to Ukraine, which is making a difference on the battlefield every day. I also welcome the latest package of military assistance announced by President Biden this morning. This is a demonstration of real U.S. leadership. The strong support provided by NATO and Allies helps ensure that President Putin’s brutal aggression is not rewarded, and that Ukraine prevails.

At the same time, we must prevent the conflict from escalating, so we have increased our presence in the eastern part of the Alliance to remove any room for miscalculation in Moscow about NATO’s readiness and determination to defend and protect all NATO Allies.

Let me thank the United States for increasing your military presence across Europe, with over 100,000 troops backed by significant air and naval power. European allies and Canada are also stepping up with more troops, high readiness, and increased defense spending. For the seventh consecutive year, defense spending has increased, and more and more Allies are meeting our guideline of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense.

President Putin wanted less NATO. He is getting more NATO, more troops, and more NATO members.

The decisions by Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership are historic, and they will strengthen our Alliance. We have to address the security concerns of all Allies, and I’m confident that we will find the united way forward.

To this end, I’m in close contact with President Erdoğan of Turkey and with the leaders of Finland and Sweden. And I will convene senior officials from all three countries in Brussels in the coming days.

Today, we also discussed the important decisions we will take at the NATO summit in Madrid later this month. We will agree NATO’s next Strategic Concept, strengthen our deterrence and defense, and prepare for an age of increased strategic competition with authoritarian powers like Russia and China. This includes working even more closely with our partners in the Asia-Pacific and other likeminded partners around the world.

We will also review progress on burden-sharing. We must continue to invest in our defense and to invest in NATO because only North America and Europe, working together in a strong NATO, can keep our 1 billion people safe in a more dangerous world.

So Secretary Blinken, dear Tony, once again, thank you so much.

### 2nc Turns China and Iran

#### **Failure to effectively defend Ukraine will greenlight Iran and Chinese invasion of Taiwan**

Malinowski & Lohsen 22 – vice chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, AND \*\*fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [ 2/28/22, Representative Tom Malinowski (D-NJ), Andrew Lohsen, “Democracy In Danger: The Russian Threat To Ukraine”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/democracy-danger-russian-threat-ukraine, access date 6/19/22 //TJ]

Rep. Malinowski: There will be bipartisan support for whatever needs to happen. The president simply needs to ask, and I think that will be provided. You know, we’ll have to see how the crisis unfolds, what the needs are. Certainly, we want to continue to provide military support to the Ukrainians. And if the president needs any additional preparations to enable that to happen, I’m sure that that will be forthcoming from Congress. We are ready to act and I think united on the principles, no matter what the partisan talking points may be on cable news.

Mr. Lohsen: I think that’s really reassuring to know, for those of us who care about Ukraine, and for the Ukrainians who are experiencing the conflict firsthand and in real time. One of the questions that I keep asking myself is how to kind of communicate why this is important to ordinary Americans who simply think that this is a conflict that’s far away from home, that the U.S. doesn’t have a dog in the fight, that it’s better just to stay out and let the Europeans handle it themselves. How do you respond to that? How is this an issue that Americans should care about?

Rep. Malinowski: That was the case I tried to make, that we – America helped build a world in which borders are not changed by force. And, you know, we – there are very few Americans still alive who have a memory of the Second World War, but I think it’s still part of our collective memory as a country. And we know what a mistake it was to let Hitler invade Czechoslovakia just because it was a tiny country far away that had nothing to do with us. And we never again want to learn that lesson the hard way, as we did in – when Pearl Harbor was attacked in 1941.

China’s watching this. China has designs on Taiwan, as we all know, and potentially other countries in its region. Iran is watching this. We absolutely do not want to send a signal to these aggressive powers that anything goes now – that the United States is no longer a serious country, that we’re no longer the head of a serious alliance that is willing to do its part to deter that kind of aggression.

And remember, we’re not being asked to fight. We’re not being asked to send troops. First thing that President Zelensky of Ukraine said to us when we met with him three weeks ago was: We do not need you to send a single American soldier to fight for Ukraine. We will do the fighting ourselves. We will protect our country. We just need you to be on our side, to help us with material support, to use your economic power to punish Russia. That’s all that’s being asked of us here. It’s not a lot.

And our European allies are with us. In fact, they’re going to shoulder a much greater share of the burden, because they’re the ones who are going to be taking refugees. They’re the ones who are going to suffer the consequences of Russia’s energy blackmail. I mean, Germans are going to be paying twice as much for heating, for heating their homes, because of this. And they’re willing to do it. So they’re willing to do that. We should be willing to do our part.

Mr. Lohsen: Now, one of the things that I also wanted to make sure that we had a chance to discuss was the democracy agenda, and what this means for the U.S. interest in supporting transitioning democracies around the world. Since the revolution of dignity in 2014, the cornerstone of U.S. support for Ukraine has been anti-corruption and governance assistance, and to help Ukraine transition into a more open society and a more fully functioning democracy. And yet, it seems now it’s being punished by Russia for pursuing those aspirations. So how do we take that into consideration as we – as we consider trying to promote open societies around the world and defend democracies from this new wave of authoritarianism?

Rep. Malinowski: Ukrainians didn’t start fighting corruption or building a democracy because we told them to, because we wanted them to. It’s what they want to do. (Laughs.) It’s how people want to live in any normal society in the world. We supported them in making that choice. We provided them with assistance and encouragement. But this was their chosen path. And their commitment to that chosen path only got stronger the more the Russians tried to stop them.

And I think that there’s probably no people in the world today, on Friday February 25th, who are more committed to pursuing that path than the people of Ukraine, precisely because of what Russia is doing to them. So, look, we have to be on the side of the good guys here. We stand up to bullies. We stand up for democracy. That’s who we are. That’s our identity. That’s why people all around the world rally to our side when we need them in a crisis. And we’re going to continue to do that.

Mr. Lohsen: I’d like to turn now to a couple of questions from the audience. We’ve gotten some excellent questions in our Q&A. And one of them is, you know, building on this question, again, about what the current invasion means in the long run for democracies elsewhere. But there’s a specific focus on what this means for Taiwan and other countries – democracies that are imperiled by much larger neighbors who think that they can now enforce a might by right principle – or, right by might principle – excuse me. Pushing, you know, other countries around just to build spheres of influence. How would you respond to that? And what the United States can be doing, and the collective West can be doing, for other countries that are really looking for that reassurance?

Rep. Malinowski: Well, all these situations are a little bit different, but I think fundamentally it’s the same principle. And so, yes, the people of Taiwan are watching this very closely. And I’m sure they feel a strong sense of kinship with Ukrainians right now. China’s also watching this very closely. And I think the Chinese government is watching to see how steadfast the United States is going to be. Because that sends a signal. If our reaction is it’s a little country far away, it’s not worth any sacrifice, we’re more worried about the price of gas than the peace of Europe, then I think that’s a signal to China that if they – if they dare to invade Taiwan at some point in the future, that the United States is not going to have to stop them.

And that makes war there more likely. And that war would absolutely come home to the United States. (Laughs.) You don’t have to believe in any of the high principles that I’ve been – that I’ve been talking about in this conversation. Taiwan produces most of the world’s advanced microchips. You want to see car prices shoot through the roof? Invite China to invade Taiwan. If you don’t want China to invade Taiwan, defend Ukraine.

### AT: Russia Not a Threat

#### **Still high risk of escalation even after Kyiv battle – include nuclear use – NATO can’t afford to take a break**

Gramer MacKinnon 22 – diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy [6/7/22, “NATO Allies Are Rethinking Russia’s Supposed Military Prowess But Russia’s early military failures in Ukraine don’t make it any less dangerous, military analysts warn.”, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/ukraine-nato-allies-rethinking-russia-military-prowess/ //TJ]

There are two major assumptions that defense planners in major NATO capitals got wrong for years, former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in an interview with [Foreign Policy](about:blank). First, Rasmussen said, “we have overestimated the strength of the Russian military. Despite huge investments in military equipment and the reopening of old Soviet bases, we have seen a very weak Russian military.”

“The other miscalculation is we have underestimated the brutality and the ambitions of President [Vladimir] Putin,” Rasmussen added.

Now, in capitals in Europe and North America, wonks in defense ministries are dusting off years-old assessments of the Russian military’s fighting prowess and starting to question long-held assumptions on what a conventional war between NATO members and Russia would look like.

“Whether it was morale or communications or lack of preparedness, there’s a bunch of factors that have added up to something that you just wouldn’t expect to see from an advanced military,” Skaluba said of the Russian forces, “even if the initial conditions or assumptions under which they went in [to Ukraine] were invalidated.”

One possible scenario that NATO militaries had long prepared for is a rapid land-grab of the Baltic states, on NATO’s vulnerable eastern flank. NATO members had planned and prepared exercises to take those countries back from Russian forces—presuming that Russia could quickly overwhelm their militaries and capture the territory in the first place.

After seeing how poorly Russian troops fared against Ukraine’s forces, some U.S. and other Western defense planners are pushing NATO to reassess that plan: It seems more feasible that, with the proper size and combination of alliance forces, command structures, and military hardware in the Baltics, they could effectively deter or, if not, withstand and repel an invasion by Russian forces. On the flip side, a Russian attempt to invade NATO territory in the Baltics also suddenly seems like a much less unlikely scenario.

Baltic leaders are expected to propose that [NATO expand its footprint](about:blank) in the region at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid in late June. If enacted, Baltic officials say, the upgrade in NATO forces could act as a more effective form of “deterrence by denial” against Putin preparing any plans to seize Baltic territory. After having seen U.S. intelligence on the impending Russian invasion borne out, Baltic nations are hoping that laggards like France and Germany will sign onto their plan.

“We’re still not giving them what they want,” one U.S. source told Foreign Policy.

With relations between NATO and Russia at their most precarious point in the post-Cold War era, some analysts feel it is time to start drawing preliminary conclusions for what a NATO-Russia conflict might look like, in the event that the Ukraine conflict spills into alliance territory. “The risk of escalation still remains, so it’s prudent for NATO planners to be thinking about what a potential conflict between NATO and Russia could look like,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former senior U.S. intelligence official now with the Center for a New American Security, a think tank.

Skaluba, Kendall-Taylor, and other military analysts caution that the war in Ukraine is far from over, and it’s possible Russia could learn to adapt and improve its military, particularly as it works to shake off the sting from its defeats in northern Ukraine and capture territories in eastern Ukraine. “We’ve already seen a capable Russian force in places like Georgia and Syria and now a bit more so in Ukraine,” said Skaluba, who is now director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. “I can’t believe that really pitiful performance we saw for a few months [in Ukraine] is reflective of the entire Russian military.”

Precise numbers on the casualties in the war on both sides are hard to verify, but it’s clear that Russia has already incurred staggering losses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky [asserted](about:blank) that some 30,000 Russian service members have been killed, while the British government estimates that number could be closer to 15,000. But Moscow still has massive reserves of military personnel and conscripts, even if they are poorly trained and equipped, and has shown no intention of backing down from the war.

The war has had two distinct phases thus far: an initial assault on Kyiv, based on the highly flawed political assumption that the Ukrainian government would collapse within days, and the ongoing fight in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, where Russia’s top military brass have exerted more influence over operations.

“In the early phases of the war, the bigger problem was the plan rather than the army,” said Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military with CNA, a think tank. “Now we’re in a phase where we’re much more able to evaluate the Russian army.”

In the buildup to the war, there was a broad consensus in the West that if Russia were to launch an all-out attack, Ukrainian military resistance would quickly crumble. Ukraine’s stiff and effective resistance proved everyone wrong, from Putin to many defense planners in Washington. But drawing direct lessons from the conflict for NATO can be tricky due to the vast number of variables involved.

“There is no such thing as a general NATO-Russia fight,” Kofman said. “It depends where, under what conditions, the plans, war aims, and assumptions truly matter. This isn’t a thing that exists in the abstract.”

Any potential conflict between Russia and NATO, however unlikely, could also quickly escalate beyond what is playing out in Ukraine—a fight between land forces—and heighten the risk of Russia drawing on its untested nuclear arsenal, said Jim Townsend, another former Pentagon official and expert on trans-Atlantic security. “There is a lot of the Russian military capability that has not been touched by this war nor been tested by this war,” he said.

Townsend also argued that NATO shouldn’t assume that a smaller size of better trained and better equipped NATO forces would be able to hold its own against a larger Russian invading force. In other words, just because Russia’s military stumbled out of the gate in Ukraine doesn’t mean NATO shouldn’t breathe easy.

“Yes, [Russia] made some stupid assumptions which cascaded in a lot of bad ways, and we made some stupid assumptions about their military modernization program,” he said. “There’s a lot of reasons why we could fool ourselves right now into thinking the Russians really suck. … But we’re going to be dealing with a wounded bear who is still very dangerous.”

### AT: Ukraine Will Lose Inevitably

#### There is still hope for Ukraine to win against Russia

Engelbrekt, 6/3/2022 --- military expert and professor at the Swedish Defense University in Stockholm (June 03, 2022 05:50 GMT, Interview by Reid Standish of Kjell Engelbrekt, “Interview: What's Next For Finland, Sweden's NATO Bids?” <https://www.rferl.org/a/sweden-finland-nato-bids-interview/31880579.html>, LKK)

RFE/RL: Changing the subject now to Ukraine, what’s your assessment of where things currently stand? Russia is making some steady gains in the Donbas, but can they hold these new areas and should we expect some Ukrainian counteroffensives at some point?  
Engelbrekt: I think it's a matter of priority for the Ukrainian side.  
Russia announced in February before it invaded that it would formally recognize the administrative areas of the two so-called people's republics in Donetsk and Luhansk and they would try to capture them. So if I were in Kyiv right now I might give higher priority to consolidating my positions in the south and if I do counteroffensives, I'd do them there. So it's a matter of priorities -- military and political -- for the Ukrainian side.  
Looking ahead, manpower issues loom large for both Kyiv and Moscow. Troops in each army are exhausted, but the morale on the Ukrainian side still appears to be very high. So I think it will be possible for the Ukrainians to train fresh troops and move them in. But that looks to be a more difficult challenge for the Russians, especially in the longer term. I think morale is really low on the Russian side. If there are continued deliveries of Western military equipment to the Ukrainians, they may at some point have the wherewithal to challenge Russian positions.  
But again, I think it's an issue of priorities for them. They would probably try and mop up the Russian forces in the north and then they would want to move in and around Kherson in the south before they make a move on Luhansk and Donetsk, where it seems like there is also a deep political commitment from Moscow to capture and hold those positions.

### 2nc Expansion Solves Russian War

#### NATO expansion will generate internal pressure on Putin to change course and moderate its foreign policy

Mitchell, 22 – senior advisor for the Russia and Europe Center at USIP [A. Wess, May 26,United States Institute of Peace, “Putin’s War Backfires as Finland, Sweden Seek to Join NATO; The Russian autocrat aimed to check NATO’s expansion but has instead strengthened the alliance,” <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/putins-war-backfires-finland-sweden-seek-join-nato>, Acc 6/23/22, HO]

What are the short-term implications of NATO expansion, specifically for the war in Ukraine? Could it prolong the war or compel Putin to take desperate measures, like deploying WMDs?

The decision by Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership demonstrates the unintended consequences for Putin of his war in Ukraine. While his immediate objective was to defeat and subjugate Ukraine, he also wanted to create a kind of demonstration effect of Russian strength and, as the pre-war Russian diplomatic note made plain, push NATO back from Russia’s borders. The war has achieved exactly the opposite. Now, Russia will have even more NATO presence on its borders, both through the addition of hundreds of miles of NATO territory to the Russian frontier, and through the deployment of Western troop presence in Central Europe. So, the war is backfiring for Putin not only militarily but geopolitically.

The immediate implication is that Putin will have to give military attention to Russia’s northwestern flank at a moment when he needs all the firepower he can muster for the conflict in Ukraine. Rather than prolonging the war, if anything, NATO’s Nordic expansion could shorten it by increasing the military demands on Russia. Politically, it may increase the pressure on Putin from within the Russian elite to alter course, since it is a further illustration, alongside the effects of sanctions and losses in the war itself, of the costs of his aggressive foreign policy. Remember, Putin’s central value proposition, and the key to his legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian elite, is his claim to military competence — specifically, the ability to be able to rebuild Russian power and prestige by the effective use of the military. If the war exposes that as a fiction, as it is now doing, and also amasses sufficient geopolitical, economic and political costs along the way, then Putin’s value proposition as a leader is seriously eroded in Kremlin circles, and among the Russian populace as well.

#### NATO expansion is the only way to prevent Russia expansion

[KLVAŇA](about:blank) 22 – former press secretary and policy adviser to the president of the Czech Republic and visiting professor at New York University Prague [2/25/22, “The Real Reasons Putin Feels Threatened by NATO”, *The Bulwark*, [https://www.thebulwark.com/the-real-reasons-putin-feels-threatened-by-nato/](about:blank), accessed 6/18/22 //TJ]

The most prominent pretext Vladimir Putin has used for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine is the [NATO membership promised to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008](about:blank). Putin has said again and again that NATO is a threat to Russia, and demanded, in December and again in his pre-war ultimatum this week, that the alliance roll back its troops to where they were in 1997, two years before NATO expanded to Central Europe. In this, he is in a way supported by some respected American foreign policy commentators—Tom Friedman, John Mearsheimer, and others—who have dusted off their mid-’90s realist arguments against enlarging NATO, and are claiming vindication today. To support his case, Friedman [recently referenced](about:blank) the late George Kennan’s well-known opposition to accepting new members into the alliance, quoting things Kennan told him [back in 1998](about:blank). None of these critics, of course, approves of Russia’s aggression, but there is an I-told-you-so element to their argument.

Here is why they are wrong.

Putin is correct when he says NATO is a danger to him, but not in the way you think. Putin knows that NATO does not pose a military threat to Moscow. He has the same information about NATO tanks, armored vehicles, missiles, and troops in Europe as we all do. He knows that NATO is a defensive alliance that would never attack his country unprovoked. He opposed NATO for the same reason he opposed deploying U.S. antimissile defenses in Central Europe 15 years ago: He knew well then they were not aimed at Russia, but were to defend the continent from an attack by at most several ballistic missiles coming from the Middle East, for example from Iran or a rogue terrorist group. Nothing will protect Europe from a massive Russian missile attack. But Putin opposed the stationing of the tracking radar and kinetic missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland because he did not want to have any U.S. military installations there.

Why, then, did Putin oppose the antimissile defenses if he knew they were not a military threat? Because they were a political threat. When a country gets a U.S. military base on its territory, it will not have a Russian base there. Putin rejects NATO in Central and Eastern Europe because he himself wants to be there—in some cases directly, such as now in Ukraine, and later possibly in the Baltics; in other cases indirectly, like in the Czech Republic or Hungary, by bribing local politicians, spreading his economic influence and covert intelligence operations. These things are much harder to do in a NATO member state than in a Finlandized zone of “neutrality.”

#### **NATO expansion challenges Russian anti-democratic moves – need to act now**

[KLVAŇA](about:blank) 22 – former press secretary and policy adviser to the president of the Czech Republic and visiting professor at New York University Prague [2/25/22, “The Real Reasons Putin Feels Threatened by NATO”, *The Bulwark*, [https://www.thebulwark.com/the-real-reasons-putin-feels-threatened-by-nato/](about:blank), accessed 6/18/22 //TJ]

Another well-known reason for Putin’s attack is his fear that Ukraine might have evolved into a stable, prosperous democracy and as such would be a role model for the pro-Western democratic opposition in Russia. He acts now based on what to him is a rational calculation of his own interests in his own political survival: He does not want to end up in prison, or even blindfolded standing against a brick wall.

What foreign policy realists do not understand—or do not want to understand—is that even if NATO had not been enlarged to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, there would be a very good chance that Putin would still behave the way he does today. There would be one difference—his political playground in Central Europe would be larger than it is today. Corruption would be an order of magnitude higher, instability would deter foreign investment, and the living standard of citizens of Warsaw, Prague, Vilnius, Bratislava, and Budapest, which is now close to Western standards (the Czechs are richer than the Spaniards and the Portuguese, and are quickly catching up to the Italians), would have been significantly lower, essentially similar to today’s Ukraine, which never got the chance to integrate with Europe.

NATO and EU enlargement have been the most successful European policies in the last three decades. The lives of the hundred million people in the former Communist states now in NATO and EU have been—despite the current difficulties—immensely improved. If we heeded the “realists” and decided “not to poke the sleeping Russian bear,” as they liked to say, and had not enlarged NATO, which provides for security, stability, and therefore also prosperity, the lives of the hundred million would have been much worse. And in exchange for what exactly? For the hope that Russia would successfully transition, ditch its historically entrenched imperialist expansionism, and become more Western? Does that sound realistic to you?

#### Ukraine conflict limits Putin’s likely response to NATO membership --- signs of aggression will just solidify NATO

Mitchell, 22 – senior advisor for the Russia and Europe Center at USIP [A. Wess, May 26,United States Institute of Peace, “Putin’s War Backfires as Finland, Sweden Seek to Join NATO; The Russian autocrat aimed to check NATO’s expansion but has instead strengthened the alliance,” <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/putins-war-backfires-finland-sweden-seek-join-nato>, Acc 6/23/22, HO]

Aside from immediate measures and threats (e.g., cutting off energy supplies to Finland, Putin’s threat of a “technical military” response), how do you expect Putin to respond if Finland and Sweden formally join NATO?

Putin’s dilemma is that he has to respond in some way to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO moves to avoid seeming weak, yet he has few obvious or effective response options. For years he has threatened both countries that joining NATO would lead to negative consequences, so he can’t afford to not respond in some fashion. The easiest response is to cut energy exports, as he has done. But both countries can diversify energy sources without excessively straining their economies. Militarily, Putin’s usual response would be to send Russian conventional forces to the border with Finland and to deploy Russian planes and ships to the eastern Baltic. But he needs all the military power he can get in Ukraine.

So, Putin’s most likely response will be to deploy missiles to the border with Finland and to Kaliningrad. Russia possesses a large nuclear arsenal, including numerous low-yield, or tactical, nuclear weapons. Putin is likely to deploy such weapons in a way that plays to Finnish and Swedish fears that entering NATO will trigger an aggressive Russian response. He is aware that there are strong pacifist traditions in both countries. In the old days, stoking those dynamics by aggressive moves to create pressure on Finnish and Swedish governments might have had its desired effect. But doing so now is only likely to increase Finnish and Swedish support for NATO membership, given what they’ve seen happening in Ukraine. That’s what war does — it creates fear, and fear leads peaceful nations to seek security through alliances.

### 2nc NATO Expansion Stabilizes Europe & Improves Hybrid Threat Response

#### Finland and Sweden accession improves NATO on total defense and hybrid threats – will make Baltics and all of Europe more stable

**Berzina, 22 – senior fellow and head of the geopolitics team at the Alliance for Securing Democracy** [5-19-2022, GMF "What Can NATO Learn from Finland and Sweden?” https://www.gmfus.org/news/finland-and-sweden-apply-join-nato-whats-next, accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

Finland and Sweden’s decisions to seek NATO membership are tremendous developments in European security, but also long-overdue steps to codify a security and defense position that has been emerging for decades. Russia may want to portray the northern Baltic in Cold War terms of neutrality, as standing apart from NATO. But Finland and Sweden are EU member states, have been close partners of NATO for years, and are members of the United Kingdom-led Joint Expeditionary Force that as recently as this year has exercised together. Finland, Sweden, and NATO view the world in very similar terms, and on many aspects of total defense and hybrid threats, the two countries have much to teach the alliance.

Why is there this alignment in security outlook? The history of Russia’s aggression is not forgotten, especially in Finland, where the success of the Winter War protected the country from the occupation that befell its southern Baltic neighbors. Russia’s threats and heavily armed presence are still very much present in the Baltic region. It may be uncomfortable for those NATO allies who focus on threats in the south, like Spain and Italy, to think about Russia’s forces and missiles in Kaliningrad, wedged between NATO members Poland and Lithuania, and to ponder the very small distance separating this Russian territory from Gotland in Sweden. But Finland and Sweden have faced down this threat for decades, vowing to protect themselves and building capabilities to counter this ever-present, untrusted neighbor.

Finland and Sweden joining the alliance will make the Baltic Sea region and all of Europe safer with new capabilities, closer coordination, and faster decision-making. The two countries have developed approaches to total defense, or comprehensive security, that draw on their societies to provide resilience, situational awareness, and cohesion in times of peace, tension, and war. The willingness to break down barriers between government institutions and use the resourcefulness of their populations are lessons all NATO members should learn.

### 2nc Expansion Improves NATO Air / Maritime / Cyber

#### NATO expansion allows alliance to defend interests in air, maritime and cyber domains

**Lesser, 22 – vice president and executive director of GMF's Brussels office** [5-19-2022, GMF, “A Strategic Plus—with a Few Political Twists,” <https://www.gmfus.org/news/finland-and-sweden-apply-join-nato-whats-next>, accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

The prospect of NATO membership for Finland and Sweden is an operational blessing for the alliance. Both countries bring substantial military assets and expertise. Their membership would create much needed strategic depth, essential to the defense of the Baltic states and the air and maritime space in the region. As longstanding NATO partners, interoperability will not be an issue. By virtue of their history and geography, Stockholm and Helsinki have always been well placed as centers for intelligence and analysis on Russia. One of the many lessons of the Ukraine war so far has been that formal security guarantees matter. Having Finland and Sweden “in” removes any ambiguity about their place in Europe’s collective defense.

In broader strategic terms, too, the benefits of this new enlargement are clear. The alliance does acquire a much longer border with Russia. But set against the heightened ability to defend alliance interests in the air, maritime, and cyber domains, including in the high north, the net exposure should not be a concern. And transatlantic partners were already stakeholders in Finland’s territorial defense.

### AT: Expansion Hurts NATO

#### Finland and Sweden will productively contribute to NATO by performing important functions

Poast 22 – associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago [Paul Poast, June 7, 2022, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “What NATO Needs to Do Before Finland and Sweden Join” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/07/what-nato-needs-to-do-before-finland-and-sweden-join-pub-87262>, Acc 6/18/22 ER]

Finland and Sweden have now applied for NATO membership, and the process of bringing them on as full members of the alliance is accelerating into what may become the quickest turnaround ever. Research by international relations scholars (including me) suggests that the alliance needs to work out and agree on a military plan for defending them as soon as possible—before the two Nordic countries join.

On the one hand, there are plenty of reasons why the two nations have a strong case to join the alliance. Finland brings much to the NATO table. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Finnish defense spending, as a percentage of GDP, was already moving toward NATO’s 2 percent target, with further increases planned. Finland also has a conscription policy, which is often seen to demonstrate to allies a strong commitment to self-defense against a potential Russian attack. Similarly, Sweden has long worked with NATO, including covert cooperation during the Cold War and assistance with peacekeeping operations thereafter. Since the defense of Finland is a pillar of Sweden’s defense policy, it also is sensible for Stockholm to follow its neighbor into the alliance. Since both nations are EU members, one could argue that they essentially gave up their military neutrality long ago. Moreover, both nations are strong democracies, a core principle of the alliance (if not always followed in practice).

#### Finland’s military has international experience – can significantly help NATO

**Ossa 22 – Researcher at the Finnish National Defence University** [[HELJÄ](https://warontherocks.com/author/helja-ossa/), MAY 9, 2022, War on the Rocks, “WHAT WOULD FINLAND BRING TO THE TABLE FOR NATO?” <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/what-would-finland-bring-to-the-table-for-nato/> Acc. 6/23/22 ER]

Although military defense is its main task, the Finnish Defence Forces have taken an active role in international crisis management too. Being an active and cooperative partner is of course important, but ultimately the underlying reason for participating in international operations is to ensure Finland’s safety. Finland currently has a total of 300 crisis management and peacekeeping troops deployed in Lebanon, Kosovo, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. By participating in international operations since the 1950s, Finland has proved its willingness to play its part in international security. Moreover, the experience gained in such operations has had a positive impact on Finnish forces’ ability to cooperate with partner countries even in demanding environments.

As Finland has thus far chosen to remain outside of NATO, it has looked for other forms of defense cooperation, the most important of which is the bilateral relationship with its western neighbor Sweden. Finland and Sweden have no mutual defense obligations but have agreed on cooperation in areas ranging from host-nation support to combined joint military operations, and from the common use of resources to territorial surveillance. Trilateral cooperation with Sweden and Norway is also gaining new significance. Strong Nordic defense cooperation is advantageous for NATO too. Should Finland and Sweden join the alliance, not only would NATO’s presence in Baltic Sea region be strengthened, but also the same would be true in the Arctic.

Finland takes part in several framework-nation cooperation forums, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, European Intervention Initiative, and Framework Nation Concept. Again, cooperation with likeminded partner countries is valuable on many levels, but for Finland the main advantage is to maintain peace and stability in the Baltic Sea region and to guarantee Finland’s capability to defend its sovereignty. In practice, defense cooperation allows better training opportunities, material cooperation, information exchange, and collaboration in research and development — all very valuable advantages for a small country with limited resources.

The Remnants of Non-Alignment?

When discussing Finland’s role in European security, one cannot escape the topic of whether Finland is still a neutral or militarily non-aligned country, or neither. It is safe to say that Finland has not been a neutral country for over 30 years. Finland and Sweden joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and the European Union in 1995, which tied them to the Western community once and for all. Still, in political rhetoric throughout the 1990s and early 2000s Finland maintained its role as a militarily non-aligned country.

As Finland’s cooperation with NATO deepened and the European Union assumed new roles in security and defense, Finland’s position as a militarily non-aligned country was questioned both nationally and internationally. Finland is one of NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity partners and it has engaged extensively in the NATO Planning and Review Process since 1995, aiming to promote the development of forces and capabilities by partners who are best able to cooperate with NATO allies. Moreover, Finland has taken part in several NATO-led crisis management operations, and is regularly invited to NATO meetings, particularly since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war. In February 2022, Finland took part in NATO’s Cold Response exercise in Norway with 680 personnel, of whom 470 were conscripts. As for the European Union, Finland has been one of the most active member states in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy in recent years and has stressed the Union’s responsibilities as a security community, reminding fellow member states that they have agreed on mutual defense (Treaty on European Union, Article 42.7).

Never Again Alone

The idea that Finland needs to be able defend itself is deeply rooted in Finnish society and strategic culture. Cooperation with other countries is extremely valuable, but ultimately the defense of the country lies in the hands of the Finns. National defense is not something that can be outsourced.

Finland has been on NATO’s threshold for a long time, and it is often said that Finland is as close to NATO as a country can be without being an actual member. Still, Finland has not thought it necessary to take the final step to seek alliance membership, until now. The speed at which public opinion towards NATO changed after the Russian attack on Ukraine is unprecedented. Equally impressive is the rapidity with which the Finnish government has responded to this change of heart — something that has also been criticized, especially among the minority opposing Finnish NATO membership.

#### NATO expansion to Finland and Sweden is key to transatlantic solidary and bolstering democratic governance in the alliance

Beitsch, 22 (4-16-2022, Rebecca, "Russia pushes Finland, Sweden into NATO’s arms," Hill; DOA: 4-18-2022, <https://thehill.com/policy/international/3270070-russia-pushes-finland-sweden-into-natos-arms/>, SMTX//BSA)

Finland and Sweden appear to be edging closer to joining NATO, a move that leaders and experts see as the best way to confront Russia as it escalates its rhetoric on nuclear weapons.

The conflict in Ukraine has forced the two Nordic nations to reconsider their absence from the alliance forged after World War II, which commits members to defending one another if attacked.

“Mr. Putin is proving NATO relevant and necessary,” said Sean Monaghan, a visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin. “If NATO didn’t exist, you’d have to invent it.”

“Finland in particular but also Sweden are very stoic on these matters and see Russia with clear eyes. And that’s why I think ultimately they will join NATO because they’ve seen Russia’s revisionist threat has been building. And now it has boiled over with the invasion of Ukraine, and there’s kind of no way back, and the best way for them to secure themselves against the threat posed by Russia is to join NATO.”

As politicians and poll results in the two countries have reversed course on the prospect — favoring joining NATO after decades of abstaining — Moscow has renewed its threat of using nuclear weapons.

Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council and former president of Russia, wrote in a Telegram post on Thursday that “there can be no talk of non-nuclear status for the Baltic” if Finland and Sweden join NATO, adding that “the balance must be restored.”

He said that should Finland and Sweden become part of the alliance, Moscow would need to “seriously strengthen the grouping of land forces and air defense, deploy significant naval forces in the waters of the Gulf of Finland.”

It’s a particularly concerning threat to Finland, which shares an 800-mile border with Russia.

Finnish Minister for European Affairs Tytti Tuppurainen said Friday that it is “highly likely” her country will join NATO, calling Russia’s “brutal” war in Ukraine a “wake-up call to us all.”

That eagerness could also put more pressure on Sweden, which would be left as the only Nordic country outside the alliance and which would break its longstanding practice of neutrality by joining.

“The fact that these countries were not on track to join NATO three months ago and now they are is definitely a response to Russian aggression. Russia should realize its aggression against Ukraine has spooked a lot of countries, even to the point that a country like Sweden, which has a 200-year history of nonalignment, is now looking at actually joining NATO,” said Kurt Volker, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO who also served as a special envoy on Ukraine.

“Finlandization was coined as a word to describe the Soviet Union’s insistence that Finland not exercise its own choices on security. Now they’re going to do it anyway. So in that sense, these are definitely responses to Russian aggression, and it’s probably good for Russia to realize that,” he added.

NATO expansionists are hopeful the two countries will formally signal their intention before NATO’s June meeting in Madrid, where members could sign an accession protocol that would also need to be individually approved by each country’s legislative body.

Experts say they are likely to be welcomed into the alliance.

“They have advanced, modern militaries and are seen as security providers versus security consumers,” Monaghan said.

But beyond the practical defense implications, the move would also send a significant message.

“This takes place within the context of what President Biden has called the contest between autocracies and democracies. So certainly membership would project an image of Western solidarity, transatlantic solidarity and I think would be an injection of democratic values into NATO, so that would be visible to Russia as well,” said Gene Germanovich, an international defense researcher with the Rand Corporation.

Once newcomers are invited by NATO members, each of the 30 member countries would have to go through their own process for approving the treaty, a task that can last years but one that experts are hoping with proper motivation could take as little as a few months.

Volker said he was hopeful Sweden would complete its own internal decision-making prior to the June summit.

“NATO summit leaders … want to be able to make this decision once and then they want to close any gray zone between going to be a member of NATO but not yet a member of NATO and ultimately becoming a member of NATO — they want to close that gap as quickly as possible,” he said.

#### Finland and Sweden would substantially help with military

DESIDERIO 22 – congressional reporter [ANDREW, 05/19/2022, “Senate on track to approve NATO bids of Finland and Sweden” <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/nato-finland-sweden-republicans-russia-00033749>, Acc 6/21/22 ER]

“Finland and Sweden are impressive and capable countries, with military capabilities that surpass many existing NATO allies,” said Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, who traveled to Helsinki and Stockholm last weekend after meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv. “As new members, they would more than pull their weight.”

### AT: Finland Won’t Contribute

#### Finland already has connections with NATO and has a strong military to contribute – joining alliance is the next step

Orpo, 22 – chair of the National Coalition party in Finland [Petteri, 14 March, Financial Times, Russia’s invasion shows it is time for the next chapter on Finland and Nato, <https://www.ft.com/content/af01c46d-15ab-461f-b1b8-e150e581e99c>, Acc 6/18/22, HO]

A lasting detente or a return to multilateral co-operation with the current Russian government seem very unlikely right now. While Finland is not facing direct military threats, it has become evident that we need to re-evaluate our relations with the country next door. While we have advocated good neighbourly relations in the past, Russia’s current aggression and statements regarding our possible Nato membership show how even the principles of good relations are subject to rapid change.

As Russia openly threatens peace in Europe, we need to look at all available means to improve our own security as well as that of Europe as a whole. There is a broad consensus in Finland that this situation has changed permanently at the same time as our potential Nato membership is on the table.

Finland has been a reliable Nato partner since 1994 and we have a close political-military relationship with the alliance. In recent years, we have participated in Nato exercises concerning collective security in Europe. In practice, Finland has become completely interoperable with Nato.

Now is the time for both Finland and Nato to look at the next steps. The National Coalition party has supported our bid for Nato membership since 2006 and continues to do so. We believe that Finland’s — as well as Sweden’s — Nato membership would improve not just our own security but the overall defence of Europe. We are in a valuable position due to our military capabilities and geostrategic location between the High North and the Baltic Sea.

While other countries downsized their militaries and capabilities after the cold war, Finland did the exact opposite. We have long prepared ourselves for conventional military threats and we never dropped the ball on national defence. Our wartime strength is 280,000 soldiers, alongside our state of the art defence capabilities. And it is worth remembering that our F-35 fighter acquisitions will take our defence budget to more than 2 per cent of gross domestic product.

It is safe to conclude that we are already a valuable contributor to the defence of Europe and will continue to be one. Even as the pillars of European security are in flux around us, it is becoming ever clearer that a common approach to upholding peace and stability in the future is necessary. The time for the next chapter for Finland and Nato is now.

#### Finland is constantly improving its defense with new military equipment and has a large defense force

**Ossa 22 – Researcher at the Finnish National Defence University** [[HELJÄ](https://warontherocks.com/author/helja-ossa/), MAY 9, 2022, War on the Rocks, “WHAT WOULD FINLAND BRING TO THE TABLE FOR NATO?” <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/what-would-finland-bring-to-the-table-for-nato/> Acc. 6/23/22 ER]

Finland has always assumed a pragmatic, hands-on approach to national defense. When the Cold War ended, most European countries shifted their focus to expeditionary operations, reduced their defense spending, and developed smaller but highly professional and specialized military forces. Finland chose a different path — not least because of its 800-mile border with Russia. Helsinki maintained a strong national defense posture, the cornerstones of which are conscription and a large, well-trained reserve. The relatively cheap conscription system and having a large reserve instead of a large active-duty force allowed Finland to maintain a credible defense even when the share of GDP spent on defense was lower than desirable. In the late Cold War, Finland spent approximately 1.6 percent of its GDP on defense, and in the early 1990s this figure saw a rapid increase to 1.9 percent are to the purchase of 64 F-18s from the United States in 1992. After that Finnish defense budgets kept declining and were at their lowest in 2001 (1.1 percent of GDP). Since then, defense spending began to rise until 2012, when the Finnish military began a three-year period of reform that included defense budget cuts from 1.4 percent to 1.2 percent of GDP and the dissolution of several military bases, resulting in significant gaps in readiness that need patching up.

Still, while other countries sold their military equipment, Finland purchased new systems and updated existing capabilities. Along with the F-18s, other major purchases include AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles from the United States (2012), Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks from the Netherlands (2014), K9 armored howitzers from South Korea (2017), and most recently F-35 fighter jets from the United States (2021). The navy modernized its Hamina-class vessels a few years ago, and underwater warfare capabilities were improved with the integration of the Variable Depth Sonar system and torpedoes. Currently, Finland is in the process of replacing several older vessels with four modern multi-role corvettes, capable of effectively conducting a range of tasks at sea all year round. Along with the defense of national territory and airspace, maintaining a capable navy (in close cooperation with Sweden) is particularly important for Finland, whose trade and security of supply depend on the open sea lines of the Baltic Sea.

The Cornerstone

Finland has based its security on strong national defense and international cooperation. The Finnish Defence Forces have four main tasks: the military defense of Finland, supporting other national authorities, taking part in international activities, and taking part in international military crisis management. Out of these, the most important task is naturally the defense of the country. The cornerstone of a strong national defense posture is capable, well-trained armed forces. The military defense of Finland is arranged through conscription — an anomaly that many European countries, including Sweden, abolished or deactivated during the post-Cold War years. Conscription and the reserve are regarded as the only cost-efficient ways to maintain a credible national defense in a country that is large in territory but small in population. According to the Finnish constitution, every Finnish citizen is obligated to participate in national defense but only men aged 18 to 60 are liable for military service. Women can apply on a voluntary basis. Depending on the role that the conscripts are trained for, their service lasts for six, nine, or 12 months, followed by rehearsals during the years after service. The Finnish military trains approximately 22,000 conscripts every year, which is about two thirds of each age group. There is a wide support for conscription among the Finnish public, alongside pressure to modernize the system — for example, many young Finns want to see conscription made more gender-equal.

The number of active military personnel in the Finnish Defence Forces is small: about 19,000 plus the roughly 3,000-strong paramilitary Border Guard, which upon mobilization would be wholly or partly incorporated into the Defence Force. Due to the conscription system, however, the reserve is large. The fully mobilized field army is sized at 280,000, with several hundred thousand more reservists available to fill losses. Units can be roughly divided into three main categories: the best-trained and equipped operational units, regional forces, and local units (some of which train frequently and maintain high readiness). The air force and navy operate higher-tech equipment, such as Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, Gabriel anti-ship missiles, and RIM-162 Sea Sparrow missiles, and are traditionally more operationally ready. Still, all air force and navy enablers (and, in the case of the navy, much of a ship’s rotating personnel) are conscripts or reservists.

As a comparison, Sweden, which has double the population of Finland, has active personnel of approximately 24,000 soldiers and a reserve of 31,800. NATO ally Norway, which is the same size as Finland in terms of population, trains approximately 10,000 conscripts a year and has 16,000 active personnel. As a response to the war in Ukraine and the deteriorating security situation in Europe, the Finnish Defence Forces recently announced an increase in the number of reservists called to rehearsals from 19,300 to 28,300 annually.

#### Finland is set to continue to increase its military spending

**Ossa 22 – Researcher at the Finnish National Defence University** [[HELJÄ](https://warontherocks.com/author/helja-ossa/), MAY 9, 2022, War on the Rocks, “WHAT WOULD FINLAND BRING TO THE TABLE FOR NATO?” <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/what-would-finland-bring-to-the-table-for-nato/> Acc. 6/23/22 ER]

Maintaining a strong and credible national defense, even in a conscription-based system, is costly. This year’s Finnish defense budget is set at 5.1 billion euros —1.9 percent of GDP. Only two years earlier, defense’s share of GDP was 1.3 percent. This rapid increase can be explained by the purchase of new F-35 fighter aircraft, but the war in Ukraine has prompted demands to further increase the budget. The military will get additional funding of 700 million euros in 2022 and 788 million euros in 2023, bringing its budget up to 2.2 percent of GDP. The readiness and capabilities of the Finnish military have been strengthened in all operational domains. Finland already has one of the strongest artilleries in Europe (1500 systems). The war in Ukraine has showed that even in the 21st century, properly maintaining strong conventional forces remains the key factor in credible deterrence for a non-nuclear state. Still, governments need to find the budget to develop readiness and capabilities in new operational domains too, including the cyber, space, and information domains. Finland is no exception. International cooperation is particularly important in responding to hybrid threats, cyber operations, and information warfare.

A competitive defense industry is another important piece in the national defense puzzle. Finland’s defense industry is highly specialized, which is why the country procures a great deal of materiel and equipment from abroad and is actively involved in procurement cooperation with other Nordic and European partners. The Finnish defense industry plays a crucial role in supplying and maintaining the Finnish military, but about 40 to 60 percent of its products are exported, including communication systems, vehicle systems, vessels, and protective equipment. In 2020 the export volume was 43 percent. The defense industry consists predominantly of small and medium-sized privately owned companies, with total turnover within the defense, aerospace, and security sectors of 1.84 billion euros in 2020. With a few exceptions such as Patria, producer of the Armored Modular Vehicle and NEMO mortar system, there are no large industrial players

### AT: Finland & Sweden Can’t be Integrated

#### Sweden and Finland can be integrated smoothly --- they already participate in exercises

Wormuth, 22 --- Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense (June 2, 2022, Christine Wormuth, moderated by Vivian Salama who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal “NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/>, JMP)

VIVIAN SALAMA: There’s a number of Ukraine questions that we’re getting here today. Can you speak to the impact—this is from Michael Hauser, by the way—can you speak to the impact of Putin’s war in Ukraine—that Putin’s war in Ukraine has had on strengthening the relationship between NATO and US Army leadership in Europe? And what is necessary to maintain the strength of that relationship in the decades to come?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: Sure. Well, we have very strong relationships with, you know, NATO country—with the armies of NATO countries. General McConville does, you know, counterpart meetings every year. There is an entire land conference for European allies—or European armies, excuse me. So we will try to keep those relationships very, very strong.

I think another thing I would highlight is through the Army National Guard state partnership program, we actually have very deep relationships with not just Ukraine, but again, all of the NATO countries. And one of the real values of that particular program is that the general officers in the National Guard, you know, their tenures can be quite a bit longer. Their personnel are not rotating as much as they do in the active component. And that allows them to sometimes have relationships with NATO countries that last for years, you know, not just a couple of years. So you’re able to have, I think, a much deeper kind of set of connections through that program.

VIVIAN SALAMA: I mean, that question sort of raises one in my mind about also the potential new members that are joining NATO and how the US military is working with Sweden and Finland to potentially get them up to speed and get them integrated into the alliance smoothly, especially with things so tense in their backyards.

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: You know, I think it’s been a little while since I’ve been deep in kind of NATO activities, but my recollection is that even though Sweden and Finland were not actually NATO members, they were very close to NATO. And, you know, when it came to participating in exercises, for example, you know, the Swedes and the Finns participated pretty deeply. So I think it will not be—you know, there’s not a big gap there to bridge. I think, you know, they will come into NATO pretty quickly and assimilate and be, you know, right up there with all of their soon-to-be counterpart countries.

### U.S.-Turkey Relations Solves Conflicts

#### Strong ties with Turkey are critical to peace in Europe – checks Russian influence and stabilizes Ukraine, Syria, Libya and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Hess, 22 – Central Asia fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (June 22, 22; Maximillian Hess, “Why the West should make peace with Erdogan now,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/22/turkey-erdogan-ukraine-russia-war-west-us-geopolitics-black-sea-europe-energy/>, AI)

The democratic West has a long and controversial history of entering alliances of convenience with dictators and strongmen around the world—unsavory but necessary partners in confronting threats to the international order. Denounced as ethically dubious, this sort of stance is also realist, balance-of-power politics par excellence. It enabled the world to unite to defeat Adolf Hitler in World War II and the West to win the Cold War.

Atop the list of unsavory partners the West urgently needs better relations with today sits Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. That he is unsavory is clear: He has actively undermined Turkish democracy, undone decades of liberalization, weaponized migration, terrorized the Kurdish minority both at home and in neighboring Syria, and helped Iran violate U.S. sanctions. Most recently, he has threatened to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. It will take a long time before the West can genuinely trust him.

However, the reality is that the West needs Erdogan more than ever. Russia’s brutal, all-out war against Ukraine has vastly raised Turkey’s profile on the geostrategic chessboard. Ankara has emerged as a key supplier of drones to Kyiv—shipments it has luckily shown no intention of halting. Ukraine’s chances of victory would be significantly improved if Turkish arms deliveries were expanded. Erdogan, who controls access to the Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, crucially shut the passage to warships in late February.

At the same time, Ankara has also been willing to cooperate with Moscow on Ukraine where Erdogan sees an opportunity. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu discussed plans to secure a route for Ukrainian grain exports with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Ankara on June 8, reportedly asking for a 25 percent discount on Turkish grain purchases as part of the deal. Without Ankara on board, any Western proposals to break the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports are dead on arrival.

The West also needs Turkey on its side in the economic war against Russia. Ankara’s support alone can restrict the flow of sanctioned Russian goods in and out of the Black Sea, which continue even as Ukrainian ships are stuck in port. Ankara’s help is crucial in cutting ratlines for Russian money and kleptocrats. Turkey has become a major destination for Russian money (and oligarchs’ yachts) fleeing sanctions and plays a growing role in supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s new autarkic economy. Turkey is one of the few major countries that freely accept Russian payment, undercutting the impact of Western banking sanctions. Bringing Turkey onboard would plug one of the largest holes in the sanctions regime.

But most importantly, Turkey will be a key player in the reordering of European energy supplies, not least because it controls energy access through a number of crucial pipelines. The key to Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor strategy, for example, is gas from Azerbaijan supplied via Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian and Trans-Adriatic pipelines—inaugurated in 2018 and 2020, respectively—and feeding into the European gas grid in the Balkans and Italy.

Erdogan is also actively seeking to develop Turkey’s own gas resources and potentially even link Israeli and Cypriot offshore gas fields to the European pipeline network. Such efforts are of course complicated by Greco-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and its surrounding waters. A revived European-Turkish partnership may be the only way the Eastern Mediterranean’s rich energy resources can be fully utilized. Such a partnership might also nudge Erdogan to make an about-face vis-à-vis Russia, where the inauguration of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020 signaled a new high point in Turkish-Russian relations.

Finally, aligning with Erdogan would offer the West more geostrategic leverage over the Kremlin beyond the war in Ukraine. Turkey is also a key player in three additional conflicts where Russia is involved: Syria, Libya, and the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Erdogan moved from a policy of benign neglect to active intervention in these conflicts over the past decade, motivated by a desire to boost Turkey’s role as a regional power independent of the West. A resumed partnership with Erdogan offers further pressure points in the effort to constrain Moscow’s global influence.

### Turkey Key to NATO

#### Turkey important to NATO – has significant military capacity to assist the alliance

Coşkun, 22 – senior fellow at CEIP and former director general for int-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 24, 22; Alper Coşkun; “Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorne their relationship”; <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-and-nato-are-stronger-with-each-other-they-must-de-thorn-their-relationship/>, AI)

With seventy years under its belt, Turkey is among NATO’s older members. It boasts a strong legacy, having been a bulwark against communism during the Cold War and a frontline player in many regional crises that erupted later, including in the South Caucasus, Balkans, Iraq, and, most recently, Syria. In contrast to most other Alliance members, this incessant state of conflict around its borders has denied Turkey any peace dividend.

Turkey’s formidable military capacity and growing expeditionary capabilities, together with its expanding defense industry (particularly in drone technologies) are all critical enablers for NATO. Even as priorities change and global attention shifts to the east, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has proven that building sustainable security in the Euro-Atlantic area is unfinished business. Much to the delight of Turkish officials, this has corroborated Ankara’s continuing geopolitical relevance—something it is betting on, maybe excessively so, in making its demands of Finland and Sweden.

But Turkey has also benefitted immensely from its membership in NATO, a reality that is often lost on (or conveniently disregarded) by ideologically driven Turkish critics of the Alliance. The country’s influence as a regional actor, both during and after the Cold War, has always been augmented by its NATO identity. Meanwhile, being embedded in the Alliance’s security network has made Turkey safer by bolstering its deterrence and defense, thereby contributing to its sense of security.

The strategic value of being a member of the world’s strongest military alliance cannot be overstated, and anyone who has doubts need not look any further than Ukraine. Finland and Sweden get it, which is why they have taken the historic decision of trashing age-old policies of non-alignment in favor of becoming NATO members.

## Affirmative DA Unity Answers

### No NATO Unity / Cohesion

#### Cohesion fraying now --- Turkey and Hungary blocking NATO priorities

Bloomberg Editors 22 [June 20, 2022, “Western Unity Is More Essential Than Ever”, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/western-unity-is-more-essential-than-ever/2022/06/10/0c095a50-e8be-11ec-a422-11bbb91db30b_story.html>, acc 6/19/22, NB]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has made the West — in this context, NATO and the European Union — more united than it’s been in a long time. Unfortunately, that cohesion is now at risk, as the Russian invasion turns into a grinding war of attrition. To deter Putin from escalating and to keep him from winning, Western leaders must focus on the two weakest links in their alliance: Turkey and Hungary.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the president of Turkey — a member of NATO but not the EU — says he will block the accession of Sweden and Finland to the transatlantic alliance unless he’s given a series of unrelated concessions. If he actually follows through, he would not only leave both countries more vulnerable to Russian aggression, but also render NATO weaker than it should be in defending its Baltic members. Gratuitously, Erdogan is also increasing tensions with Greece, another NATO ally.

Then there’s Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. For weeks, he’s been holding up a sanctions package that would embargo Russian oil. EU leaders last week thought they had finally reached a compromise: Only Russian oil delivered by ship would be banned, whereas the sort arriving via pipelines would not. That would give landlocked Hungary, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, more time to adjust their energy infrastructure.

In a shocking breach of decorum, Orban then reneged on even that compromise. Bizarrely, he also insisted on keeping the Russian Orthodox Church’s Patriarch Kirill — a staunch backer of Putin and the war — off the new sanctions list. The EU gave in to this demand, too, to get the package passed.

The whole ordeal was an embarrassment, and a rare cause for Putin to be optimistic. In every way he can, Orban is signaling that he’s not fully behind the West’s joint effort to support Ukraine and undermine Russia — in effect, that he’s not a reliable ally.

So what can be done? A basic design flaw shared by both the EU and NATO is that neither has a mechanism to eject errant members. That means both will need to get creative in reining in rogue leaders.

In Erdogan’s case, acceding to blackmail shouldn’t be an option. The US should announce that future arms sales to Turkey will be halted until it comes around on the new accessions. NATO should threaten to suspend Turkish involvement in military planning and exercises. If the situation escalates, revisiting the alliance’s rules to allow for expulsions should be on the table.

As for Orban, the EU will need to adopt a similarly hard line. In 2018, the bloc triggered its treaty’s Article 7 against Hungary in a censure of its subversion of democratic institutions, launching a process that could in theory strip Budapest of its voting rights in Brussels. In practice, the measure has been toothless, because it requires unanimous support. Poland, whose populist government is also the target of an Article 7 proceeding, always had Hungary’s back.

These days, however, Poland is among the member states that are most hawkishly anti-Putin. And Warsaw is horrified by Orban’s obstructionism. Belatedly, the Poles have come to understand that a strong EU is in their national interest, not against it. They should therefore persuade Orban to join the effort to weaken Putin’s war machine and strengthen Ukraine. If he doesn’t, the other 26 EU countries — including Poland — should strip Hungary of its votes.

Holding together the Western alliance has never been easy. Amid a worsening war on its doorstep, it has rarely seemed more necessary. The time for populist political games is over.

#### NATO still facing several obstacles that undermine cohesion --- disagreements over strategic concept and political and military weaknesses

Lucas, 22 --- nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (JUNE 7, 2022, 5:31 AM, Edward, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date; With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/>, JMP)

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making?

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.”

The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia.

Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork.

The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarterss split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy.

A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin.

#### NATO not united on Ukraine

Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” [https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia Acc 6/24/22](https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia%20Acc%206/24/22) ER]

Moscow’s aggression also has triggered a sense of alarm and a more serious attitude in multiple European countries about doing more for NATOs collective defense mission. That shift has been especially evident in Germany, where Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government approved an emergency fund to boost Berlin’s military budget by 100 billion Euros. The latter move would finally fulfill Germany’s longstanding pledge (along with all other NATO members) to spend at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product annually on defense. Berlin had repeatedly procrastinated about carrying out that commitment. A far more militant posture by the Scholz government also was apparent when it stated an intent to ship weapons to Ukraine to bolster that country’s military resistance. Previous German governments would have considered such involvement in a raging war unthinkable. Numerous other NATO members, including the United States, already are pouring weapons into Ukraine.

Nevertheless, it is easy to **overstate the degree of unity** regarding policy toward Russia even among NATO members, much less within the broader international community. Indeed, some **cracks already are beginning to form** in NATO’s solid front. When Poland’s Vice Premier, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, suggested that the Alliance send an armed peacekeeping force to Ukraine to provide humanitarian aid, the reactions were widely divergent. Estonian Defense Minister Kalle Laanet said that a proposed peacekeeping mission was “one of the possibilities” NATO should consider, but several other governments pushed back. We’re “still in too early stages to talk about that,” said Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren, adding that such a deployment would need the backing of the United Nations Security Council—a requirement that made the plan a nonstarter, since as a permanent member of the Council, Russia holds veto power.

**Divisions within NATO** are even **increasingly evident** on the issue of providing weapons to Ukraine. Addressing a massive campaign rally on March 15, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orban, emphasized that “we must stay out of this war … therefore we will not send any troops or weapons to the battlegrounds.” A few days later, Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov stated flatly that his country will not engage in “hostilities” in Ukraine and that no arms will be supplied.

#### While US may support aid to Ukraine, there lack of unity and cohesion globally on strategy

Carpenter 22 – senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute [Ted Galen, MARCH 23, 2022, CATO institute, “Just How United Is NATO (and the World) against Russia?” [https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia Acc 6/24/22](https://www.cato.org/commentary/just-how-united-nato-world-against-russia%20Acc%206/24/22) ER]

Beyond NATO (and longstanding U.S. allies in East Asia), the absence of support for Washington’s strategy of imposing harsh penalties on Russia is glaringly evident. That problem surfaced almost immediately. On March 2, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces. 141 countries voted for the resolution, and U.S. officials gloated that only 5 voted against it.

However, a stunning 35 countries decided to abstain, even though a favorable vote to placate the United States and its allies should have been an easy option, since the resolution was purely symbolic, not obligating UN members to take any substantive action. Yet a significant number of countries in Asia, the Greater Middle East, and Sub‐​Saharan Africa, opted to snub Washington. When more than 20 percent of the General Assembly’s membership refuses to embrace a purely feel‐​good measure Washington wants passed, the U.S.-sponsored global coalition looks fragile indeed.

It is especially ominous for U.S. objectives that both China and India have remained firm in their opposition to imposing economic sanctions on Russia—as have numerous other countries outside of Europe and East Asia. Even portions of Latin America have balked at waging an economic war against Russia. Indeed, beyond Washington’s network of traditional allies, the isolation of Russia appears to be significantly exaggerated.

Political scientists frequently note that coalitions tend to be a **mile wide but only an inch deep**. That situation may well apply to NATO unity regarding policy toward Russia. When it comes to the rest of the world, any sense of unity on that issue is not even a half‐​inch deep.

### AT: Consultation Link

#### Consultations have not been effective in strengthening NATO – there is no enforcement or obligation

Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf>, accessed 6/23/22, NB]

The strongest norms and most elaborate mechanisms have been developed regarding consultations on collective defence policy. Since this is a primary task of NATO, derived directly from the Washington Treaty, some experts claim that there might be a legal obligation to consult before a NATO member takes a definite action, which could undermine the common defence.4 There is no mechanism to enforce compliance and there are numerous examples of Allies bypassing consultation to take unilateral actions. Nevertheless, most Allies try to respect such a norm as it creates a similar obligation for the US, limiting the risk, for example, of the unexpected or uncoordinated withdrawal of US troops from Europe.

There is another important dimension of consultations concerning actions outside the Euro-Atlantic area—since this is not a ‘treaty area’ there is no apparent legal obligation to consult. Nevertheless, the European Allies expected the US to use consultations to inform them about plans that could affect NATO’s security. The US was also interested in such consultations, expecting that they would facilitate coordination of NATO policies in support of American foreign policy goals, but this rarely turned out to be the case. The 1967 Harmel report was an attempt to strengthen this dimension of consultation and thus NATO’s political cohesion, stating that “the North Atlantic

Treaty Area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance.”5

In 1974, NATO made another attempt to strengthen consultations adopting the Ottawa Declaration, which stressed that “the Allies are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world.”6

Such declarations, however, did not solve the structural problems that discouraged states from consulting to coordinate common responses to crises outside the treaty area. Some states blocked such consultations, believing that the Alliance should not deal with problems beyond its ‘treaty area’ and that discussions could lead to new commitments that would undermine collective defence and deterrence policy. Bigger states also wanted to preserve their privileged bilateral relations with the US, which often resulted in informal consultations in smaller formats. The US did not want to share sensitive information with all Allies without guarantees that this would result in coordinated action in support of US foreign policy goals.

#### NATO consultations have not diffused tensions

Lorenz, 20 --- international security expert at the Polish Institute of International Affairs [Wojciech, November, 2020, “Strengthening NATO’s cohesion through consultation”, <https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ICDS_Brief_NATO2030_-Series_1_Wojciech_Lorenz_November-2020_cor.pdf>, accessed 6/23/22, NB]

In recent years, NATO’s mechanisms of consultation have proved lacking in defusing tensions and discouraging unilateral actions, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond it.

During Donald Trump’s presidency, for example, the US withdrew troops from Syria, despite the possible impact on the security of the Allies. This unilateral decision encouraged Turkey to send troops to Syria, which could further complicate the fight with Islamic terrorist groups and increase the risk of confrontation between Turkey and Russia, which has a military presence in Syria. Also, despite NATO’s presence in Afghanistan, the US pursued negotiations with the Taliban without providing NATO with an insight into its plans. And it only resorted to consultations in NATO on its decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty after the criticism from the Allies. Similarly, it first announced the decision to withdraw troops from Germany and only later consulted with Allies about how to limit the impact on NATO. Some of these decisions were publicly criticised by NATO members, most vocally by French president Emmanuel Macron who, before the 2019 NATO leaders meeting, accused the Alliance of being “brain dead” and took the opportunity to promote the idea of European ‘strategic autonomy’.9

### Unity Not Key

#### Unity is not key to helping member states--- disagreements are inevitable and a built-in benefit

Skaluba & Rodhian, 22 --- \*served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, AND \*\*associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative (January 18, 2022, Christopher Skaluba – also director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Conor Rodihan, “No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/>, JMP)

As the crisis over Ukraine intensifies, key stakeholders are looking to Brussels for signs of Western resolve. At the NATO-Russia Council meeting on January 12, the Alliance delivered: In a vivid expression of solidarity, it categorically (and unanimously) rejected Russian demands to forgo future expansion or withdraw forces from member countries.

Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or sending anti-tank weapons—will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices.

This shouldn’t be surprising. Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing support for separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region: NATO actions in support of Kyiv have been more political than operational, leaving it to individual allies to provide munitions, equipment, and training to Ukrainian forces. And despite a recurrent pledge that Ukraine would one day be welcome to join the Alliance, as well as the sympathy expressed by allies for Ukraine’s plight, there’s been precious little progress on this front.

NATO is primarily concerned about defending its members from Russian aggression—which it is also wary of provoking by supporting the Ukrainian military.

Yet despite its lack of meaningful military support for Ukraine, the crisis has been the animating issue on the Alliance’s agenda since 2014. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and its support for separatists have driven major NATO initiatives on readiness, defense planning, force posture, intelligence, and technology development, with an eye toward beefing up the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks and deterring Russia in both the conventional and sub-threshold realms. As an institution established to safeguard Europe, it has successfully geared itself to deter the type of destabilizing Russian belligerence currently on display.

Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine.

First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda.

Second, a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right.

Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor, not evidence of its ineptitude.

In the case of military support for Ukraine, policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue with Russia, it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine—from condemning Kremlin aggression and standing up for Kyiv politically to reaffirming its open-door policy with an expectation that Ukraine will eventually become a member. It might even share intelligence and develop training and advisory programs for the Ukrainian military.

And while it won’t find a consensus to fight, it could provide the foundation for certain allies to support Ukrainian forces in ways consistent with their national priorities outside of NATO. In that case, NATO’s enabling value to its members in complicating Putin’s cost-benefit assessment should be applauded.

Last week’s NATO-Russia Council meeting showcased an Alliance working in lockstep and finding political consensus in responding to preposterous Russian demands. NATO should always strive for this degree of consensus. But if and when this crisis intensifies, and Putin advances further into Ukraine, expectations for NATO assistance will be raised, decisions about how to respond will become more difficult, and consensus will be more elusive.

Despite the rhetoric we might hear in response, this is not evidence of NATO’s ineffectiveness—but rather a reflection of how democratic institutions function. And even absent consensus, NATO can still contribute invaluably to Ukraine’s sovereignty.

### NATO Can’t Solve Russia

#### NATO unprepared for Russia’s modern warfare

* Weaponizing of hunger
* Campaign of disinformation

Lucas, 22 --- nonresident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (JUNE 7, 2022, 5:31 AM, Edward, “NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date; With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/>, JMP)

Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.

NATO could acquire these capabilities. Or it could regain them: During the Cold War, the alliance had an economic warfare division and ran a program called the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring sensitive technologies. But in the strategic timeout that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these agencies and their skill sets shriveled and died.

But as with NATO’s military shortcomings, identifying the problems is not the same as solving them. And given the bloc’s unwieldy structure and issues with key members, it might be wise to lower expectations about NATO returning to Cold War levels of consistent readiness and effectiveness. A more realistic vision for the alliance would be to treat it as a framework for the most capable and threat-aware members to form coalitions of the willing. These groupings already exist: The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, for example, is a 10-country framework for military cooperation, chiefly aimed at enabling very rapid deployments to the Nordic-Baltic region in the event of a crisis. France has a similar venture, the European Intervention Initiative. The five Nordic states have their own military club, called the Nordic Defence Cooperation, while Poland has close bilateral ties with Lithuania. A similar network of bilateral and multilateral ties would greatly strengthen the alliance’s floundering presence in the Black Sea and other regions, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These groupings would not supplant NATO but improve action and interoperability on top of the alliance’s established structures and mechanisms.

The difficult and underlying question here is the role of the United States. Europe is, in theory, big and rich enough to manage its own defense. But its persistent political weakness prevents that. The paradox is that only U.S. involvement makes NATO credible—yet overdependence on the United States also undermines the alliance’s credibility, while stoking resentment in France and elsewhere. The task for Washington is to encourage European allies to shoulder more of the burden and start thinking strategically again, even as it retains the superpower involvement that gives the alliance its decisive military edge. That is entirely doable. But don’t expect it to happen in Madrid—or anytime soon.

### Russia Won’t Use Nuclear Weapons

#### Nuclear use unlikely by Putin --- would make him a pariah and alienate Russia from the international community

Wormuth, 22 --- Secretary of the Army, US Department of Defense (June 2, 2022, Christine Wormuth, moderated by Vivian Salama who serves as a national security reporter at The Wall Street Journal “NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/>, JMP)

VIVIAN SALAMA: Before we move on to another subject, just a really blunt question, being that there is concern that President Putin could resort to nuclear weapons at some stage, especially if he gets desperate in this conflict. What is the Army’s role in preventing that kind of a scenario, especially absent direct military involvement in Ukraine?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: You know, I think what we can do—I mean, first of all, I think it’s important to say that, you know, we are undoubtedly looking at that type of contingency and trying to think through what our options—you know, what options would be available to policymakers if that were to happen? The Army, I think what we can most, you know, helpfully do is to try to provide training for how to operate under those kinds of conditions. You know, we have personal protective equipment and things like that. But I think, you know, if Putin were to decide to use some sort of tactical nuclear demonstration, I think, you know, that would erase, in my mind, any possibility that he could be anything other than a pariah leader and a—leader of a pariah state, you know, for decades going forward. So I think that Putin would have to think extremely long and hard about that, since he clearly wants to try to bring Russia back into the international community at some point. I don’t see how he does that if he goes nuclear.

## Affirmative DA NATO Expansion Answers

### Turkey Will Block NATO Expansion to Sweden / Finland

#### Turkey will NOT let Sweden and Finland join NATO --- won’t be persuaded

Turak, 22 -- CNBC correspondent (5/17/22, Natasha ‘The stakes here are now massive’: Turkey is threatening to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/will-turkey-block-nato-membership-for-sweden-and-finland.html>) //AB

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has doubled down on his opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the NATO alliance, a move that would be historic for the two Nordic countries in the wake of [Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/05/17/russia-ukraine-live-updates.html).

“We will not say ‘yes’ to those [countries] who apply sanctions to Turkey to join security organization NATO,” Erdogan said at a news conference late Monday. He was referring to Sweden’s suspension of weapons sales to Turkey in 2019 over its military activities in Syria.

Sweden’s Foreign Ministry said Monday that it planned to send senior officials joining with officials from Finland to the Turkish capital of Ankara to address Erdogan’s objections. But the Turkish leader essentially said they’d be wasting their time.

“Will they come to persuade us? Excuse us, but they shouldn’t bother,” Erdogan said. He added that the two countries joining would make NATO “a place where representatives of terrorist organizations are concentrated.”

#### Turkey won’t vote for membership until Sweden and Finland address Kurdish activists

Wintour, 22 – Diplomatic Editor of The Guardian [Patrick; 6/14/22; The Guardian; “Turkey threatens year’s delay to Swedish and Finnish entry to Nato”; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/14/turkey-threatens-years-delay-to-swedish-and-finnish-entry-to-nato>; accessed 6/18/22; DWC]

Turkey has said it is willing to delay Swedish and Finnish membership of Nato for more than a year unless it receives satisfactory assurances that the two Nordic countries are willing to address support for Kurdish groups it regards as terrorist organisations.

Finland’s prime minister said on Tuesday that the two nations’ Nato applications could stall if the issue is not resolved before a vital Nato summit due to start in Madrid on 29 June.

Turkey accuses Sweden and Finland of harbouring alleged members of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) and also objects to their decisions in 2019 to ban arms exports to Ankara due to Turkey’s military operations in Syria.

Turkey has gone on a public diplomacy offensive to highlight Swedish support for Kurdish groups in northern Syria that it links to the PKK – designated as a terrorist organisation in the EU, US and Turkey – and is planning to stage a fringe meeting on the issue at the Nato summit.

“This is a matter of vital national interest, and we are prepared to prevent their membership for as long as a year if necessary,” said Akif Çağatay Kılıç, an MP for the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP) and chair of the Turkish parliament’s foreign affairs committee. “Turkey is the second largest army in Nato and has been providing the drones that help Ukraine defend itself. We deserve greater respect.”

He said Turkey respected its own duties and responsibilities to the alliance. “What are [Sweden and Finland] going to do? They have been harbouring terrorist organisations that kill my people, disrespect my borders, pose an existential threat to my country. The only thing we demand is that there are no distinctions. A terrorist organisation is a terrorist organisation.”

He denied the crisis was an attempt to fan nationalist flames before difficult elections, saying the non-Kurdish opposition parties were supportive of the stance of the president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He also said there was no attempt to barter with the US over arms deals.

During a visit to Sweden on Tuesday, Finland’s prime minister, Sanna Marin, warned: “If we don’t solve these issues before [the] Madrid [summit], there is a risk that the situation will freeze.

“We don’t know for how long but it might freeze for a while.”

Jens Stoltenberg, the Nato secretary general, has praised Swedish efforts to address Turkey’s concerns, but seems to have recognised that plans for a fast-track membership may now be disappearing.

The Swedish prime minister, Magdalena Andersson, is due to attend the summit, which may end up being a show of division as much as it is concerned with long-term strategic thinking and enlargement. Privately, western officials admit that Germany, France and the US are not keen to have Ukraine dominate the summit, although it is hard to imagine Nato support for Kyiv not being the central issue.

On Friday Sweden tried to mollify Turkey by publishing a foreign policy paper that highlighted the need to fight terrorism, and opened a path for Sweden to resume arms export sales to Turkey. Sweden imposed restrictions on arms sales in 2019 after Turkey’s invasion of northern Syria. Britain has already lifted the sales ban.

The policy paper said Sweden would “contribute to all of Nato’s security including that of Turkey”. A tougher anti-terrorism law, due to come into force on 1 July, gives the Swedish intelligence services greater latitude to monitor communications of suspected terrorist sympathisers.

Although Turkish demands can vary, officials have said they want to see specific Kurdish activists deported to Turkey, as well as the sacking of the Swedish defence minister, Peter Hultqvist, over a 2011 meeting with the PKK, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation in Sweden since 1984.

Ankara would like the two countries to sever ties with the US-backed Syrian Kurdish autonomous administration, which Turkey says has a synonymous leadership to the PKK.

Andersson’s room for manoeuvre is limited, in that she is not going to transform Swedish extradition laws simply to satisfy the threats coming from the Turkish president, and last week she had to rely on the support of a Kurdish Swedish MP and former peshmerga fighter, Amineh Kakabaveh, to survive a narrow confidence vote. The MP says she received unspecified guarantees in return for her vote.

Sweden is home to 100,000 Kurdish refugees.

Turkish diplomats resent suggestions that it did not make its objections to Swedish membership earlier or that it is being hypocritical about the Kurdish issue due to its support for extremist groups elsewhere in the Middle East.

Finland has fewer problems with Turkey, but has said it is unlikely to press ahead with a membership request without Sweden.

Finnish media reported that the country received 10 Turkey-related extradition requests between 2019 and 2022. It granted two of those requests and is processing seven.

While Britain has strong diplomatic ties with Turkey, it has also given security assurances to the two Nordic countries during the potentially dangerous grey period between their application to join Nato and the moment when full membership gives them the alliance’s collective defence protection.

In an effort to find a resolution, the UK’s Europe minister, James Cleverly, is in Turkey this week to meet ministers. Angus Lapsley, the director for Euro-Atlantic security at the Foreign Office, said the UK was working night and day to try to resolve the dispute.

Stoltenberg has said the Madrid summit was never a deadline.

#### Turkey is demanding steps by Finland and Sweden before it supports accession

Tosu, 22 – Director of International Programs at the University of Nevada (6/23/2022, Mehmet, 2022"Unity, solidarity against common threats key for NATO, Türkiye tells US," No Publication; <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/unity-solidarity-against-common-threats-key-for-nato-turkiye-tells-us/2621180>, DOA: 6-23-2022) SMTX//BSA

There must be unity, harmony and solidarity among NATO allies against common security and terrorist threats, Türkiye’s Presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin said in a phone call with US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan on Thursday.

Along with bilateral political and economic ties, the officials held discussions on Türkiye’s role in NATO and contributions to the alliance, the upcoming NATO Madrid summit, Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids, grain shipments through the Black Sea and other regional issues, according to a statement from the Turkish presidential spokesperson.

They exchanged views on issues on the agenda for next week’s NATO summit, including its new Strategic Concept, the Ukraine war, the fight against terrorism, the global food crisis and other security issues, the statement said.

Kalin emphasized that NATO allies must have a unified stance against common security and terrorist threats, reiterating that Sweden and Finland must fulfill Türkiye’s demands and expectations in the fight against terrorism.

Since Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO last month, Türkiye, a longstanding member of the alliance, has repeatedly voiced objections over the countries’ tolerance, and even support, for terrorist groups, particularly the PKK terrorist organization.

Kalin stressed that no progress could be made on the matter until Sweden and Finland take concrete steps.

He underlined that it was unacceptable that PKK/PYD/YPG supporters are disseminating propaganda in Stockholm and through the media while Ankara remains engaged in talks with the two Nordic countries.

He also conveyed that Türkiye is continuing negotiations with Ukraine and Russia on creating a safe corridor for grain shipments through the Black Sea.

Achieving results from this negotiation process, which includes the UN, is of strategic importance for global food security, he added.

#### Turkey has several concerns about Sweden and Finland that could derail or at least delay accession

**Ünlühisarcıklı, 22 -- manager of the Resource Development Department of the Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey** [5-19-2022, Özgür, “Erdoğan Will Not Walk Away Empty-Handed,” <https://www.gmfus.org/news/finland-and-sweden-apply-join-nato-whats-next>, accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

Sweden and Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership is welcome with enthusiasm across the Atlantic, but Turkey may spoil the party.

In an unexpected move, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced that he does not favor the two countries’ membership to NATO on the grounds that they are havens for terrorist organizations targeting Turkey, specifically the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its offshoots. Both Sweden and Finland reject this claim but remain open to discussions with Turkey on the subject.

It would be a mistake to dismiss Erdoğan’s stance as being motivated by domestic political considerations alone or to expect him to walk back empty-handed. Turkey has real concerns and will likely delay the upcoming NATO enlargement unless those concerns are addressed by Sweden and Finland.

Erdoğan is playing a two-level game here. At the international level, he aims to further weaken the PKK. In Turkey’s view, separatist terrorism is the single most important security threat and whether others agree is not relevant for its calculus. Degrading the PKK has been, and remains, a priority for every government in Turkey since the 1980s.

At the domestic level, he aims to portray himself as a strong leader who can protect Turkey’s interests internationally in a way that his predecessors could not. According to the [Turkish Perceptions of the European Union 2021 Survey](https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkish-perceptions-european-union) conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 67.9 percent of Turkish respondents believe that the European countries want to divide and disintegrate Turkey, just like they did to the Ottoman Empire in the past. Moreover, 70.1 percent believe that the European countries have helped strengthen separationist organizations such as the PKK in Turkey. As such, Erdoğan’s criticism toward Sweden and Finland will easily resonate with the Turkish people.

It would also be a mistake for Ankara to underestimate the magnitude of the decision to delay a historical NATO enlargement and the negative reaction it would face from each and every NATO ally at a time when Turkey is trying to bridge the gap between itself and its Western allies.

Turkish, Swedish, and Finnish diplomats, with support from other allies, can and should find common ground to address the concerns regarding the stance of Sweden and Finland toward the PKK and ensure that NATO enlargement can proceed without delay. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO is so important, for Turkey as well, that this problem will likely be resolved through dialogue and empathy. But it will not go away on its own.

#### Turkey blocks Finland and Sweden from joining NATO

Coşkun, 22 – senior fellow at CEIP and former director general for int-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 24, 22; Alper Coşkun; “Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorne their relationship”; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-and-nato-are-stronger-with-each-other-they-must-de-thorn-their-relationship/AI)

As NATO prepares for its summit in Madrid next week, Turkey is in the headlines for holding up Finland and Sweden’s bids to join the Alliance—irking not only the two candidate countries, but also their would-be NATO allies.

Ankara wants Helsinki and Stockholm to stop harboring and supporting individuals affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it considers to be a terrorist organization (and is recognized as such by both the United States and the European Union). It also demands an end to the arms embargoes imposed by these countries after Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria in 2019. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made it clear that nothing short of concrete steps will be enough to reverse Turkey’s stance.

Turkey’s concerns are serious and, as stated by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, they are “legitimate.” Yet Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the belated manner in which Ankara has publicly raised its concerns have muddled that important reality, tainting Turkey and its role in the Alliance.

#### Turkey will still block Sweden and Finland --- disagreement over PKK issue

Alaaldin, 22 – Nonresident Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (Ranj, 2022"Turkey’s threat to derail Swedish and Finnish NATO accession reraises the Kurdish question," Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/03/turkeys-threat-to-derail-swedish-and-finnish-nato-accession-reraises-the-kurdish-question/;DOA: 6-21-2022) SMTX//BSA

Turkey’s opposition to Sweden and Finland joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the wake of Russia’s war on Ukraine has elevated the Kurdish question on the international stage. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is attempting to capitalize on the urgency of fortifying Western deterrence by increasing the pressure on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The insurgent group has fought the Turkish state for five decades to secure greater rights for Turkey’s Kurds but enjoyed a rapid ascension with the onset of the Syrian civil war and Washington’s 2014 decision to partner with its sister organization to defeat the Islamic State group (IS).

The PKK has constituted a major component of Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the United States for decades, and Erdoğan has initiated several military campaigns into Syria’s northeast to suppress the autonomous enclave the PKK’s sister organization, the Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG), formed in the midst of the civil war. While Turkey may be using the Nordic NATO accession talks to receive Western backing for another campaign, it has a long record of carrying out cross-border incursions against the PKK and Erdoğan may also be trying to secure other concessions, including the lifting of embargoes on Turkey’s defense industry.

But Ankara’s opposition to Swedish and Finnish accession, based on their refusal to extradite PKK members, as well as followers of the Islamic cleric Fethullah Gülen (whom Ankara accuses of instigating a 2016 coup attempt), highlights that the Kurdish question cannot be decoupled from Western security interests. The tectonic shifts that have taken place in the global security order since Russia invaded Ukraine means that the second-order effects of the war against IS and the proximity of the Kurdish question to U.S. and European security interests requires a reprioritization of the issue in the West.

Turkey’s conflict with the PKK has long complicated Turkey’s relations with the U.S. and its European allies. Relations have been in flux and either enhanced or upended by shifting fault lines in the Middle East since the 2011 Arab uprisings and the emergence of IS. Although the 2013 peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK raised hopes of a lasting settlement, the fragile truce was upended in 2015 by the YPG’s ascension in Syria, its refusal to prioritize the fall of the Assad regime, and deep-seated animosities. The result was a renewal of a domestic conflict that has taken on multiple transnational dimensions and produced untold humanitarian crises.

Ankara has for decades questioned Europe’s commitment to addressing its security concerns. In the 1990s, Greece and Italy provided refuge to the PKK’s imprisoned founder and leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and the PKK established an expansive infrastructure, including in Sweden, that allows it to mobilize supporters and resources in Europe and in Turkey. European leaders had hoped to leverage Turkey’s EU accession process to improve Turkey’s human rights records but talks stagnated more than a decade ago and both sides have effectively given up on it.

Similarly, in addition to supporting the YPG, the U.S. has provoked Erdoğan’s ire by refusing to extradite the Pennsylvania-based Gülen, while Washington also imposed tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium after an agreement to release pastor Andrew Brunson fell through in 2018. Ankara did U.S.-Turkey relations no favours by purchasing Russian air defense systems, after which Washington imposed sanctions on Turkey.

Turkey’s relations with the West will continue to be crisis-driven amid a range of ongoing tensions, including over the conflict in Libya, the eastern Mediterranean crisis, tensions with the EU over the future of 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, and NATO expansion in response to Russia’s aggression. Putting Turkish responsibility for the current state of affairs to one side, the trans-Atlantic alliance is guilty of failing to establish forward-looking approaches to tumult in Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighborhood, opting instead for incoherent and reactive engagement that has put issues like the PKK conflict and broader Kurdish political questions on the back burner.

The failure to mitigate the second-order effects of policies designed to address security threats like IS has allowed Ankara to exploit the West’s failure to balance the imperative of securing the defeat of the jihadis with the need to manage the security interests of regional actors like Turkey. This has had serious strategic implications, as evidenced by the current dispute over NATO membership and the pressure NATO has faced as a result of the ebb in relations and disputes over the YPG’s dominance in Syria.

### U.S.-Turkey Relations Low

#### U.S.-Turkey relations are low now --- erodes consensus building

#### Coşkun, 22 – senior fellow at CEIP and former director general for int-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 24, 22; Alper Coşkun; “Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorne their relationship”; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-and-nato-are-stronger-with-each-other-they-must-de-thorn-their-relationship/, AI)

Restoring the balance

But serious thorns remain in Turkey’s relations with certain allies, and the estrangement risks undermining NATO’s resilience at a critical juncture.

For one, Turkey is deeply irritated that the United States and others are partnering with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the PKK, in the fight against the Islamic State. It is also frustrated at the imposition of arms embargoes—or covert restrictions on arms sales—by its allies over issues like Ankara’s purchase of Russian-made S-400 air-defense systems, its Syria policy, and its support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 war against Armenia. These differences have led to a mutual erosion of trust between Turkey and its allies, sometimes making consensus-building on critical matters difficult.

The Syria issue has, over time, become the most harmful one, pushing Turkey to the extreme on a matter it considers to be of existential nature: fighting terrorism. The first public manifestation of this deepening discord came before NATO leaders met in London in 2019—where Turkey held out until the last minute before begrudgingly endorsing Poland’s and the Baltic states’ defense plans. Ankara was reacting to a hold that had previously been placed on its own defense plans at the behest of the United States, rooted in disagreement about how to refer to the YPG.

### Congress Will Delay NATO Expansion

#### Senate will delay approval for expansion --- could take several months

Auerswald 22 – Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College [David Auerswald, May 17, 2022, “How the US Senate could slow down Sweden and Finland’s NATO future” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-senate-could-slow-down-sweden-and-finlands-nato-future/ Acc 6/21/22 ER]

If history is any guide, the Senate will overwhelmingly support adding Finland and Sweden to NATO (certainly by more than the two-thirds required by the Constitution). That was the case in 1998, when senators supported membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland by an 80-19 vote; in 2003, when senators unanimously welcomed Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia by a 96-0 vote; in 2008, when senators admitted Albania and Croatia by voice vote; and in 2017 and 2019, when it approved Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, respectively, to join the Alliance with only two dissenting votes each time.

The more interesting question is how long it will take the Senate to provide its advice and consent—and here the record does not bode well. The amended treaty is likely to be signed in the next few weeks, perhaps even before the NATO Summit at the end of June. That means the Senate, which is typically in recess during August, would need to hold hearings and vote in June and July, September and October, or wait until a lame duck session after the midterm elections. The fastest enlargement process, in 2003, took a month and a half from the NATO signing ceremony to final Senate passage. Other rounds took much longer: The 1998 round took more than four months, while the 2017 and 2019 enlargements took more than ten and eight months, respectively. The war in Ukraine could certainly speed up the process, but do not be surprised if the Senate process drags into the fall.

Another question is whether senators will condition their votes on changes in administration policy. In 1997, for example, Republican Sen. Jesse Helms withheld support for the Chemical Weapons Convention until the Clinton administration agreed to abolish the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the US Information Agency.

Senators can also use more subtle means to change policy. In providing treaty advice and consent, senators pass what is called a ratification document that affirms that Washington will abide by the treaty’s terms. Senators can add all sorts of reservations, understandings, and conditions to that document. For example, senators have specified that arms-control treaties do not limit US missile-defense capabilities.

Nothing in the Constitution or US law requires that these reservations, understandings, or conditions be limited to the treaty itself. That means senators can add clauses requiring executive-branch reports to Congress on unrelated foreign-policy issues, prohibitions on certain kinds of executive-branch behavior, or administration acceptance of a senator’s foreign-policy initiative. For instance, senators included provisions on Nazi war crimes and unrelated prisoner-of-war issues in the 1998 NATO enlargement document. And a document addressing the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty specified the allowable parameters of future conventional arms control and human-rights agreements with the Soviet Union.

The record demonstrates that the chamber is more likely to add (perhaps unrelated) conditions to treaties dealing with important security issues such as NATO membership when the United States lacks a foreign-policy consensus, or when it is facing few international threats. Given the war in Ukraine, expanding NATO would seem to qualify as an important issue and one on which there is near-consensus on the Russian threat and NATO’s role in deterring it. This suggests that we will see conditions added to the NATO enlargement ratification document, but not the dozens that have been added to other security treaties. The fewer the conditions, the faster will be the Senate debate.

Still, ultra-partisan senators tend to insert non-germane conditions and significant reporting requirements on any number of issues into treaty ratification documents—something we can expect from today’s polarized Senate. That slows the process.

The Senate debate over NATO’s enlargement is likely to yield a positive result. But the question is how long that debate will take and what conditions senators may levy on the administration in exchange for their votes.

### AT: Turkey Autonomous Weapons Link

#### Turkey supports human control

Wareham, 20 --- advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch (August 10, 2020, Mary, “Stopping Killer Robots; Country Positions on Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons and Retaining Human Control,” <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and>, JMP)

Turkey

In November 2013, Turkey supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[254] In April 2016, Turkey said that “such weapon systems do not exist and we are working on an issue which is still hypothetical,” therefore, “we hesitate on the accuracy of a general prohibition preemptively.”[255] It also affirmed the “need for human control and accountability” of weapons systems.[256] Turkey is developing, producing, and using various weapons systems with autonomous functions. Turkey participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019.

#### Turkey denied that drones operated autonomously to strike targets

Gurcan, 21 --- served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008 (June 8, 2021, Metin Gurcan, “Turkish drone sets off international buzz over 'killer robots'; The appearance of Turkish artificial intelligence-controlled drones in Libyan skies has rekindled questions on how lethal autonomous weapons will affect regional geopolitics and whether they should be banned,” <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/turkish-drone-sets-international-buzz-over-killer-robots>, JMP)

Turkish military sources familiar with the matter confirmed that Kargu-2s had been used in Libya on multiple occasions, but denied that the drones — which have both autonomous and manual operation modes — were allowed to use artificial intelligence to select and hit targets. The drones operated autonomously only to reach target areas, after which operators on the ground made the decisions to strike, the sources told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity.

### NATO Expansion => Nuclear War with Russia

#### NATO expansion risks Russian nuclear aggression --- wants to secure borderwith Finland

Caldwell and Vought, 22 – President of the Center for Renewing America and VP of Foreign Policy at Stand Together [Dan and Russ; 6/13/22; Fox News; “Finland and Sweden joining NATO won’t make U.S. safer”; <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/finland-sweden-joining-nato-us-safer>; accessed 6/18/22; DWC]

Additionally, neither country currently meets the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal that was agreed to by NATO members. Just as in other parts of Europe, a security guarantee provided by the United States could encourage free-riding and disincentivize increased investment in defense capabilities in favor of more spending on politically popular social programs.

But most dangerously, adding Finland and Sweden to NATO will increase the risk of a nuclear confrontation with Russia. As a result of its failures in Ukraine, the threat posed by Russia’s conventional forces has been reduced. But Russia still possesses a large nuclear arsenal that, according to the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, they will likely rely on more to secure their borders — including the nearly 850-mile one they share with Finland. NATO membership for Finland and Sweden includes extending the umbrella of America’s nuclear deterrent to both nations, thus elevating the risk that any border dispute could escalate into a nuclear exchange.

Instead of enabling NATO accession for Finland and Sweden, the United States should take actions to encourage the strengthening and development of non-NATO security architectures in Europe like the Nordic Defence Cooperation, which Finland and Sweden are already a part of. The failures of Russia’s military in Ukraine have demonstrated that collectively Europe is more than capable of securing itself without significant U.S. support, as long they properly prioritize defense investments.

#### Sweden and Finland joining NATO risks nuclear conflict with Russia AND forces resource tradeoffs

Caldwell and Vought, 22 – President of the Center for Renewing America and VP of Foreign Policy at Stand Together [Dan and Russ; 6/13/22; Fox News; “Finland and Sweden joining NATO won’t make U.S. safer”; <https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/finland-sweden-joining-nato-us-safer>; accessed 6/18/22; DWC]

It is not in the national interest of the United States, through NATO, to commit to defend two wealthy European welfare states whose neutrality has kept them safe and prosperous for more than 70 years. While some insist Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changes everything, the fact remains that new security guarantees will force trade-offs, consume more resources, and increase the likelihood of a confrontation with a nuclear-armed adversary.

Despite rhetoric from NATO evangelists that can often give the contrary impression, adding Finland and Sweden to NATO will lead to increased costs for the U.S.

Admitting both nations to NATO could generate up-front expenses of over $8 billion along with $1.5 billion in additional annual costs. And while U.S. military leaders are currently claiming that their membership in NATO won’t lead to a permanent stationing of troops in either nation, they do admit that more U.S. troops will likely rotate to both Finland and Sweden on a more frequent basis. This will place further strain on a U.S. military that is already struggling to sustain deployments in support of dozens of ongoing operations including active combat missions in Iraq, Syria, and Somalia.

One frequently cited justification for admitting Finland and Sweden to NATO is that they have capable militaries that would enhance NATO. However, the reality is that both countries have relatively small professional militaries of around 20,000 troops each that rely on large reserve forces in a time of war and which lack long-range force projection capabilities. Sweden is already requesting a larger U.S. naval presence in the Baltic Sea, calling into question the ability of their military to secure their own backyard.

Additionally, neither country currently meets the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal that was agreed to by NATO members. Just as in other parts of Europe, a security guarantee provided by the United States could encourage free-riding and disincentivize increased investment in defense capabilities in favor of more spending on politically popular social programs.

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At a time of record inflation and a $30.5 trillion national debt, it is hard to justify spending more American tax dollars and committing more American troops to defend two wealthy European social democracies.

This is particularly true when neither state enhances U.S. security and both have benefited from neutrality for decades. The lack of robust debate around this important topic and the smearing of those who dare to question the benefits of NATO expansion only raises the risk that the United States will become overextended, or worse, potentially sleep-walk into a war with a nuclear-armed Russia.

After decades of foreign policy failures that have cost the United States dearly, America’s elected officials owe the American people better than more costly security commitments disconnected from our safety and economic prosperity.

#### Risks war with Russia – Finland is highly exposed to military threats

Ashford, 22 – senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security [5-30-2022, washington post, "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden," https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

Consider also the question of the defensibility of new NATO territory. Admitting Sweden could be strategically beneficial, allowing NATO forces to better control the Baltic Sea and to use Gotland Island, at an important chokepoint off the Baltic States, as a staging ground for any future conflict.

Finnish territory, in contrast, is a strategic nightmare. It would dramatically increase the alliance’s exposure to any future attacks by Moscow: the country shares an 800-mile border with Russia that, as a recent study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it, is “highly exposed to Russian military threats.”

There are grab bag of other reasons for caution, including the usual concerns about expanding the alliance to an ever-more unwieldy set of member states. It doesn’t take a genius to predict that 32 nations will be even harder to manage than 30. Before its Ukraine moment, NATO was struggling to maintain the peace between Greece and Turkey, few nations were meeting the 2% spending goal, and President Emmanuel Macron of France had drawn headlines for suggesting the alliance was experiencing “brain death.”

Even in the face of Russia’s aggression, support for adding the two members isn’t unanimous. Turkey’s vehement opposition to Finland and Sweden may be an attempt to wring political concessions from the alliance, but also owes a lot to these countries’ support for Kurdish causes.

Alliance leaders should also consider the risk of Russian overreaction. Moscow has started three wars over potential NATO expansion — invading Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 before the current war. While Moscow is clearly not able to stage another major military campaign right now, one cannot rule out President Vladimir Putin doing something irrational in response to a NATO expansion that takes the alliance within 200 miles of his birthplace of St. Petersburg.

At the same time, it’s not clear that Finland and Sweden are at increased risk unless they are allowed NATO membership. They have long relied on their neutral status and domestic defense capacity to prevent crises. Refusing to admit them to NATO is not hanging them out to dry, but simply retaining a workable status quo.

The symbolic value of admitting two new member states as the price for Russia’s brutality in Ukraine may carry the day in Brussels. But before proceeding further with the accession process — which offers leaders and legislatures in each member state a chance to weigh in — policy makers should consider the whole strategic picture, and whether admission strengthens the alliance or not.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty makes clear that existing members may invite new states to join if they “contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.” By that standard, the strategic case for admitting Sweden and Finland to NATO is not a slam-dunk.

### NATO Expansion Undermines Asian Pivot

#### Expansions will complicate the Asian pivot --- saddles U.S. with more defense obligations

Ashford, 22 – senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security [5-30-2022, washington post, "NATO Should Think Twice Before Accepting Finland and Sweden," https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/nato-should-think-twice-before-accepting-finland-and-sweden/2022/05/30/b412ee2a-dff7-11ec-ae64-6b23e5155b62\_story.html accessed on 6-18-2022, LKK]

One of the ironies of Russia’s war against Ukraine — ostensibly fought to prevent that nation from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — has been its impact on two of Europe’s traditionally neutral states, Finland and Sweden. On May 18, just 84 days after the invasion, Swedish and Finnish ambassadors handed over applications to join NATO in a public ceremony at the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels.

“This is a historic moment which we must seize,” said Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. “You are our closest partners, and your membership in NATO will increase our shared security.” It seems likely that their applications will be swiftly approved, and NATO will soon grow to a 32 member states.

Yet in the rush to give Putin a black eye by embracing Finland and Sweden, US and NATO leaders may be failing to consider the potential costs of inducting two more countries into what, after all, is intended to be a collective defense organization.

There are only two clear-cut benefits to bringing in the two Nordic nations. The first is symbolic: providing a clear demonstration of European and democratic solidarity against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. The second is technical: Admitting Finland and Sweden would better align the membership of NATO with that of the EU, avoiding the unlikely but problematic scenario in which an EU member state is subject to aggression but is not covered by NATO’s Article 5 mutual-defense pact.

In every other respect, however, the question of Finnish and Swedish membership is more complicated and worrisome. Consider overall European defense capacity.

Yes, Finland and Sweden have highly advanced economies. They could be net contributors to NATO’s technological capabilities through national champions like Ericsson AB and Nokia Oyj. They are also more capable militarily than some other European states — particularly Finland, which has maintained conscription into the post-Cold War period and has a relatively wide range of military competencies, including the continent’s largest artillery force.

Yet from the point of view of existing NATO members — and particularly the US — it’s still not necessarily a net win. Finland and Sweden have long focused their militaries on defending their own territories, raising doubts about their value in contributing to a common defense, which is at the heart of NATO’s charter.

And while both nations have pledged to increase their military spending and ability to bolster Europe’s broader defenses, it is also possible that they would not. Instead, they may free-ride on America’s military strength — and its nuclear umbrella — as so many European states have done for years. According to the International Monetary Fund, neither country comes close to meeting the NATO goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense.

History suggests the most likely outcome is two more states adding to America’s defense burden at a time when Washington should be pivoting to Asia.

### NATO Expansion Undermines European Cooperative Defense

#### European states are relying on US support for defense – expanding the alliance will only make this worse

**Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest** [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]

America’s strategic interest in the European balance is not under any significant threat from a potential hegemonic challenge that seeks to dominate the entirety of European landmass under one army and one flag.26 During the early years of the Republic, American grand strategy in Europe was one of cautious detachment and non-interference in the imperial affairs of the European great powers. After the fall of the traditional historic balancer of Europe, the British empire, and facing two world wars and hegemonic threats to security from Imperial, and subsequently Nazi Germany, American strategy evolved to one that mirrored the historic British grand-strategy of “offshore balancing,” that ensured that America would intervene whenever there was a hegemonic threat in the European horizon. To that end, the interests of the United States, much like the British empire before her, is to ensure a militarily disunited Europe, and maintain open trade and sea routes.

The difference in this instance was that the British aspired to attain this objective through a delicate “balance of power” within the continent with minimal interference to tilt the balance as and when required, while cautiously avoiding continuous engagement in the domestic affairs of European countries, or commitments about spreading rights and values. While the American interest in ensuring no hegemonic threat in the European continent remained intact, the American grand-strategy, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, deviated from an earlier realist one. It in turn sought to institutionalise peace across the continent, while ensuring fundamental human rights in every corner – or in the words of John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen, ensure primacy and spread “liberal hegemony.”

Unfortunately, that resulted in the atrophy of Europe’s traditional security providers–the western powers–and at the same time, encouraged free riding on American treasure and muscle. The institutionalisation of peace, first through an expansion of NATO and then through support of the EU, also resulted in buckpassing wherein Western European great powers are perfectly content to wave the EU flag but simultaneously rely on the US tax-funded security subsidies. The Eastern European powers are permanently activist with lofty rhetoric about values and human rights, meanwhile leaving the security burden in large part to be covered by the US. Both Western European states and the Eastern European states act rationally based on their narrow security interests, and that is perfectly understandable. The narrow American interest is the only one ignored in this context.

Several American presidents and policymakers, from Dwight Eisenhower to John Kennedy to Donald Trump, have attempted to grapple with European free-riding and “buckpassing.”27 Various attempts were made either through implicit warnings (such as Bob Gates’ final speech to NATO in 2011) or explicit threats (under the Trump Administration) to encourage or compel Western European powers to shoulder more security burden and provide security umbrella to theatres in Eastern Europe.28

Further enlargement of NATO in the current scenario risks doubling down on American security commitments. That, coupled with unlimited financial aid for Ukraine, or further permanent troop additions in theatres of Eastern Europe, reverses all the recent gains that were made to require Europe to fund more of its own security requirements. In the face of renewed Russian aggression, a one-time US infusion of resources and weaponry to Ukraine may have been understandable, as were enhanced bilateral alignments with Finland and Sweden. However, those efforts should have been accompanied by corresponding requirements that rich European states shoulder the long-term localized security architecture and endure the majority of the future cost. This is especially so given that a localized war in the periphery of their continent is of far more strategic significance to Europeans, than it is to the United States. As the accompanying chart demonstrates, it is not justifiable to American taxpayers that Europe is once again subsidized by the US.

Instead, the Biden administration is absolutely determined to double down on the failures of the post-Cold-war strategy in supporting the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The shift of NATO frontiers further to the east and north, and adding more buffer states, would only disincentivize rich Western European nations from providing security in their own backyard. With the rising threat of a near-peer rival in China, severe economic downturn, and looming strategic trade-offs, committing more to NATO is irresponsible and imprudent.

### NATO Expansion Unnecessary – Sweden & Finland Already Capable

#### Sweden and Finland are already capable of defeating Russia without NATO or other outside support

**Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest** [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]

Within ten weeks, Finland’s eight decades-long equidistance, and Sweden’s two centuries long neutrality were jettisoned, in favor of unprecedented levels of military bloc formations and foreign military power support pledges, most notably from fellow Scandinavian nations: Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and a post-Brexit Britain.5 Having rejected their historic neutrality, Finland and Sweden have now made formal applications to NATO membership. However, the new desire for NATO membership should not be construed as revealing a lack of current defenses or alertness towards the danger posed by Russia.

The existing force postures of Finland and Sweden are uniquely designed to deter Russia unilaterally. The Finnish force of 280,000 is augmented by around 900,000 reservists who are trained for wartime.6 Finland never abolished conscription, so the Finnish population is functionally ready for wartime service at a moment’s notice. Finnish “Comprehensive Security” stresses training to balance Russian hybrid warfare, with intelligence exchange, interoperability, and training with Western forces.7 Finnish strategy of insurgency as a deterrence tactic to blunt massive occupation forces is designed with Russia in mind. Finnish defence spending is roughly 2% of GDP and certain to increase.8 Finland is thus well positioned to blunt and deter any Russian invasion on its own and is almost certain to have major western support in arms and resources in case of a war, even without NATO membership, as Ukraine has enjoyed.

Sweden saw major cuts in defense spending and manpower in the immediate post-Cold War era similar to other major powers, but brought back conscription in 2017, after some deliberation following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.9 Sweden boasted of mass conscription during the Cold War and had one of the largest trained militaries, which were downsized as the Soviet threat receded. Sweden is also fortunate to have the Baltic states and Finland as buffer states from a direct Russian land invasion. In recent days however, Sweden increased its draft by 4,000 soldiers per year and reinstated a garrison on a dormant but strategic island base in Visby, Gotland. Overall, both Sweden and Finland have been and arguably are capable of deterring a Russian push for conquest.10

The Case Against NATO Expansion:

In a recent open survey of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy experts, a question was posed about whether Finnish and Swedish memberships are useful for NATO. The answers ranged from “no doubt,” to “certainly,” and “definitely,” to “straight yes” and “enormously so,” before reaching the broad consensus that the accession of Finland and Sweden would “strengthen the alliance’s defenses and greatly increase security in the Baltic region.” There was not a single voice of dissent.11 While this might be exemplary of a typical selection bias in such quarters, and design flaw in open question surveys, the Atlanticist foreign policy community has been overwhelmingly supportive of adding further commitments and members in the alliance. This is symptomatic of the long generational and ideological shift in foreign policy thinking in Washington, from serious scholarly opposition to NATO’s first round of expansion during the Clinton administration, to an overwhelming support in recent days.12

Support for Finnish and Swedish membership can be categorized into three broad arguments.13 First, that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unleashed an intense “security dilemma” and the smaller states who now feel threatened should be immediately added as protectorates and the western (primarily American) nuclear umbrella extended. Second, Sweden and Finland are already de facto part of the Western alliance, through either regional cooperative frameworks such as the Nordic Defense Cooperation and Joint Expeditionary Force, or collaborations within the EU framework and partnerships with NATO. Third, Sweden and Finland already have strong militaries and countries with democratic foundations, and both bring unique deterrence capabilities and strengthen NATO’s northern flank which will make NATO stronger. These arguments are contradictory, often paradoxical, and strategically flawed.

The first line of argument – that the Russian threat has morphed to now require NATO protection – is predicated on Sweden and Finland’s threat perceptions. While Russia’s revanchism in Ukraine is clear, the fundamental security dynamic has not changed. At the time of this brief, Russia is suffering from enormous and potentially unbridgeable battlefield setbacks. The Russian dash to Kiev failed, and Moscow is seemingly unable to compensate battlefield attrition, including an overwhelming number of officer class attrition, unthinkable for any other top-tier military and unseen in any other recent conflicts. The Russian battlegroups are not in full operational strength. Russia is unable to fill the gaps created by casualties, troop morale is low, and around a fifth of Russian invasion force hardware have been destroyed. In short, Russia is in no position to continue a “war of conquest,” much less a war of occupation or attrition, without declaring a “total war” that requires vast levels of domestic conscription, which is of course, politically unpopular and potentially volatile for Vladimir Putin. While there have been some indications of a willingness to broaden the Russian military base, it is certainly not in the interests of Western policymakers to incentivize such a development. The much-vaunted Russian military reforms quite clearly did not materialize. The Russian-backed air war over Syria was dependent on Syrian regime troops as cannon fodder, and is materially different and far less costly than a multi-spectrum state-vs-state war of conquest in Ukraine. Russia isn’t capable of the latter.

Despite her historic aspirations, Russia enormously overestimated her own power in Ukraine. Instead, the Russian experience in Ukraine, while a humanitarian catastrophe, has demonstrated long term hardware, personnel, intelligence and training deficiencies, as well as structural issues including endemic corruption, old school planning, authoritarian decision-making echochamber, and low troop morale.14 Russia also lacks the economic base and material power and is increasingly reeling under sanctions.15 Put simply, Russia is not going to be the hegemonic spectre looming over Europe anytime in the near future. What logically entails, is that the Ukraine invasion is not the first domino to fall across Europe, meriting a preoccupation with Russian encroachment, but rather, Russia is a manageable threat that European states can increasingly balance on their own collectively. Europeans are perfectly capable without further investment of American treasure or promise of American blood, and a primacist grand-strategy requiring American forward presence.16 The only reason Europe is taking a backseat is because they are reliant on the unending generosity of Americans.17 In addition, a much-weakened Russia can also be extremely volatile, prone to miscalculation and paranoia, which might be exacerbated by the “chain-ganging” of Western great powers by their activist junior allies–a very common and observable dynamic especially seen under the conditions of multipolarity wherein smaller protectorates and hectoring and sanctimonious allies attempt to drag much larger benefactors to a great power war. It is a trap the US must judiciously avoid at all cost. Otherwise the result could well be greater misunderstanding and an even greater risk of accidental conflict along a much longer border with NATO. This paradoxical dynamic isn’t new in international relations, the First World War being the most ruinous example.18

The only development that might reverse an emerging natural equilibrium, is a Ukrainian counterattack on Crimea or somewhere deep inside Russian territory, or a major expansion of an alliance which justifies Russia’s historic and entrenched paranoia, such as a renewed push for further NATO enlargement. A Ukrainian counterattack might result in Russia pulling the nuclear card. It might also solicit a “rally around the flag” effect for this otherwise unpopular and deteriorating war. Barring those, Russian aspiration to be a major revanchist great power in the European balance is practically over, and Russia’s current near total international isolation in 2022 is comparable to her isolation in 1856 or 1921. Meanwhile Ukraine has managed with conscription and compulsory male draft to gather an overwhelming number of men willing to defend their country, and is well supplied with practically unlimited foreign resources and weaponry, an example to other states in the region.

In that light, the idea that Finland and Sweden, with significant military capabilities of their own, need to be in an alliance for protection against Russian revanchism at a time when Russia’s status as a revanchist great power is itself in question, is fallacious, especially with Russia facing a quagmire in Ukraine. The possibility of a Russian invasion and conquest of Finland or Sweden is nearly non-existent.19

Likewise, it is also paradoxical to argue that Finland and Sweden need protection, while simultaneously contending that they are uniquely powerful militaries with deterrence capabilities needed for strengthening NATO’s northern frontier.20 The capabilities that Sweden and Finland has, including a top-tier airforce, are formidable, but not novel to NATO. Addition of another approximately two hundred jets will not significantly alter the combined air power of NATO, which is already superior to Russia. Sweden and Finland will not bring any new capabilities that would drastically alter the balance of power in the region, and other than intelligence sharing, would not add any material advantage to an already overwhelmingly superior NATO. Given that Swedish and Finnish conscription forces and reservists only come into play during a war, and the chance of a war with Russia is negligible, they are also not adding any significant manpower to NATO. NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” from Poland and the Baltic states, can already cover and protect the allies in the region, as well as project power in the Arctic without the need for any new bases in Sweden or Finland. According to NATO’s website, the force projection includes eight multinational “battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States respectively, [which] are robust and combat-ready forces,” and a “multinational brigade, under Multinational Division Southeast in Romania” for improved situational awareness and enhanced readiness.21 The Baltics and the Arctic are challenging frontiers to defend, and some of the older arguments against NATO enlargement touched upon it. Russia is considered to have an escalation dominance in the region, due to sheer manpower it can muster in a full spectrum war. However, recent Russian experience in Ukraine, and the negligible chance of a full spectrum war should ease some of the concerns about mindless Russian imperial revanchism. According to a Rand Corp analysis, even though the Baltics are hard to defend in case of an actual war, deterring Russia is relatively easy with a few divisions of forward positioned troops, with the implied threat that any casualty would trigger a NATO – Russia war. Newer bases in Finland and Sweden are unnecessary in that regard for any extended deterrence in the region.22

### NATO Expansion Unnecessary – Russia Weak

#### Russia is so weak that expanding NATO is unnecessary

**Maitra 22 – National Security Fellow, at the Center for the National Interest** [SUMANTRA, MAY 23, 2022, Center for Renewing America, “NATO EXPANSION FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN: A DANGEROUS AND UNNECESSARY DISTRACTION FROM US INTERESTS” https://americarenewing.com/issues/nato-expansion-for-finland-and-sweden-a-dangerous-and-unnecessary-distraction-from-us-interests/ Acc 6/19/22 ER]

“NATO membership would strengthen Finland’s security. As a member of NATO, Finland would strengthen the entire defence alliance,” Finland’s President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Sanna Marin said in a joint statement citing the Russian threat of invasion. “Finland must apply for NATO membership without delay.”1The very same day, The Times of London reported (albeit, per Ukrainian military sources) that the Russians lost an entire battalion with over 50 vehicles, and “as many as 73 T-72 and T-80 tanks, BMP armoured fighting vehicles, armoured tractors, a tugboat and other equipment were destroyed,” and that around 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers were killed, while crossing a tactical bridge in Eastern Ukraine, arguably near Russian strongholds.2

Threat is a combination of intention, power, proximity and capability. For that reason, the lackluster performance of Russia in Ukraine, and corresponding heightened threat perception in Europe, is baffling to realists. After all, what is the hegemonic threat potential of a great power across a continent that cannot provide air cover to its massacred battalions over a pontoon bridge, much less total air supremacy over a theatre of war? It is a pertinent line of inquiry. Wounded by her own folly, Russia remains without any demonstrable hegemonic capabilities to conquer Ukraine and molest parts of Eastern Europe or the wider continent.3 Without the threat of Russia as a hegemon, the argument in favour of the US incurring further security commitments in Europe by expanding the NATO alliance to Finland and Sweden is weak.

### U.S. Won’t Send Troops to Finland

#### Expansion will require more forces in Finland that the U.S. won’t send

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One step for NATO to take is obvious: deploy forces, immediately. Unlike during past NATO membership expansions, time is not on the alliance’s side here. If it’s too late for pre-planning, then NATO must quickly move to reposition troops into the alliance’s new northeastern flank. If the NATO allies are not willing to commit new troops, this could be achieved by repositioning existing forces. Alternatively, perhaps this is the time for the EU itself, given that Finland and Sweden are both members, to fully commit to being a security provider. The EU could fill the gap in force deployments by encouraging its members to move forces to the Finnish-Russian border, potentially leveraging NATO’s command and control capabilities. Given that the contributions to the Enhanced Forward Presence are shared in a fairly equitable fashion among various NATO members, perhaps this approach can be duplicated in Finland.

However, under the current structure of NATO, the United States is the ultimate backstop for such deployments, and it will ultimately fall on Washington to fill in any gaps in forces for Finland. This is problematic. Though U.S. President Joe Biden and his administration strongly support Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO, it is unclear that the Biden team, or any future U.S. administration, is willing to base sizeable deployments of U.S. forces on Finnish territory.

To further complicate matters, forward deploying troops on Finnish territory would not be a short-term commitment. Even if the war in Ukraine grinds to a halt, Russia will probably retain or rebuild its ability to carry out quick incursions against its neighbors, which would then include a Finland within NATO. Defending Finland will require a long-term and concrete plan involving the deployment of substantial forces. Such a commitment would not come without costs, both in terms of budget expenses and the potential diversion of troops from other theaters.

Additionally, questions should be asked about how Finland and Sweden will contribute to the defense of NATO territory beyond their own borders. Their presence alters NATO’s map. Whether that alteration is a net positive or negative for the alliance depends on exactly how Sweden’s and Finland’s forces are used. While they have a track record of working alongside NATO members in operations outside NATO territory, will they, for example, assist with the Enhanced Forward Presence? How exactly will they balance Russian operations in the Arctic? These questions must be faced in the rush to add Finland and Sweden to NATO.

### AT: NATO Expansion Reduces U.S. Defense Obligations

#### Adding Sweden and Finland won’t reduce U.S. defense commitments – those exist regardless

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For any other military or intelligence needs, bilateral or EU frameworks are more than sufficient.23 Sweden and Finland’s telecom companies such as Nokia and Ericsson already can get privileged treatment and American defense contracts, and provide a bulwark against Chinese dominance in the domain; a formal alliance isn’t necessary or needed for that. The argument that adding more countries in the alliance will free up American troops is also flawed, as historically that has only led to further Eastern European reliance and demands as well as West European free-riding on the American military. It is simply ahistorical to contemplate that this particular dynamic would change with Finland and Sweden within NATO. Consider that Sweden is not even in NATO yet, and is already calling for more US naval presence in the Baltic sea.24 In fact, Russian force posture towards Finland and Sweden might change once they join NATO, with more potential Russian bases in the Arctic, adding to further increased demands of American military presence.25 The cost-benefit analysis suggests that the only material difference for NATO will be the cost of an additional nearly thousand-mile frontier, and further chances of miscalculation and feeding of Russian paranoia about encirclement, which the Russian ruling elite will use to further justify their worldview.